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In the last two decades, the notion of ‘best practice’ has become accepted into the
standard lexicon of policy-making. Transport policy has not been exempt from
this trend; ‘best practice’ approaches to the development, implementation and
evaluation of policy interventions are ubiquitous at all scales of governance,
appearing to enjoy both explicit and tacit support from a diverse array of political
actors. Recently, however, dissenting voices in the planning literature have
questioned the core tenets of the ‘best practice’ notion. Chiefly, these critiques
have tended to focus on the apparent naiveté of ‘best practice’ as it relates to the
attendant notion of ‘policy transfer’, highlighting the salience of institutional
heterogeneity as a limitation to spatial policy convergence. Yet, while such
analyses are extremely commendable, they have failed to address: (1) how the
notion of ‘best practice’ is understood, encountered and employed by policy
actors; (2) why the ‘best practice’ notion has proven so popular; and (3) the
broader implications of ‘best practice’ policy learning with regard to a future
transition to sustainable mobility. Grounded in critical realist ontology, this thesis
directly addresses these three concerns through a series of in-depth case studies
with policy actors involved in UK walking and cycling policy. Contrary to
received wisdom, it argues that the notion of ‘best practice’ is characterised by
significant conceptual ambiguity and diverse functionality, attributing this to the
inherent causal powers present in the notion itself and the antagonistic,
intractable policy context in which active travel is presently mired. Recognising
the limits to ‘best practice’ thinking, the thesis concludes with a plea for a
modest ‘rebalancing’ of contemporary policy learning approaches.- iii -
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Chapter 1
A portrait of ‘best practice’
In recent months I have consulted a number of books that offer guidance on the
process of writing a postgraduate thesis. Almost without exception, they have
cautioned against commencing any chapter with a map, graph or figure.
Doubtless, this is sound advice. However, I believe that Figure 1.1 so succinctly
encapsulates the central concern of this thesis that I feel its inclusion at the outset
is not only excusable, but genuinely valuable.
The graph is straightforward to interpret, and its conclusion profound. During the
last decade, approximately thirteen percent of all electronically-searchable
academic and quasi-academic materials containing the phrase ‘sustainable
transport’ returned by the search engine Google Scholar also include at least one
mention of the phrase ‘best practice’. Of course, the veracity of this claim ought
to be tempered by statistical caveats. This headline figure, for example, will
Figure 1.1 The ubiquity of ‘best practice’A portrait of ‘best practice’
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undoubtedly incorporate citations, paraphrases and other passing references, and
it would be naive to conclude that all of the sources in question were explicitly
concerned with ‘best practice’ per se.
1 Nevertheless, for all such qualification,
the sheer ubiquity of the ‘best practice’ notion in recent literature cannot help but
demonstrate the extent to which it has become accepted into the standard lexicon
of contemporary transport policy.
Yet, if one delves beneath such coarse, high-level statistics, it becomes the
nature of this acceptance―rather than its magnitude―which proves to be most 
fascinating. Significantly, the notion of ‘best practice’ appears to have gained
international recognition across an extraordinarily heterogeneous assemblage of
transport professionals. Consider, for example, the diverse provenance of the
publications returned by Google Scholar: we see peer-reviewed articles by
academic researchers advocating ‘best practice’ approaches to the design of
travel surveys (Ampt and Ortúzar, 2004); conference papers outlining ‘best
practice’ guidance for the design of pedestrian signals (Barlow et al., 2003); non-
governmental organisations publishing ‘best practice’ guidelines on cycling
policy and the reduction of transport-derived CO2emissions (CTC, 2002; C40
Cities, 2008); national governments sponsoring ‘best practice’ schemes for
achieving sustainable freight distribution (Welsh Assembly, 2008; Department
for Transport, 2010a) and even supranational bodies, such as the EC Directorate
General for Mobility and Transport, commissioning research on international
‘best practice’ in policy package design (OPTIC, 2009).
In parallel with this diverse patronage, the nature of the ‘best practice’
phenomenon in contemporary transport policy has also come to be characterised
by an astonishing dearth of conceptual clarity. It is an extremely rare event when
a reader of such publications encounters a considered and cogently-articulated
definition of ‘best practice’, either formulated by the author(s) themselves or
cited from a secondary source. Perhaps, given the structural ubiquity of the ‘best
practice’ discourse, this is understandable at the level of individual authorship.
Nevertheless, it is slightly disconcerting to learn that the central tenets of the
‘best practice’ notion―whatever they may transpire to be―appear to be tacitly 
1 Furthermore, legitimate questions may be poised as to the representativeness and accuracy of the database
underpinning Google Scholar, as some academics have duly noted (e.g. Jacsó, 2005).A portrait of ‘best practice’
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accepted as self-evident, somehow existing below the theoretical radar and thus
rendered immune from scholarly critique.
This introductory chapter is comprised of four sections. First, I set out the
aims and central justifications for this research. Second, I provide a brief history
of ‘best practice’, charting the manner in which the notion has been employed
and variously appropriated since its inception. Third, I review existing critiques
of ‘best practice’ in the broadly-defined planning literature. Finally, I outline the
specific objectives of the research.
1.1 Aim and rationale
The overarching aim of this thesis can be stated as follows:
I intend to critically assess the present ubiquity of ‘best practice’ usage in
the UK transport policy community, and evaluate the extent to which the
notion of ‘best practice’ represents a desirable organising principle for
policy learning processes.
In the following paragraphs, I shall outline the supporting rationale that
underpins this aim. Broadly, my intention here is to convey the significance and
urgency of this research in the context of the transport policy community’s
response to pressing socio-environmental concerns.
It is logical to start with a sobering overview of the socio-environmental
context within which this research is situated. In recent decades, the prevailing
mobility paradigm in the advanced capitalist economies―which, for land-based 
transport, we might reasonably characterise as ‘hydrocarbon-dependent
automobility’ (HDA)
2―has come to pose a significant challenge to the project of 
‘sustainable development’, a now-familiar tripartite concept that seeks to
harmonize the competing priorities of the economy, society and the environment
(Banister, 2005; Sperling and Gordon, 2009). In other words, while the growth of
hydrocarbon-fuelled transport systems clearly confers significant benefits to
2 ‘Hydrocarbon-dependent’ as its continuity is almost entirely contingent on the discovery, extraction,
refinement, freightage and combustion of petrochemicals; and ‘automobility’, following Urry (2004), as it
is largely predicated on quasi-autonomous travel practices afforded by the private automobile.A portrait of ‘best practice’
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certain individuals, firms and national economies, it simultaneously engenders
myriad adverse economic, social and environmental consequences; including, but
by no means limited to: vehicle emissions, social exclusion, congestion, obesity,
noise pollution and road traffic accidents (for an overview, see Banister, 2005).
Undertaking an exhaustive discussion of these externalities in turn would be
tangential to the specific aims and objectives of this thesis. Nevertheless, in order
to contextualise later debates as to the merits of ‘best practice’ approaches to
policy design, it is important to convey a sense of the magnitude and complexity
of the challenge facing transport professionals. In light of this, let us briefly
consider the particularly illustrative example of vehicle emissions. The
environmental and health implications of vehicle emissions have risen to the fore
in recent policy debates on sustainable transport (Gilbert and Perl, 2008). At the
local scale, gases such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen monoxide and carbon
monoxide, as well as suspended particle matter (SPM), are all harmful to humans
upon inhalation (Yelda et al., 2005). More pertinently, and over broader spatial
and temporal scales, concern over anthropogenic climate change, with regard to
escalating emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), has engendered a new sensitivity
toward the relationship between transportation and global environmental change
(IPCC, 2007).
The scale of the emissions challenge facing the transport sector in the
European Union can be starkly illustrated. Between 1990 and 2005, for example,
while net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from EU-27 nations decreased by
7.9%―from 5621 to 5177 Mt CO2e
3―GHG emissions from the EU-27 transport 
sector increased by 27% (European Environment Agency, 2008). Given the fact
that the EU-27 transport sector is responsible for 22% of net EU-27 GHG
emissions, it follows that had the sector matched the emissions reductions made
elsewhere in the EU-27 economy, net EU-27 greenhouse gas emissions from
1990-2005 would have decreased by 14% instead of the 7.9% actually realised
(ibid.). Road transport is responsible for the overwhelming majority of these
domestic transport emissions. In 2008, for example, road transport accounted for
90% of all transport-derived CO2 emissions in the United Kingdom (Department
for Transport, 2010b).
3 These data include Romania and Bulgaria, despite the fact that their official accession to the EU took place
on 01 January 2007. MtCO2e stands for Metric Tonne Carbon Dioxide Equivalent.A portrait of ‘best practice’
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How, then, has the transport policy community responded to the enormity of
the challenges posed by the seemingly-entrenched mobility paradigm of HDA?
The first observation to make here is that contemporary processes of policy
design, policy implementation and policy evaluation operate across extremely
fragmented organisational and institutional milieu (Ney, 2009; Docherty and
Shaw, 2009). As evidenced by the introductory remarks to this chapter, we see a
heterogeneous assemblage of governmental and non-governmental actors
performing a diverse array of activities variously related to the overarching
project of mobility governance. As a direct consequence of such a ‘networked
polity’ (Ansell, 2000), the ease with which one might be able to definitively
evaluate the policy ‘response’ to such challenges is significantly diminished.
Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the emergence of a particular normative logic
of transport planning―dubbed ‘new realism’―which, over the last two decades, 
has attempted to engender both a philosophical and practical shift toward a more
holistic appreciation of UK transport policy in terms of its relationship to broader
social, economic and environmental concerns.
As is often the case with social movements, the essence of the ‘new realism’
agenda can perhaps best be understood as a critical rejection of the mentality
which preceded it: the so-called era of ‘predict and provide’ (Goodwin et al.,
1991; Owens, 1995). As an entrenched set of principles, the logic of ‘predict and
provide’ formed the theoretical bedrock of UK transport policy during the latter
half of the 20
th Century. According to Phil Goodwin (2001)―one of the central 
figures in the emergence of the new realism movement―this ‘predict and 
provide’ mentality revolved around three strongly misguided assumptions. First,
came the belief that road traffic should be wholly conceptualised as a derived
demand. That is to say, the transport policy community exhibited a strong
tendency to assume that none of the principal drivers of traffic growth were to be
found within their jurisdictional sphere. Specifically, growth in demand was
assumed to result from broader socioeconomic variables such as rising levels of
disposable income. This conviction, in turn, underpinned the second assumption,
that the raison d’être of transport policy was principally one of subservience toA portrait of ‘best practice’
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overriding economic imperatives.
4 In essence, the role of the transport planner
was considered to be twofold: first, they were to accurately forecast the growth in
travel demand over a specified future timeframe (i.e. ‘predict’); and second, they
were to decide upon the most cost-effective means by which the supply of
transport infrastructure should be increased so as to accommodate said demand
(i.e. ‘provide’). Third, was the tacit and not-so-tacit assumption that the presence
of alternative road transport modes (i.e. public transport, walking and cycling),
would decline in real terms, but that the costs of this decline would be more than
compensated for by the net economic benefits of increased automobility.
In their seminal report to the Rees Jefferys Road Fund, titled Transport: the
new realism, Goodwin et al. (1991) exposed the fallacious nature of this ‘predict
and provide’ mentality. Over the medium to long-term, it was argued, balancing
the forces of (finite) supply and (infinite) demand in the transport system
necessitated a fundamental qualitative shift in the nature transport policy away
from supply-led interventions toward a practice founded upon the principals of
demand management (see also Bulkeley and Rayner, 2003; Banister, 2005).
While few actors would now disagree with the theoretical validity of ‘new
realist’ logic, however, the academic literature is replete with evidence that
genuine demand management has been extraordinarily difficult to achieve
(Vigar, 2002; Bulkeley and Rayner, 2003; Docherty and Shaw, 2003). As
Nykvist and Whitmarsh (2008, p. 1374) emphatically note:
‘To date, policy measures to foster more sustainable mobility by influencing
individual travel decisions (e.g., congestion charging, vehicle taxation) have
had little effect relative to the underlying growth in demand. The benefit of
technical measures to reduce vehicle emissions and noise has often been
outstripped by the increase in vehicle numbers, engine size, travel frequency
and trip length.’
Although the apparent failure of demand management measures is clearly
disappointing, it should not be altogether surprising. For while specific instances
4 This subservience is neatly illustrated in the title of the Conservative Government’s 1989 white paper
Roads for Prosperity, which ministers billed as ‘the largest road-building programme since the Romans’
(see Docherty, 2003).A portrait of ‘best practice’
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of policy failure are heavily determined by local contextual factors, they have a
tendency to be united by a recurring―and often implicit―theme which we 
might broadly conceptualise as ‘complexity’. As Urry (2004) contends, our
contemporary mobility paradigm bears many of the hallmarks of a so-called
‘complex system’, insofar as it is characterised by the ubiquitous presence of
opaque and highly unpredictable ‘non-linear’ relationships. Of course, it would
be naïve to imagine that the nature of mobility in the Western world has only
recently exhibited such complexity. Ever since its invention in the late nineteenth
century, for example, the motorcar has been enmeshed in myriad sociocultural
processes that extend far beyond its sheer utility value as a means of
transportation (see Pettifer and Turner, 1984).
5 Yet arguably, whilst the ‘predict
and provide’ approach merely catered to the output of this complexity, the ‘new
realist’ emphasis on demand management very much entails that the transport
policy community proactively engages with it. The essence of the problem hence
lies in the fact that it is one thing to intervene in a complex system per se, but
quite another to intervene in such a manner that the system responds in a
desirable fashion.
Absolutely central to this engagement with complexity has been the notion
of policy learning (Vigar, 2002; Gudmundsson et al., 2005). The pressure for far-
reaching policy change, coupled with the fact that the problems of the
contemporary mobility paradigm are manifest in all advanced capitalist
economies with limited historical precedent, mean that policy learning, in its
broadest sense, represents a particularly logical and attractive form of educative
practice (Rose, 2005). In essence, learning from the experiences of one’s national
and international peers may allow policy actors to draw conclusions as to what to
do, what not to do, and hence aid their ability to formulate an optimal/rational
course of action within their own jurisdictional sphere of influence. In this sense,
evidence-based policy learning offers something that ex-ante modelling of a
potential policy measure cannot; even the most refined econometric models are
5 Culturally, for example, the car has come to represent far more than just a mode of personal transportation.
As the ‘epitome of modernity’ (Wachs, 2008), it offers a unique blend of ‘mobile privacy’, providing an
extension of the private home while supporting novel forms of sociality (Miller, 2001; Latham et al.,
2009).A portrait of ‘best practice’
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founded upon abstract models of human behaviour with a limited capacity to
include pertinent situational and contextual variables. Thus, learning from
elsewhere is attractive as it allows one to see how things have worked in practice,
albeit within a different sociocultural context (ibid.).
Yet while learning as a political response is as old as governance itself
(Rose, 2005), less attention has been paid to the manner in which this learning
takes place. This is less true of debate in the political science literature, but is
certainly the case for transport studies and its related disciplines of land use and
environmental management. In short, it appears that there is little concern for
what we might think of as ‘learning how to learn’. Given the centrality of policy
learning to the contemporary transport policy profession, this omission is at once
intriguing and concerning. Unless critical attention is paid to the manner in
which such learning is taking place, we risk being unable to collectively gauge
whether the techniques and practices guiding our learning are as effective and
efficient as possible.
Indeed, in the absence of any systematic analysis or definitive criteria with
which to evaluate the merits of a particular approach to policy learning in the
transport policy community, it would appear that the notion of ‘best practice’ has
become the de facto synonym for policy learning. Consider, for example, TfL’s
(2007) Sustainable Freight Distribution: a plan for London which contains ten
references to ‘best practice’ in the executive summary alone―occurring, on 
average, once every three hundred words. Not once, however, is the term
defined, nor a reference provided to a secondary source where an interested
reader might find such a definition.
We are now homing in on the crux of the professional rationale that
underpins this thesis. Specifically, that there is an urgent need to examine: first,
the manner in which the ‘best practice’ notion is used and understood in the
contemporary transport policy community; and second, whether ‘best practice’ is
a genuinely valuable organising principle for our collective policy learning
processes. Of course, if the notion of ‘best practice’ possessed no intellectual or
communicative merit whatsoever, it is unlikely that it would have attained such
prominence, whether in transport policy or elsewhere. Yet, as Martin and Sunley
(2003) rightfully point out, the mere popularity of a term can never fully
guarantee its validity as a theoretical construct.A portrait of ‘best practice’
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Thankfully, although disciplinary space for critical and reflexive debate
remains decidedly limited in comparison to mainstream human geography, recent
contributions to the academic literature appear to have fostered a growing
acceptance amongst transport scholars for the questioning of supposedly self-
evident ontological truths. In part, this reflects the major influence of the so-
called ‘new mobilities paradigm’ over the past decade, which has rakishly
exposed the deficiencies of the prevailing nomological-deductive approach to
transport studies (see, for example, Urry, 2004; Cresswell, 2006; Sheller, 2007;
Merriman, 2007). More recently, however, such sociological critiques have also
been accompanied by concerned voices within the deductive tradition per se.
Consider, for example, the debate in Transport Reviews on the theory of travel
time (see Metz, 2008; Schwanen, 2008; Givoni, 2008), or longer-standing
epistemological reflections on the philosophy of transport planning (Talvitie,
1997; Goetz and Szyliowicz, 1997; Timms, 2008).
Inspired by such contributions, this thesis also attempts to question an
accepted norm: that ‘best practice’ thinking is inherently beneficial to the
development, implementation and evaluation of effective transport policies.
Consider again the curious and heterogeneous coalition of actors using the term
mentioned in the introductory remarks to this chapter. Surely this merits
inspection, understanding and explanation? There is a pressing need to
understand just how this collective fixation with ‘best practice’ has arisen, how it
is used, why it is used, and what implications this usage has for the viability of
future decision-making in the transport policy community.A portrait of ‘best practice’
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1.2 A brief history of ‘best practice’
‘Among the various methods and implements used in each element of
each trade there is always one method and one implement which is
quicker and better than any of the rest’
―Frederick W. Taylor ([1911] 2004, p. 17) 
While the current prevalence of the term ‘best practice’ in contemporary
professional life is significant, its overarching sentiment―as it relates to the 
identification and spatial/temporal diffusion of ‘superior’ customs―is almost 
certainly as old as human history itself (Rogers, 2009). Indeed, as Overman and
Boyd (1994) note, approaches to the same effect have been enacted throughout
the ages, albeit under different, or non-existent, nomenclature. One might
consider, for example, the spread of prehistoric tool-making or particular fire-
starting practices as broad instances of ‘best practice’ dissemination in action.
Furthermore, given that this sentiment is so intertwined with the associated, if
conceptually distinct, themes of ‘imitation’ (Tarde, [1903] 1962), ‘diffusion’
(Rogers, 1962), ‘innovation’ (Schumpeter, 1934), ‘transferability’ (Evans, 2004)
and ‘knowledge dissemination’ (Castells, 1996; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999),
detailing a comprehensive genealogy of ‘best practice’ per se as it has
materialised in twentieth and twenty-first century discourses, would be a major
undertaking. Nevertheless, it is possible―and, indeed, worthwhile―to trace the 
emergence of ‘best practice’ thinking and terminology, illustrating its powerful
and contested nature.
Of those commentators that have pondered the emergence of ‘best
practice’―and its sister term ‘benchmarking’―several trace its conceptual 
origins to the nascent profession of management consultancy in the early
twentieth century. Indeed, Overman and Boyd (1994), Katarobo (1998) and King
(2007) all point to the renowned American engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor
as a major figure in the emergence of ‘best practice’ philosophy in the
organisation of industrial processes. While Taylor’s (1911 [2004]) seminal work,
The Principles of Scientific Management, actually preceded the first recorded use
of the term ‘best practice’ by 73 years, his zealous pursuit of industrialA portrait of ‘best practice’
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efficiency―as manifested in his famous ‘time studies’―was such that he 
remained convinced of the existence of a singular optimal solution for any given
industrial problem, as evidenced by the quotation above.
Writing well after the industrial revolution, Taylor clearly was not the first
person to believe that some methods of industrial production might be superior to
others. Yet, as Kanigel’s (1997) pertinently-titled biography The One Best Way
demonstrates, Taylor was a vociferous and tenacious character who had great
influence amongst the industrial elite in the early twentieth century. The
profound changes to industrial production that he enacted, along with those of his
peers such as Henry Gantt and Morris Cooke, were instrumental in the
developing the nascent ‘science’ of efficiency studies into the bona fide
profession of management consultancy―the core competency of which, to this 
day, remains trading in commercially-applicable knowledge of optimal business
practices (Cody, 1986). Correspondingly, it is in the professional fields of
accounting, business and management consultancy that ‘best practice’ ethos is,
and always has been, most prevalent. Although it was not until the publication of
Hitching and Stone’s (1984) Understanding Accounting that the actual term first
appeared in print (OED, 1989).
6
Consistent with this heritage, ‘best practice’ has been defined by the Oxford
English Dictionary as ‘a mass noun, chiefly used in business: the practice which
is accepted by consensus or prescribed by regulation as correct; the preferred or
most appropriate style’ (ibid., p. n/a). In the business studies and management
science literature, the use of the term ‘best practice’ appears to have followed a
relatively consistent, if not wholly uniform, pattern. Although explicit definitions
are relatively rare in proportion to the volume of literature published, those that
are offered―as well as those implied―tend to adhere to the key elements 
outlined in the OED (1989) definition above. Specifically, they tend to
emphasise the fact that the adoption of particular routines present in the modus
operandi of other firms (or indeed, other areas of the same firm), may yield
effective and desirable outcomes for one’s own firm, and avoid the risks and
6 It should be noted, however, that Hitching and Stone’s (1984, p. 314) reference to the term ‘best practice’
was not neological, but rather they use it in reference to the ideas of their accounting peers―strongly 
indicating that the term ‘best practice’, like most phrases, enjoyed a period of use prior to its first
appearance in written form.A portrait of ‘best practice’
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inefficiencies incurred through unnecessary duplication. Parnaby et al. (2003, p.
265), for example, consider a ‘best practice’ to be ‘a practice that will lead to
superior performance’; for Hillson (2004, p. 2) it is a ‘routine activity that leads
to excellence’; and, perhaps most simply, in The Complete Idiot’s Guide to
Knowledge Management (Clemmons Rumizen, 2002, p. 102), ‘best practice’
pertains to ‘something that has been shown to be effective in one place that could
be effective in another.’
Literature that can be loosely grouped under the umbrella-term ‘business
improvement’ appears to be particularly replete with ‘best practice’ thinking.
Notable examples include books by Codling (1995), Gattorna (1998) and Zairi
(1999); academic papers by Kumar et al., (2004) and Reijers and Mansar (2005),
as well as countless items of so-called ‘grey literature’, often published by
organisations or individuals on the internet (e.g. Business Best Practice, 2007;
Business Link, 2010). In such materials, the notion of ‘best practice’ is almost
always discussed in conjunction with the closely-related concept of
‘benchmarking’, which, according to the OED (1989, p. n/a), can be defined as ‘a
process in which a business evaluates its own operations (often specific
procedures) by detailed comparison with those of another business, in order to
establish best practice and improve performance; the examination and emulation
of other organizations’ strengths.’
As we have seen in the previous section, while the use of ‘best practice’
terminology is still most prevalent in business management, recent decades have
witnessed the emergence of the notion in the public sector. Clearly, given the
aims of this thesis, a truly comprehensive explanation for this emergence and an
appraisal of its implications has yet to be made. Yet, at a macro-level, it would
appear from the literature that the ‘best practice’ approach gained particular
legitimacy through its near-synonymous relationship to the attendant notion of
‘policy transfer’, which, for Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p. 5) corresponds to:
“the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present)
is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements,
institutions and ideas in another political system”.A portrait of ‘best practice’
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As several commentators point out, policy transfer is not a new phenomenon
(Davis, 2009; Fraser, 2003; Stone, 1999). There is clear evidence, for example,
that social reformists in nineteenth century Britain keenly followed the course of
socio-political developments in Australia, Canada and New Zealand in the belief
that these colonial outposts, sharing Britain’s cultural and institutional traditions,
represented ‘laboratories’ for domestic learning (Rogers, 2009; Burton, 2006).
Dolowitz (2000) too, notes the case of constitution-building as a historic example
of policy transfer, with Hungarian bureaucrats modelling their nation’s
constitution on that of Spain, which in turn had been modelled on that of
Germany, which in turn had been modelled on that of the United States (see Agh,
1998). Nevertheless, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, the widespread
adoption of the market-orientated New Public Management (NPM) philosophy
during the 1980s and 1990s increasingly led to policy transfer becoming
commonplace in a ‘modernising’ public sector (Overman and Boyd, 1994;
Verchick, 2005).
In the United Kingdom, the rise of NPM particularly asserted the validity of
policy transfer and, ergo, ‘best practice’ in the formalised structures of
governance following the election of the 1997 New Labour government. As
Duncan (2009) notes, for example, the UK Cabinet Office (1999, p. 16) affirmed
in the white paper Modernising Government that there was a genuine need to
‘look beyond what government is doing now... learning lessons from other
countries; and integrating the European Union and international dimensions into
our policy-making.’ Supported in this endeavour by like-minded think tanks such
as Demos and the Institute for Public Policy Research, the New Labour
government devoted significant resources to the transference of policy measures
from the United States; especially in the context of welfare and employment
reform (Hulme, 2005; Duncan, 2009).
Given this ‘outward looking’ policy agenda (Page and Mark-Lawson, 2007),
the growth of ‘best practice’ thinking at the level of policy formulation and
implementation is unsurprising. However, the identification and promulgation of
‘best practices’ in the public sector is similarly prevalent at the organisational
tier―particularly in healthcare and education (Kennedy, 2008; Coffield and 
Edward, 2008). The BMJ Group, for example, has developed a major evidence-
based decision-support tool for medical professionals called ‘Best Practice’,A portrait of ‘best practice’
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which couples empirical evidence with expert opinion and guidelines on
diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and prevention (see BMJ, 2009). Formal and
informal procedural guidance in the UK National Health Service, too, is replete
with ‘best practice’ thinking―prevalent, for example, in decision-support (DH, 
2007), pharmaceutical procurement (DH, 2008) and even ‘whistle-blowing’
protocol (DH, 2010). In the UK education sector, Coffield and Edward (2008)
frame the emergence of ‘best practice’ as symptomatic of centralised decision-
making by the New Labour government, citing the purported ambitions of the
Department for Education and Skills to put ‘teaching, training and learning at the
heart of what we do by establishing a new Standards Unit to identify and
disseminate best practice’ (DfES, 2002, p. 5).
Unlike the private sector incarnation of ‘best practice’, however, it would
appear that in the more diffuse and heterogeneous environment of the public
sector, subsequent interpretations of the notion have become more diffuse. Some
authors do offer relatively ‘Taylorist’ definitions of ‘best practice’, such as: ‘the
selective observation of a set of exemplars across different contexts in order to
derive more generalizable principles and theories of [public] management’
(Overman and Boyd, 1994, p. 69); or, ‘the most efficient and effective way of
accomplishing a task, based on repeatable procedures that have proven
themselves over time’ (McInerney and Liem, 2009, p. 3). However, other
adopters of the notion in the public sector are rarely explicit about their
understanding of ‘best practice’, seemingly using the phrase in reference to a
variety of tangential and conceptually distinct issues. Hence, rather than alluding
to ‘best practice’ as an approach for generating inductive claims, we are told that
the term variously refers to: ‘policies and programmes that [are] evaluated by
external international agencies and considered to be successful in terms of
outcomes and costs’ (Lana and Evans, 2004, p. 208); or, ‘the ways in which a
teacher works within constraints of his or her environment to design appropriate
learning contexts for his or her students’ (Stewart, 2002, p. 102).A portrait of ‘best practice’
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1.3 Institutional saliency and the ‘pragmatic’ critique
One of the most lauded examples of ‘best practice’ in the business management
field was the Japanese business philosophy of ‘kaizen’. Roughly translated into
English as ‘continuous improvement’, kaizen, like Taylorism, placed
considerable emphasis on the need for manufacturing firms to simultaneously
improve quality in the production process whilst eliminating inefficiencies.
Unlike Taylorism, however, kaizen involved the devolution of power and
responsibility throughout firm hierarchies, entailing the ‘up-skilling’ and
intellectual involvement of assembly line workers (Imai, 1986). Throughout the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the extent to which major Japanese manufacturing
firms, such as Toyota, were able to improve their business performance by
adopting kaizen―as well as related ‘just-in-time’ (JIT) delivery 
processes―gained considerable attention from manufacturing firms in the West 
(ibid.; Womack et al., 1990). As a result―particularly in the global electronics 
and automotive industries―the kaizen philosophy was heralded as a self-evident 
‘best practice’, with North American and European manufacturing firms
investing considerable resources in attempts to generate similarly successful
outcomes.
In reality, however, attempts to implement kaizen in the West were broadly
unsuccessful (Gertler, 2004). The explanation for this wholesale failure embodies
what is almost certainly the major critique of the ‘best practice’ notion existing in
the academic literature to date; which, for the sake of argument, we shall term the
‘pragmatic critique’.
7 The cornerstone of the pragmatic critique is that actors who
attempt the spatial transfer of favoured ‘best practices’ often grossly overlook the
salience of institutional heterogeneity (ibid.). In other words, the success of
specific systems, processes or conventions that are thought to constitute ‘best
practices’ remain heavily contingent upon myriad socio-cultural, economic and
political forces, which, by their very nature, are spatially constituted (Amin and
Thrift, 1992; Martin, 1994; Gertler, 2004; Tacconelli and Wrigley, 2009). Thus,
despite the much lauded shift toward a global ‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1996;
7 Following the OED (1989, p. n/a), whereby pragmatic pertains to: ‘dealing with matters in accordance
with practical rather than theoretical considerations or general principles; aiming at what is achievable
rather than ideal; matter-of-fact, practical, down-to-earth.’A portrait of ‘best practice’
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see also O’Brien, 1992), ‘place’ remains an inherent determinant of any
practice―‘best’ or otherwise. 
For the economic geographer Meric Gertler (2004), these
forces―manifested in local/regional/national ‘cultures of production’―represent 
a set of complex and interrelated, yet crucially definite, ‘institutional’
arrangements, variously acting to enhance/constrain efficient and profitable
economic activity in different locales (Gertler, 1995, 2004; see also Coe, 2005).
Importantly, such institutions are not, as some have suggested, analogous to
operational and behavioural practices (see, for example, Hall, 1986), and neither
are they akin to material organisations. Rather, they represent both formal
regulations/legislations/systems and informal societal norms within and upon
which all economic activity takes place, such as labour markets, education and
training regimes, industrial relations, corporate governance, capital markets and
competition (Gertler, 2004; see also Gertler et al., 2000).
For Gertler (2004), the institutionally contingent nature of both production
and consumption thus curtails the extent to which the spatial dissemination of
‘best practice’ can be effectively realised. Yet importantly, he demonstrates that
it is not so much the issue of geographic proximity (i.e. distance) per se that is of
significance. Rather, such physical distance is representative of a relational
distance, insofar as institutional frameworks (such as labour market regulations
and training regimes) are often constituted at the national scale. Other
commentators, too, have contributed to this pragmatic critique of ‘best practice’
in the private sector. Hope (2004), for example, describes the problems
encountered in the transfer of ‘best practice’ in the international hotel industry
(see also Tayeb, 2001); Martin and Beaumont (1998) turn their attention to
internal ‘best practice’ transfer within multinational firms operating across
different cultural contexts, as does Szulanski (1996) in his exploration of
‘internal stickiness’; and Purcell (1999) illustrates the challenges faced in the
spatial transfer of ‘best practices’ in human resource management.
Importantly for our analysis, however, the core tenets of this pragmatic
critique also represent the principle focus for detracting expositions of ‘best
practice’ in the field of comparative politics. Most evident here are the countless
contributions to the literature that stress the inherent intellectual and political
obstacles to successful international policy transfer (Rose, 1991, 2005; DolowitzA portrait of ‘best practice’
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and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans and Davis, 1999; Radaelli, 2000; Page and Mark-
Lawson, 2007). Jones and Newburn’s (2007) Policy Transfer and Criminal
Justice, for example, is particularly illustrative of the pragmatic critique, insofar
as it traces the efforts of the New Labour government to transfer a series of
policing reforms from the United States that had proven to be particularly
successful in reducing New York City’s crime rates during the early 1990s. As
the authors explain, the extent to which the core elements of the US
reforms―particularly the notion of ‘zero tolerance’ policing―were adopted in 
the UK remained heavily contingent upon the institutional inertia present in UK
policing. Indeed, the limited extent of the eventual transfer was attributed to the
fact that senior police chiefs in the UK exhibited a reluctance to devote
significant resources to relatively minor crimes―a cornerstone of the US ‘broken 
windows’ approach (see also Page and Mark-Lawson, 2007). Focussing on the
extension of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Gorton et al. (2009),
too, offer a similarly compelling analysis of policy transfer that epitomises the
pragmatic critique. In essence, their argument points to the disjuncture between
the totalising assumptions underpinning the rationale and practical application of
the CAP, and new member states’ extraordinarily diverse socioeconomic
characteristics, largely rooted in the institutional legacy of socialist agriculture.
Seemingly influenced by such wider debate amongst scholars of public
policy, the pragmatic critique has also come to represent the natural point of
departure for those authors who have questioned the ‘best practice’ mantra from
the interrelated domains of transport policy, land use management and spatial
planning (Scottish Executive, 2003; De Jong et al., 2002; Geerlings and Stead,
2005; Gudmundsson et al., 2005; De Jong and Geerlings, 2005; De Jong, 2007).
One of the key figures in this area, Martin de Jong (2007), offers a
comprehensive account of institutional structures’ effects on the viability of
transport policy transplantation across national boundaries. Pointing out the
significant differences that exist between nations’ specific policy issues and the
ability of governments to ably finance, legislate for and implement transport
interventions, he largely attributes instances of policy failure to a ‘lack of
congruence’ between formal and informal institutional structures. For de Jong
(2007, p. 307), formal institutional structures correspond to institutions with a
‘visible legal or organisational form’, such as legislative frameworks, propertyA portrait of ‘best practice’
- 18 -
rights, environmental regulations and the nature of public private partnerships.
Yet while such formal institutions are almost invariably the focus for policy
transfer initiatives, informal institutions―such as shared cultural conventions, 
moral codes, societal norms and attitudes to policy compliance―remain strong 
determinants of policy success. Hence, where the nature and characteristics of
formal institutions are altered under the auspices of implementing one or more
foreign ‘best practices’, a ‘lack of congruence’ between these novel structures
and the underlying informal institutions may well result, as the latter are often
endemic and temporally enduring. For example, in response to high levels of
urban smog, Scandinavian policy-makers may introduce a policy measure that
restricts motor vehicle usage according to vehicles’ registration plates (i.e.
vehicles with even-numbered and odd-numbered plates are authorised to travel at
different times of the day, respectively) (ibid.). Typically, this measure may meet
with a relatively benign response from policy actors and citizens―given 
historically high rates of compliance with formal regulation. However,
transferring such a policy to nations where citizens have a culturally-entrenched
distrust of public authority, argues de Jong (2007), may well result in citizens
attempting to circumvent the measure through undesirable means (for example,
by purchasing an additional vehicle belonging to a different plate category).
This theme of congruence resonates strongly with Gudmundsson et al.’s
(2005) report on the experience of the ‘Benchmarking European Sustainable
Transport’ (BEST) thematic network, which was tasked by the European
Commission to explore the potential of benchmarking at the European policy
level in order to support the dissemination of best practices in the promotion of
sustainable transport. Pointing, like those discussed above, to the institutional
constraints on best practice dissemination, the paper again serves to exemplify
the pragmatic critique. For example, one constraint outlined relates to the
heterogeneous array of policy-making style apparent in the EU. Hence, while
some modes of governance may be characterised as relatively ‘reactive’, others
are more ‘anticipatory’; while some exhibit adversarial tendencies, others offer a
more consensual approach. Indeed, while the notion of benchmarking is viewed
as a potentially useful tool for policy learning, measurability and comparability
limitations led the authors to conclude that as ‘policies are not directlyA portrait of ‘best practice’
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comparable across contexts…attempting to benchmark sustainable transport
policies against one another…is not advised’ (ibid., p. 669).
1.4 Research objectives
Like Gudmundsson et al. (2005), Stead’s (2009) arguments are also focused at
the European Union level, where he launches a particularly vociferous attack on
the notion of ‘best practice’ as manifest in the European Commission’s approach
to spatial planning. Identifying twelve Commission-funded projects on spatial
planning that demonstrate a profound infatuation with ‘best practice’ thinking,
Stead (2009, p. 1) firstly charts the inherent limitations of the approach as it
relates to the international transferability of policies between EU member states,
noting that the primary vehicles for such transfer―European Territorial 
Cooperation programmes― are: 
‘…founded upon the assumption that best practices are equally applicable
and effective in another setting and that the development and dissemination
of best practice will help to lead improvements in policy and practice in
other countries, regions or cities...such a belief is too simplistic.’
Given that a significant portion of Stead’s (2009) work echoes that of Gorton et
al. (2009; see also Radaelli, 2000)―insofar as it discusses the limitations of ‘best 
practice’ transfer from Western Europe to Eastern Europe―it is tempting to treat 
his contribution as another example of the pragmatic critique. Yet, as the second
part of the paper testifies, to do so would be to overlook its broader significance
as an earnest bridging point between the quasi-utilitarian overtones of the
pragmatic critique and the more nuanced, investigative flavour of what we might
term the emergent ‘actor critique’.
Typified by the contributions of Wolman and Page (2002) and Bulkeley
(2006), the actor critique represents an embryonic, but long overdue, extension of
the literature on ‘best practice’ and policy transfer. Essentially, these authors
acknowledge that while exponents of the pragmatic critique―in recognising and A portrait of ‘best practice’
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disclosing the institutional limitations of ‘best practice’―have served to 
enlighten mainstream discourse in the transport and land use policy community,
the pragmatic critique alone is insufficient as a lens through which to capture the
complexities of the ‘best practice’ notion in its entirety. In order to understand
‘best practice’, they argue, it is necessary to complement the outputs of the
pragmatic critique with an analytical focus that pierces right to the heart of the
notion per se―entailing a critical examination of the manner in which it is 
performed, routinised and habitualised by relevant actors.
Recall once again the twofold aim of this thesis: first, to critically assess the
ubiquity of best practice usage in the transport policy community; and second, to
examine the validity of the notion with respect to the broader project of policy
learning. Clearly, given the net contribution of the pragmatic critique, a good
deal of progress has already been made with respect to the latter; clarifications on
the reasons for failure in policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), and the
establishment of key institutional requirements for the successful dissemination
of ‘best practices’ (Scottish Executive, 2003; de Jong, 2007), for example, are
highly valuable. Fundamentally, however, in order to develop a thorough
understanding of the present ubiquity of best practice, it is within the precepts of
the actor critique that this research must be situated.
Specifically, there is an urgent need to pose searching and incisive questions
to relevant actors, examining how and why they make use of the term ‘best
practice’. This thesis is therefore structured around the following three research
objectives:
(A) How is the notion of ‘best practice’ encountered and understood within
the UK sustainable transport community?
(B) What are the generative mechanisms and structures that explain the
present ubiquity of ‘best practice’ in the UK sustainable transport
community?
(C) What are the broader implications of ‘best practice’ thinking with regard
to policy learning and policy development?A portrait of ‘best practice’
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Chapter 2 will outline the theoretical and methodological approach by which
these objectives are to be fulfilled, while Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will discuss the
research findings in terms of A, B and C, respectively. Conclusions are offered in
Chapter 6.Theory and method
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Chapter 2
Theory and method:
a critical realist approach
‘The more usual, or at least currently fashionable, practice is to devote at
least a chapter of your book or PhD thesis to a tortured, self-flagellating
disquisition on the ethical and methodological difficulties of participant
observation...you must spend a good three pages explaining that your
unconscious ethnocentric prejudices, and various other cultural barriers,
probably make this [undertaking] impossible. It is then customary
to...express grave reservations about the validity of modern ‘Western’
science as a means of understanding anything at all.’
―Kate Fox (2005, p. 4) 
Given the introspective character of much theoretical and methodological debate
in the social sciences, it is probable that the frustrations expressed in the above
epigraph from Fox’s (2005) Watching the English will resonate with many
contemporary human geographers. Strikingly, Fox’s irritation does not appear to
be overly directed at a real or perceived hostile readership―the overarching 
principles of ethnography require little defence in anthropological circles. Rather,
she appears to be exasperated with the academic conventions that explicitly or
tacitly demand such ‘self-flagellating disquisitions’. In her best-seller Watching
the English, therefore, Fox revels in the intellectual and argumentative freedom
afforded by what Mills (2008) dubs the ‘pop anthropology’ format. Absolved of
the tiresome academic requirement to incessantly justify the validity of her
professional work, she is at liberty to simply ‘get on with’ her research without
rehearsing what she implies to be staid and repetitive platitudes.
In this chapter I take an opposing view. Whilst I empathise with Fox, I see
genuine value in discussing the theoretical and methodological frameworks that
underpin this research and it is my intention here to maximise the potentialTheory and method
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contribution of this chapter to the overall strength of this thesis. Specifically, I
seek to avoid superficial discussions of methodology, such as the misguided and
unhelpful ‘qualitative versus quantitative’ debate and instead attempt to ground
this research in the philosophy of critical realism. While this is primarily for
intellectual reasons, the ‘place’ of this research in the sub-discipline of transport
geography entails that there is a corresponding pragmatic rationale for a detailed
defence of its post-positivist spirit.
This chapter is thus comprised of three sections. First, I introduce and
outline the fundamentals of critical realist ontology. Second, I discuss the
epistemological implications of this ontology for the project of social science and
note how this is reflected in the thesis structure. Finally, I outline and reflect
upon the chosen research design, justifying the use of an in-depth case study
approach as the optimal means by which to reveal the generative causal
mechanisms accounting for the current prevalence of ‘best practice’ thinking in
the contemporary transport policy community.
2.1 Critical realist ontology
Although the contemporary critical realist movement is characterised by
numerous perspectives and contributions, the core philosophy of critical realism
stems from the British philosopher Roy Bhaskar’s seminal texts A Realist Theory
of Science (1975) and The Possibility of Naturalism (1979). It is, of course,
impossible to convey the complexities of critical realism without extensive
discussion; yet, Baert (2005, p. 87) manages to succinctly encapsulate its core
sentiment, implicitly defining critical realism as an attempt ‘to salvage the
naturalist project while taking on board that knowledge is a social construct.’ In
essence, therefore, the philosophy of critical realism offers an ontological
platform that simultaneously exposes the fallacious nature of the deductive-
nomological approach to social science whilst circumventing the relativistic and
nihilistic tendencies of hermeneutic theory and postmodernist deconstructionism.
For disenchanted social scientists, critical realism thus holds out the promise of
transcending…Theory and method
- 24 -
‘…the current debate governing the larger reflexive self-understandings of
the human and social sciences [which] is…misguided, hopeless, and sterile.
Essentially, two failed philosophies of social science [empiricism and
postmodernism] are deadlocked in a struggle to control the future of the
human and social sciences. Neither, in fact, merits any influence. The
inherited debate mis-frames the issues, problems, and possibilities, and so
generates useless conflict and, consequently, widespread apathy among
social scientists about critical reflection on the larger nature and purposes of
their disciplines.’
(Smith, 2006, p. 7)
The ‘realism’ of which Bhaskar (1975) speaks is both ontological and
epistemological. It is ontological in the sense that critical realist philosophy
maintains that there is an extant metaphysical reality independent of human
perception; and it is epistemological in the sense that it maintains that this reality,
in principle, is capable of being apprehended through, admittedly fallible,
inferential processes of abduction and retroduction. In A Realist Theory of
Science, Bhaskar (1975) develops his ontological position through successive
critiques of empirical realism, the Humean theory of causality and the deductivist
assumption that explanation and prediction are one and the same. The core
foundations of Bhaskar’s (1975, 1979) argument rest upon his conceptualisation
of reality as ‘stratified’. In other words, he makes an ontological distinction
between three ‘domains’: the real, the actual and the empirical. As Bhaskar
vividly recounts in his series of recent interviews with Mervyn Hartwig, making
such a strong case for distinguishing between the ‘real’ and the ‘actual’ can incur
ridicule if viewed superficially (Hartwig and Bhaskar, 2010). Yet, for critical
realists, recognising the qualitative distinctions between these ontological
domains is absolutely fundamental to comprehending the rejuvenated raison
d’être of both natural and social science. Without grasping the significance of
this ‘stratified notion of reality’ (Bhaskar, 1975) we cannot hope to move beyond
the ‘misguided, hopeless and sterile’ debates that so needlessly curtail the
professional project of social science (Smith, 2006, p. 7; see also Baert, 2005).Theory and method
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Perhaps the most illustrative means of examining this stratification is
through Bhaskar’s (1975) critique of the Berkeleian notion of ‘the empirical
world’, in which, to all intents and purposes, the philosophy of science has been
entrenched since the Enlightenment. While the natural sciences represent the
immediate context for this critique
8, the implications of Bhaskar’s logic resonate
with equal measure in the social sciences. Essentially, Bhaskar (1975) argues that
classical empiricism―the philosophy characterised by Locke, Hume and 
Berkeley which asserts that experiential sense-data is the sole means of acquiring
warranted knowledge―is undepinned by a metaphysical dogma characteristic of 
an ‘epistemic fallacy’, whereby ontological and epistemological concerns are
erroneously conflated. As Bhaskar (1975, p. 16, emphasis added) puts it, this is
evident in empiricists’ implicit conviction that ‘statements about being [i.e.
ontological concerns] can always be transposed into statements about our
knowledge of being [i.e. epistemological concerns]’, which, for Collier (1994, p.
32) ‘misrepresent[s] the world of our everyday experience by assimilating it to
that discovered by science’, and results in the existence of ‘a world [solely]
defined by its relation to our experience’ (ibid., p. 36, original emphasis).
In highlighting this epistemic fallacy, Bhaskar (1975) thus demonstrates the
enormous ontological limitations of the empiricist mentality. To reduce ‘what is’
to ‘what we can know’ is, for critical realists, extraordinarily problematic as it
imposes highly inappropriate constraints on the potential of scientific enquiry.
Consider, as Collier (1994) does at length, the salience of the epistemic fallacy as
manifested in processes of scientific experimentation. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary (1989, np.), the noun ‘experiment’ can be defined as ‘an
action or operation undertaken in order to discover something unknown, to test a
hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth.’ Hence, for empiricists,
the explicit goal of experimentation is to isolate a particular mechanism or
process with the overarching aim of establishing a causal law which universally
governs the relationship between two variables and supports future predictions.
In essence, the unique nature of carefully-contrived experimental conditions is
8 It is not until The Possibility of Naturalism (1979) that Bhaskar turns his attention to focus explicitly on the
social sciences.Theory and method
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such that the mechanism or process in question can be examined ‘free from the
interfering flux’ of other mechanisms or processes (Bhaskar, 1986, p. 35).
A precondition of experimentation is thus that the experimental conditions
must represent a closed system, which can be defined as systems characterised by
both internal closure―‘the absence of any changes to the internal workings of 
the system’―and external closure―‘stability in the relationship between the 
system and factors that may interfere with its workings’ (Baert, 2005, p. 92).
Importantly, within such closed systems, causal laws are determined through a
Humean (i.e. empiricist) conceptualisation of causality. In other words, causality
is considered to be successionist in character, whereby a causal relationship
between two entities is said to exist when one type of event (the cause) is
regularly succeeded by another (the effect) (Bhaskar, 1975). Thus, where such an
empirical regularity is evident, it is both necessary and sufficient to assert a
causal relationship between the two events (Baert, 2005). For example, all else
being equal, if one is holding a tennis ball and then one allows the ball to escape
from one’s grasp (cause), it will fall to the ground (effect). A Humean causal
law, in the form of ‘if X, then Y’ (X→Y) would therefore state: if a ball is 
released (cause), it will fall to the ground (effect).
Yet while they may hold in closed systems, such causal laws suffer from two
major interrelated flaws. First, they are explanatorily impotent; they can describe
a succession of events, but cannot account for why effects followed causes.
Consider the following interchange in the television series Inspector Morse:
Morse: “I’m tired, Lewis”
Lewis: “what caused that, Sir?”
Morse: “a lack of sleep”
The reason that this interchange is humorous is precisely because Morse answers
Lewis’s question in a Humean fashion. Faithful to the causal law of X→Y, his 
‘explanation’ is so laughably superficial that, quite literally, it becomes a joke.
Evidently, in this instance, Lewis can brush off Morse’s flippancy. Yet in
situations where enquiring minds seek a genuine explanation for phenomena, the
implications of Humean causality run deeper. For example, if a curious child
asked why their ball fell to the ground, the response “your ball fell because youTheory and method
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dropped it” would clearly be pedagogically unacceptable. Hence, Humean causal
laws are purely descriptive; they pertain to regular correlations in closed systems
but they do not offer a reason for such regularities.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, Humean causal laws are rarely
applicable outside controlled, contrived environments. Whereas closed systems
might permit a degree of conflation between correlation and causation, it is
almost impossible to identify anything approximating a closed system outside of
the laboratory. On the contrary, the world in which we live is almost entirely
characterised by emergent systems variously described as ‘complex’ (Urry,
2004), ‘chaotic’ (Pecora and Carroll, 1990), ‘nonlinear’ (Khalil, 2001) or, for
Bhaskar (1975, p. 35), ‘open’―defined as ‘systems in which causal laws are out 
of phase with patterns of events and experiences’. Indeed, as the mathematician
Stanislaw Ulan facetiously pointed out in the 1950s, the omnipresence of these
systems is such that ‘calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and
talking about all the interesting non-elephants you can see there’ (cited in
Ramalingam and Jones, 2008, p. 24).
This lack of applicability clearly highlights the fundamental weakness of
empiricism as a valid basis for both natural and social science. Simply put,
empiricism erroneously presupposes the ubiquity of closed systems and as a
result has never sought to extend its conceptualisation of causation beyond that
of Hume’s successionist notion (Bhaskar, 1975). As Collier (1994, p. 34,
emphasis added) illustrates, attempting to employ X→Y causal laws in open 
systems is thus an utterly hopeless endeavour:
‘The events that we can ordinarily observe are not invariably preceded or
followed by any other constantly conjoined event. Red sky at night is not
always followed by a fine day, or deflationary budgets by reductions of
inflation, or burglars entering by dogs barking, or spots on the sun by war, or
sexual intercourse by conception.’
Given that the Humean notion of causality clearly does not prevail in the natural
world, we are thus obliged to revisit the very properties that a causal law must
possess for it to be considered as a law in a bona fide sense. If we maintain the
criteria of universalism then we are faced with the problem implied above; theTheory and method
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only laws possible in natural science will be found in a tiny handful of closed
systems (e.g. the solar system) and there would be none in social science. Yet if
we abandon the criteria of universalism, then why speak of ‘laws’ at all as the
whole purpose of contriving an experiment and producing laws is that these laws
will have some value outside of the laboratory (see Baert, 2005)?
It is in the attempt to transcend this impasse where we come full circle in our
discussion and return to the stratified notion of reality. Both the natural and
social worlds, as open systems, are characterised by innumerable mechanisms
that together interact so as to produce events (Collier, 1994). Hence, Bhaskar
(1975) demonstrates the need to broaden the ontological horizons of debate in the
philosophy of science, arguing that causality ought not to be conceptualised in a
successionist sense, but rather in a normic sense, compatible with the production
of knowledge about open systems. This is to say that causal laws must not be
analysed according to empirical regularities, but instead according to the
‘tendencies’ of generative mechanisms―defined as ‘powers or liabilities of a 
thing which may be exercised without being manifest in any particular outcome’
(ibid., p. 14). It is absolutely vital to appreciate this latter point; in open systems,
mechanisms interact in myriad and unpredictable ways. They may, for example,
augment, contradict, disguise, or conceal one another. Nevertheless,
ontologically-speaking, they remain present in the domain of the real, even when
their interactions preclude their materialisation in the domains of the actual
and/or empirical.
Appreciating causality in this manner is inordinately useful, and something
that we take for granted in everyday life. It is the generative mechanism of the
earth’s gravitational pull, for example, which explains the fact that when a ball is
released from a height it falls to the ground. Ontologically speaking, it is these
generative mechanisms which constitute the domain of the ‘real’; it is their
complex interplay, tangibly manifested in the events of the world which
constitutes the domain of the ‘actual’; and it is our (necessarily limited)
experience of these events which constitutes the domain of the ‘empirical’. Refer
again to Bhaskar’s (1975, p. 35) definition of an open system: ‘systems in which
causal laws are out of phase with patterns of events and experiences’. Here we
can see exactly why the Berkeleian notion of ‘the empirical world’ is anTheory and method
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epistemic fallacy; the ‘empirical’ is but one worldly domain, ontologically
distinct from the ‘actual’ and the ‘real’.
2.2 Epistemological implications
Given the profundity of critical realism’s ontological contribution, it is
subsequently necessary to consider its implications for the broader project of
social science. Here Bhaskar (1975; 1979) sets out, in a normative sense, the
purpose of social science as the production of valid and useful (i.e. generalizable)
explanatory knowledge of phenomena based on comprehensive understandings
of the generative mechanisms, events and experiences that collectively constitute
reality.
Essentially, this involves making conceptual connections between the three
ontological domains set out above (Danermark et al., 2002). As implied in the
previous section, it is through the process of experimentation that natural
scientists are able to make these connections. Under the contrived conditions of
an experimental closed system, generative mechanisms can be isolated and
revealed as the domains of the real, actual and empirical are effectively equated
(i.e. Dr= Da = De) (Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1994). Yet, as social scientists, we
clearly cannot ‘close’ the open systems which characterise our fields of study in
any meaningful sense. The human subjects at the heart of our analysis are
conscious, self-aware, deliberative and reactive, and it is thus not possible to
contrive an empirical situation where we can isolate one mechanism from the
interferences of others (i.e. Dr≥ Da ≥ De) (Danermark et al., 2002). Ostensibly,
this poses a problem for social scientists as―according to the purpose 
above―we are still obliged to produce warranted knowledge about generative 
mechanisms. In other words, we are tasked with establishing the character of
these mechanisms even though they are not reducible to empirical isolation.
For critical realists, it is through processes of abstraction that this obstacle
can be overcome (Bhaskar, 1975). At this point it is important to clear up
potential confusion, as the concept of ‘abstract’ is often discussed in a pejorative
sense within social science, where it is ontologically contrasted withTheory and method
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‘concreteness’, ‘tangibility’ or even ‘reality’ per se (e.g. Hamnett, 2003)
(Danermark et al., 2002). As Markusen (2003, p. 704, emphasis added) observes:
‘The term ‘theorist’ is often applied to those who deal mainly in abstractions
and abjure empirical verification, rather than to those who take up knotty
problems, hypothesize about their nature and causality, and marshal
evidence in support of their views. It is common to hear scholars refer to a
divide between the quantitative people and the theorists, as if those who use
data for evidence have no theory and those who ‘do’ theory have no use for
evidence.’
In contrast, abstraction represents something fundamentally different in critical
realist philosophy. It is not to be associated with glossing over the complexity of
the social realm but rather engaging directly with it. Abstraction, in this sense,
can be conceived of as a ‘thought experiment’ designed to reveal the nature of
the particular structures and generative mechanisms (the real) that together work
to constitute events (the actual). For example, in a sociological account of
workplace discrimination (the actual), a critical realist approach may ‘abstract’ a
generative mechanism of gender socialisation (the real).
As we might expect, the practical implications of this revised epistemology
are significant. In order to genuinely embed processes of abstraction in the
practice of social science, critical realists argue that nothing short of a wholesale
revision of traditional scientific method is necessary. Variously referred to as the
‘Popper-Hempel’, ‘covering-law’ or ‘deductive-nomological’ (DN) model
(Ekström, 1992), traditional scientific method is grounded in empiricism and the
Humean notion of causality discussed above. In essence, therefore, the DN
model seeks to make generalizable claims to knowledge using deductive
inference based upon the premises of universal laws.
9 In a formal sense, the DN
model thus attempts to derive the ‘explanandum’ (i.e. the event) from three forms
of ‘explanans’ (i.e. the conditions which explain the occurrence of the event):
universal law(s), framework condition(s) and triggering cause(s). For example, in
the case of the tennis ball discussed in the previous section, we have:
9 Hence, ‘nomological’, from the Greek nomos meaning ‘law’.Theory and method
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Explanans: X. All objects fall to the ground when dropped (universal law);
Y. Sam is holding a ball and there is nothing between the ball and
the ground (framework conditions);
Z. Sam drops the ball (triggering cause).
Explanandum: The ball falls to the ground.
(adapted from Danermark et al., 2002)
Here we can see that the explanandum is inferred by logical deduction from
the premises of the explanans. In other words, one can conceptualise the
explanans as the answers provided to a question phrased around the
explanandum: ‘why did the ball fall to the ground?’ ‘It fell due to X, Y and Z.’
Recognising the form and influence of such inferences, for critical realists, is a
precondition for appreciating the power of abstraction and the salience of the
generalization objective for social science. Defined as ‘reasoning[s] from
something known or assumed, to something else which follows from it’ (Oxford
English Dictionary, 1989, np.), inferences hence represent the tools by which we
can relate the specific to the universal.
In social science we can identify two distinct ways of conceptualising
generalisation: first, the empiricist concept of generality; and second, the realist,
abstractive concept of generality, otherwise known as transfactual
argumentation (Bhaskar, 1975; Danermark et al., 2002).
10 Typically when we
encounter generalisation in social science, we encounter it in terms of the former
sense, where it refers to the extent to which empirical observations derived from
the study of one group of events can be considered a valid means of
apprehending the characteristics of a larger group of events (see Figure 2.1,
upper level). It is thus analogous to inductive extrapolation and its nuances lie at
the heart of statistical debates on representativeness. Yet as we have seen,
10 The term transfactual signifies that the focus for generalisation extends beyond the realm of observable
fact (i.e. the empirical domain) (Bhaskar, 1975).Theory and method
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ontologically-speaking, empiricism is inextricably confined to the domain of the
empirical. It is thus insufficient to solely concern ourselves with questions about
events’ general validity if we are to ensure that social science is to genuinely
possess an explanatory capacity. In contrast, the realist concept of generality
instead refers to what Bhaskar (1975) terms events’ transfactual conditions. That
is to say, for critical realists, the purpose of generalization is thus the
identification of those mechanisms, structures and properties that exist in the
deep domain of the ‘real’ which directly or indirectly constitute ‘actual’
phenomena (Figure 2.1, lower level). For critical realists, this represents the
fundamental essence of Bhaskar’s (1975) revised scientific method.
While empiricist generalisation relies on inductive and deductive logic,
therefore, realist generalisation instead employs two other modes of
inference―abduction and retroduction―that are more suited to the revised 
explanatory goals of social science. In other words, in the same way that a
carpenter recognises that a screwdriver is an inappropriate tool with which to
carve wood, or that an axe is an inappropriate tool with which to achieve a
smooth finish, critical realists here argue that some inferential tools are more
applicable than others in the quest to produce particular types of generalisable
Figure 2.1 Two types of generalisation
Source: adapted from Danermark et al. (2002, p. 77)
Empirical extrapolation (i.e. empiricist generalisation)
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 ……..En Empirical
phenomena/events
S1 S2 S3
Transfactual
argumentation/
retroductive inference
(i.e. realist
generalisation)
Transfactual conditions/ fundamental structuresTheory and method
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explanatory knowledge. Moreover, just as carpenters cannot cut wood effectively
or efficiently with a blunt axe, the social scientist must appreciate that even the
optimal mode of inference for a given situation must be employed in a
considered fashion, underpinned by a thorough understanding of its
epistemological function.
First formalised by Peirce (1932), and termed ‘theoretical redescription’ by
Bhaskar (1975), abduction can be broadly interpreted as a mode of inference that
relies upon creative judgement, critical thinking and causal postulation. Whereas
deduction reasons from the general to the particular, and induction reasons from
the particular to the general, abduction essentially involves recontextualising an
event within a novel conceptual framework in order to give the event meaning
(Peirce, 1932; see also Danermark et al., 2002). By way of example, consider the
following hypothetical situation involving a prison inmate, where we shall draw
on Peirce’s (1932) terms: rule, case and result.
If we are told that all prisoners in the local prison are wearing orange
jumpsuits, and we are about to meet an inmate from the local prison, we do not
need to see the inmate to know for certain that he or she will be wearing an
orange jumpsuit. This is deduction, because we have reasoned from the ‘rule’
(i.e. the universal law that all inmates are wearing orange jumpsuits) to the
‘result’ (i.e. that the inmate is wearing an orange jumpsuit) by way of the ‘case’
(i.e. that the inmate is from the local prison). If, on the other hand, we are
presented with the ‘case’ first―that the inmate is from the local prison―and we 
then observe the ‘result’ (i.e. s/he is wearing an orange jumpsuit), we can induce,
albeit fallibly, a rule (i.e. all inmates in the local prison wear orange jumpsuits).
Finally, if we unexpectedly find a person hiding in a garden wearing an orange
jumpsuit (the result), we abduce by interpreting this event in terms of our
existing knowledge of seemingly relevant ‘rules’ (i.e. our existing knowledge
that all the inmates in the local prison wear orange jumpsuits), and hence imbue
the event with plausible meaning (i.e. the person in the garden might be an
escaped inmate from the local prison (the case)).
When conveyed in formal terms―as with deduction and induction―it is 
easy to lose sight of just how basic and prevalent abduction is in everyday life. In
truth, we constantly abduce when we give meaning to household events by
situating them within broader conceptual frameworks. We infer abductively, forTheory and method
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example, when we interpret the presence of a crumpled sock lying on the stairs in
terms of someone dropping laundry, or the presence of cutlery laid on the dinner
table in terms of an imminent meal. Indeed, abduction is such an elementary
thought process that we hardly need to note its omnipresence in social science;
simply focussing on one set of phenomena―manifestations of capitalism―we 
see Marx ([1867] 1992) abducing in terms of historical materialism; Weber
([1905]1958) in terms of religious conviction; and Sombart (1915) in terms of
greed and possession.
Importantly, deductive conclusions can be logically certain while inductive
and abductive conclusions cannot. For example, at the moment of abductive
inference―from our limited vantage point at the kitchen window―we cannot be 
completely sure that the person lying in the garden is an escaped prisoner. It is
perfectly possible that they were intoxicated and fell asleep in the garden on their
way home from a fancy dress party. Hence, while inductive conclusions can be
strengthened through the intelligent use of statistical tools, the only means of
strengthening abductive conclusions involves attaining greater knowledge of the
mechanisms and structures we employ to make such inferences in the first
instance. Thus, as abductive inference serves to cast events and phenomena in
terms of a particular theoretical light, genuine causal explanation necessitates
retroductive inference ‘from actual phenomena to structural causes...[and] from
manifest phenomena to their generating mechanisms’ (Smith, 2006, p. 8; see also
Bhaskar, 1975). In order to truly explain phenomena, in other words, we must
move beyond abductive inference and purposefully undertake retroductive
processes of transfactual argumentation to arrive at warranted knowledge of
transfactual conditions (cf. Figure 2.1). The criterion upon which retroductive
inferences are to be judged is thus their explanatory power. Just like detective
work, retroduction thus moves beyond abductive ‘hunches’ and interrogates the
generative mechanisms, structures, tendencies and latent powers found in the
domain of the real. Hence, when Inspector Morse admiringly declares “you’ve
done it again, Lewis!” it is because Lewis has formulated and defended a
brilliant retroduction―tying together knowledge of disparate events, 
motivations, testimonies and capacities to account for how and why a particular
phenomenon (e.g. a murder) came to be.Theory and method
- 35 -
While they remain conceptually distinct, abduction and retroduction can be
so intertwined in practice that they are often viewed as synonymous. For
example, when we use abductive inference to recontextualise the phenomenon of
the person in the garden in the context of a potential prison escape, one could
easily argue that our thought process is characteristic of ‘a mode of inference in
which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which
are capable of producing them’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 107). Yet this is Sayer’s
definition of retroduction, not abduction. At the level of relatively simple
phenomena―such as our prisoner example―such conflation is perfectly 
understandable; the two modes of inference are almost indistinguishable here
because, through recontextualisation, we arrive at a viable explanation almost
immediately. However, in the context of more complex social phenomena, it
becomes easier to discern where the modes are respectively employed. Consider,
for example, the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s (1989) explanatory
account of how the holocaust came to be possible. Left unconvinced by existing
explanatory accounts which traced the occurrence of the holocaust to the
spatially- and temporally-contingent socioeconomic characteristics of Nazi
Germany (i.e. economic crisis and anti-Semitism), Bauman (1989) first
abductively recasts the phenomenon of the holocaust in the context of modernity,
arguing that the conditions which made the holocaust possible may instead be
found in the structure of modern society itself. From this platform, he
subsequently retroduces in order to determine those transfactual conditions
which are capable of explaining the holocaust: first, the ‘gardening culture’
constitutive of modernity, through which those who do not ‘fit in’ are removed;
and second, power-laden bureaucratic hierarchies constitutive of modernity,
whereby divisions of labour act to distantiate actors from the consequences of
their actions and authoritarian social control is endemic (see also Danermark et
al., 2002).
In concluding this section, it is worth illustrating how the substantive
components of this thesis―Chapters 3, 4 and 5―simultaneously correspond to 
the cornerstones of the critical realist scientific method and the three research
objectives set out in Section 1.4. As we have discussed, the central activity for
critical realist social science is transfactual argumentation, founded upon
abductive and retroductive inference. Importantly, however, the full criticalTheory and method
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realist method involves four complementary stages which both precede and
succeed these. First, it is necessary to undertake what Danermark et al. (2002)
simply term ‘description’. Here researchers endeavour to depict the nature of
events and experiences found in the ‘actual’ domain, paying particular attention
to the way in which relevant actors make sense of situations. Second, this
depiction is studied by way of ‘analytical resolution’ (ibid.), whereby emergent
themes and significant dimensions of the ‘actual’ are highlighted and recognised
as being of interest. In this thesis, these two stages together correspond to
Chapter 3, where we examine the manner in which policy actors encounter the
notion of ‘best practice’ and, in so doing, accentuate those elements of their
experience which pertain to the notion’s popularity. In Chapter 4, we extend this
analysis by way of abduction and retroduction―attempting to explain the 
ubiquity of the ‘best practice’ in terms of its transfactual conditions. Intertwined
with this, we will also carry out a fifth stage, rephrased as ‘comparative
abstraction’, where the merits and limitations of the emergent explanation are
evaluated against existing abstractions in terms of explanatory penetration―thus 
establishing the extent to which the emergent theory contributes to existing
explanatory knowledge. Finally, in Chapter 5, we return to actual domain and
undertake the process of ‘contextualisation’ (ibid.), whereby the implications of
our retroductive conclusions with regard to the ubiquity of ‘best practice’ are
appraised in a holistic sense―examining the manner in which the structures and 
generative mechanisms uncovered in Chapter 4 interact with other aspects of the
policy development process (see Figure 2.2.).Theory and method
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2.3 Research design
Since their inception, the philosophical positions outlined by Bhaskar (1975,
1979) have come to inform a variety of empirical approaches in sociology,
human geography and heterodox economics. Although some commentators
appear mistaken in equating Bhaskar’s ‘epistemological timidity’ (Pratt, 2009)
with an aversion to questions of method and applied social research (e.g. Baert,
2005), it is from these disciplines that the major works dealing with the
methodological repercussion of Bhaskar’s ontological and epistemological
contributions have emerged (e.g. Sayer, 1992, 2000; Layder, 1990; Ekström,
1992; Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997; Danermark et al., 2002; Lawson, 2003). As
Yeung (1997) and Pratt (2009) point out, and as should hopefully evident from
the preceding sections, this is because critical realism is metatheoretical in
character; it lays the ontological and epistemological foundations for social
Figure 2.2 Objectives, substantive approach and thesis structureTheory and method
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science, but it devolves the formulation of appropriate methodological apparatus
to social scientists themselves.
In this final section, we thus examine how the critical realist sentiment is
manifested in the practice of this research―establishing, describing and 
reflecting upon the means by which the three research objectives stated in
Section 1.4 are to be resolved. To reiterate, these were:
(A) How is the notion of ‘best practice’ encountered and understood within
the UK sustainable transport community?
(B) What are the generative mechanisms and structures that explain the
present ubiquity of ‘best practice’ in the UK sustainable transport
community?
(C) What are the broader implications of ‘best practice’ thinking with regard
to policy learning and policy development?
Significantly, we can consider these three objectives to be related in a
derivational sense. That is to say the strength of arguments made in relation to
(B) will be highly contingent upon the quality of knowledge and argument
produced in relation to (A) and, in turn, the strength of arguments made in
relation to (C) will be highly contingent upon the quality of knowledge and
argument produced in relation to both (A) and (B) (Table 2.1). Given this
derivation, the net worth of the arguments put forward in the forthcoming
chapters will be greatly determined by the extent to which (A) is satisfactorily
addressed. In other words, it is vital that accurate, comprehensive and insightful
knowledge is produced about how actors in the sustainable transport community
presently encounter and understand the notion of ‘best practice’; for if these
foundations are not conceptually sound, subsequent efforts to explain and
appraise the ubiquity of ‘best practice’ thinking will fall short of the required
standard.Theory and method
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Objective Primary knowledge source Complementary knowledge sources
A
(Chapter 3)
Detailed empirical fieldwork ―
B
(Chapter 4)
Output from (A)
Existing literature on ‘best practice’ and
theories of the policy process
C
(Chapter 5)
Output from (B) Approaches to policy learning
In light of this, it is profitable to conceptualise our research design in terms
of what Rom Harré―Roy Bhaskar’s D.Phil. supervisor―terms intensive and
extensive empirical procedures (Sayer, 1992). Unlike other methodological
dichotomies in contemporary social science, this conceptualisation has merit
precisely because it stems explicitly and directly from clear, overarching
ontological and epistemological convictions (in this case, critical realist ones).
Hence, in contrast to the tiresome, blinkered and misguided ‘debate’ between
qualitative and quantitative methods (for an overview, see Kwan and Schwanen,
2009; Essletzbichler, 2009), conceiving of research approaches in intensive or
extensive terms instead enables researchers to recognise the complementarity of
different methodological instruments―given that they may pertain to alternative 
modes of scientific inference and forms of generality. Methodological debates
are thus played out on a more fruitful plane, as researchers recognise the fact that
social scientists may seek different things, by asking different questions and by
using different techniques, whilst genuinely residing in the same epistemological
‘space’.
In addressing objective (B) and ergo (A), it should now be clear that we are
concerned with undertaking retroductive inference in order to establish the
transfactual conditions which account for the ubiquity of the ‘best practice’
notion. Central to this process is the concept of natural necessity, aimed at
defining the indispensable properties that are constitutive of this ubiquity, as
‘abstractions must…at any given point in time, separate the object’s necessary
properties from the contingent ones and show what it is in the object that makes
it what it is and not something else’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 44). The key
Table 2.1 Derivational nature of the research objectivesTheory and method
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question for us here is thus: ‘how is the ubiquity of the ‘best practice’ notion
possible?’ or, more explicitly in terms of natural necessity, ‘what properties must
exist in the world for the ubiquity of the ‘best practice’ notion to exist and be
what it is?’ (ibid.). It is through the straightforward recognition that this question
pertains to the workings of causal process in a set of substantively-related cases
that we arrive at the need for an intensive research approach in this thesis. Our
focus is thus on:
‘processes, activities, relations and episodes of events rather than statistics
on particular characteristics…[hence where] results are more vivid because
they describe individuals and their activities concretely rather than in the
bloodless categories of statistical indicators.’
(Sayer, 1992, p. 242)
While this quote succinctly encapsulates the essence of the intensive
approach, the fact that it has been taken out of context may erroneously portray
Sayer’s (1992) position as anti-extensive. It is worth stressing again that critical
realists, such as Sayer, are strong proponents of extensive research―an approach 
that seeks to discern common properties and patterns in a given population―yet, 
following Bhaskar (1975), they assert that the primary purpose of social science
is explanation; something that extensive research, alone, cannot achieve.
11
Rather, the advantage of extensive research lies in its capacity to buttress
explanatory endeavours through empirical description of what Lawson (2003)
terms ‘demi-regularities’. For example:
‘if we want to understand and explain the new poverty at the end of the
1990s, it is highly relevant to ask ourselves what poverty is like in this
particular case [i.e. through intensive research], but also to ask how many
people there are among the new poor, and what is empirically characteristic
of the new poverty. Thereby we can get some idea of what empirical
patterns are produced by a particular mechanism or structure of
mechanisms’
11 Due to the ‘epistemic fallacy’ discussed in Section 2.1.Theory and method
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(Danermark et al., 2002, p. 166, emphasis added)
Intensive research―in examining causal relations―represents the 
methodological rationale for a wide variety of popular research instruments;
including participant observation, interviews, questionnaire surveys and action
research. In this thesis, the ubiquity of the ‘best practice’ notion is interrogated
through eight, strategically-selected, in-depth case studies, with each study
focusing on the manner in which an individual policy actor encounters and
understands the notion of ‘best practice’ in the context of their professional roles,
objectives and activities. Crucially, this approach fulfils the descriptive
imperative underpinning objective (A), whilst simultaneously providing a
comprehensive and detailed point of departure for the explorative intentions
underpinning objective (B). The selected cases are outlined below in Table 2.2.Theory and method
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In selecting these cases, a range of criteria were employed in order to
maximise the potential critical insights that that they might afford, both
individually and collectively. In essence, these criteria strived to ensure a balance
between what might be termed ‘case homogeneity’ and ‘case heterogeneity’. The
Case Name
[pseudonym]
Organisation
[pseudonym]
Position Job description
A Will Marlsworth County
Council
Transport planner Developing, implementing
and evaluating active travel
policies for Marlsworth
B Sam Marlsworth Cycling
Campaign
Chair † Lobbying Marlsworth’s
politicians and practitioners
to improve local ‘cyclability’
C Chris Marlsworth Pedestrians’
Association
Chair † Lobbying Marlsworth’s
politicians and practitioners
to improve local
‘walkability’
D Martha Whitehall Senior civil
servant
Funding and encouraging
active travel policy
nationwide
E Harry Organisation for
Sustainable Transport
(national charity)
Campaigns
director
Lobbying national
government to develop and
implement more
sustainable transport
policies
F Graham Cycle UK
(national charity)
Campaigns and
policy manager
Lobbying national
government to improve UK
‘cyclability’
G Lisa University of Eastbrook Academic
researcher
Developing and testing
future UK active travel
scenarios in conjunction
with the public and key
stakeholders
H Keith MoveIT
(peer-to-peer
professional network)
Chair Facilitating international
‘best practice’ development
and dissemination amongst
active travel practitioners
† Both Sam and Chris undertake their roles in a voluntary capacity. All other participants are
remunerated professionals.
Table 2.2 Research participants and core attributesTheory and method
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intention for achieving a degree of case homogeneity stems from a wish to
examine the manner in which the notion of ‘best practice’ is encountered and
understood within a particular policy network. In the introductory chapter, we
problematised the notion of ‘best practice’ within the broad context of
sustainable transport policy. Our empirical focus, however, is purposefully
narrower; centred upon a relatively close-knit policy network almost exclusively
concerned with the short-, medium- and long-term future of walking and cycling
(active travel) in the United Kingdom.Specifically, all eight participants were
drawn from a group of advisors and stakeholders connected to a UK research
council-funded project which we shall call the ‘Futures project’.
12 Each
participant is UK-based, with an almost exclusive professional focus on UK
active travel.
The reason for selecting the participants from this network is twofold. First,
a tacit axiom appears evident in the broad transport policy literature that a
commonality of understanding exists around the notion of ‘best practice’―most 
apparent in the fact that the notion is almost never defined. If such commonality
of understanding were indeed to be present, it is more than reasonable to assume
that it would manifest itself most palpably amongst a relatively homogenous,
cohesive subset of the transport policy community (as this would ‘control’
somewhat for potentially varying interpretations according to modal or
geographic foci). However, if we can demonstrate a divergence of understanding
at the network scale (cf. Chapter 3) we can immediately discredit this postulate.
Second, with respect to ‘positionality’ (Valentine, 1997; McDowell, 1998), I
am a member of this particular policy network myself.
13 This proved highly
beneficial in the research process, often in intangible ways. For example,
possessing a sound understanding of participants’ professional objectives and
activities in advance of the research, as well enjoying personal friendships with
12 The Futures project seeks to develop and explore a range of potential urban futures for UK cities, with a
particular focus on improving the quality of the urban environment for walking and cycling. Specifically,
the project involves the creation of internally-consistent mobility scenarios, sensitive to various societal,
economic and environmental priorities, the development of multimedia narratives for use with
stakeholders and the public, and the development of innovative multi-criteria analysis methods to assess
the likely implications of alternative futures.
13 As a research fellow in the Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford, a substantial proportion of my
work is concerned with developing medium- to long-term strategies for increasing rates of active travel in
the UK.Theory and method
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some of them, enabled the exploration and probing of certain issues in much
greater depth―and often in much great frankness―than would have otherwise 
been possible. This ‘closeness’ to the material also greatly facilitated the
analytical and conceptual work undertaken in respect of objectives (B) and (C).
As noted above, however, I consciously sought to temper the extent of case
homogeneity with a degree of case heterogeneity. Hence, within the overarching
network, individual decisions on participant selection were made in respect to
three criteria―relating to ex-ante estimations of potential cases’ ‘circumstance’,
‘scale’ and ‘function’, respectively. By ‘circumstance’ I refer to the whether a
potential case was thought to most closely represent: (1) what Denscombe (2007)
terms an extreme case, whereby retroductive inference is actively facilitated
though the appearance of a phenomenon (i.e. usage of ‘best practice’) in an
abnormally pure or explicit form (cf. Graham, Lisa, Keith); or (2) what Collier
(1994) terms a pathological case, whereby retroductive inference is actively
facilitated though the appearance of a phenomenon (i.e. usage of ‘best practice’)
as a result system flux and disruption (cf. Will, Sam, Chris, Martha, Harry).
14
By ‘scale’, I simply refer to whether a potential case was thought to be
concerned with: (1) national, UK-wide active travel policy (cf. Martha, Harry,
Graham); (2) local active travel policy constituted at the city/county level (cf.
Will, Sam, Chris); or (3) overarching, ascalar policy-related support (cf. Lisa,
Keith). By ‘function’, I refer to whether a potential case was thought to be
characterised by: (1) demand-side responsibilities and activities, pertaining to
actors with a campaigning objective seeking to change the status quo―with 
whom the notion of ‘best practice’ is often associated (cf. Sam, Chris, Harry,
Graham); (2) supply-side responsibilities and activities, pertaining to public
sector actors with development or managerial objectives, seeking to formulate,
implement and/or evaluate active travel policies (cf. Will, Martha); or (3)
facilitatory responsibilities indirectly related to policy (cf. Lisa, Keith). Ensuring
scalar and functional heterogeneity in this manner was considered to be crucial in
14 Technically-speaking, it may be that Collier’s (1994) pathological analogy is more appropriate to
‘extreme’ cases. The OED (1989), for example, define ‘pathological’ in the mathematical sense as:
‘grossly abnormal in properties or behaviour; not exhibiting certain properties common to almost all other
examples of its class’. However, Collier’s (1994) usage is followed here for continuity.Theory and method
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order to make substantive contributions with respect to objectives (A), (B) and
(C).
Upon identifying each case as appropriate and desirable for inclusion, letters
of request were written to the respective actors outlining the objectives and
desired outcomes of the research. Happily, positive responses were received from
all. Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between the various selection criteria
discussed above and the final eight cases chosen.
A.Will
B.Sam
C.Chris
D.Martha
E.Harry
F.Graham
G.Lisa
H.Keith
Case
heterogeneity
Case
homogeneity
Circumstance Scale Function
The specific procedure by which actors’ encounters with, and
understandings of, the ‘best practice’ notion were explored consisted of two
substantive elements: semi-structured interviews and a technique known as
‘cognitive mapping’. Interviews with each participant were conducted on a face-
to-face basis, with five taking place at participants’ workplaces, two at
participants’ homes and one at my own office in Oxford. Lasting anywhere
Figure 2.3 Research participants and case selection criteriaTheory and method
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between 45 minutes to 1.5 hours, each interview was digitally recorded and
followed three pre-determined stages. In Stage 1, the participant was asked in
great detail about their ultimate professional objectives, their routine actions, the
‘targets’ that they sought to achieve through these actions and the key audiences
that they felt it was necessary to both ‘speak’ and ‘listen’ to. This laid the
contextual foundations for Stage 2, where the interview proceeded to trace
exactly how the notion of ‘best practice’ was encountered within this
professional framework. Depending on their individual circumstances, the
discussion here pertained to either endogenous interaction, whereby participants
themselves made direct or indirect use of the ‘best practice’ notion in order to
meet their objectives, exogenous interaction, whereby participants’ abilities to
meet their objectives were directly or indirectly impacted by external actors’
usage of the ‘best practice’ notion, or a combination of the two. Finally, in Stage
3, the interview concluded with a discussion of participants’ understanding of the
notion of ‘best practice’ in a broader sense. In other words, the conversation
stepped back from a focus on how the notion was manifested in their
professional activities, and instead encouraged participants to reflect upon its
generic advantages, limitations, meanings and implications as they perceived
them. A sample interview schedule from Case A, illustrating these three stages,
is provided in Appendix (i).
Following each interview, audio recordings were transcribed using a word-
processing package and a process of referential coding was undertaken in order
to organise the resultant body of textual data into a suitable format for
examination (see Denscombe, 2007). In part, this involved high-level ascription
of the data to the three objectives (A), (B) and (C), according to their respective
relevance. More significantly, however, this involved a reflexive engagement
with questions of analysis and interpretation. Indeed, considering interviews as
‘dialogue rather than interrogation’ (Valentine, 1997, p. 111) or ‘conversation[s]
with a purpose’ (Eyles, 1988 in ibid., p. 111), it becomes clear that beyond the
obvious need for reflexivity and sensitivity there is little definitive guidance
available to support researchers’ interpretive efforts (in contrast to the well-
documented, procedural guidance aiding statistical analysis). Indeed, analysis of
interview data is a messy, iterative process shot through with questions of
representation, veracity and meaning. As ever with such practices, there is aTheory and method
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balance to be struck. As Crang (1997, p. 183) tellingly observes, ‘analysing
qualitative material is not an ineffable and mysterious process but neither is it a
case of painting by numbers’. Hence, while one must retain a belief in the
possibility of making valid interpretations (thereby avoiding over-anxious
paralysis), it is vital to acknowledge the fact that making sense of interview-
generated ‘talk data’ material is far from unproblematic.
Following the tenets of ‘grounded theory’, the data were interrogated using
two forms of analytical coding: open coding and selective coding (Strauss, 1987).
Collectively, these pertain to a process whereby relevant descriptions, arguments
and opinions articulated by participants during the interviews are both
categorised and analysed according to their various properties and dimensions. In
practice, however, it is often difficult to clearly distinguish between open and
selective codes, as the process of analytical coding is characterised by a
significant degree of iterative movement between these two forms. Open
coding―involving the recognition and formalisation of emergent themes in the
data (such as the theme of ‘outcome/process conflation’ introduced in Chapter
3)―entailed a thorough, line-by-line reading of the transcripts, making detailed 
notes and attempting to get a ‘feel’ for the data. This was an extremely fruitful
process; new insights continually emerged, and others that had been all too
fleeting in the maelstrom of the fieldwork also returned and became clarified.
Through selective coding, these themes were related together in a systematic
fashion so as to support theoretical analysis (ibid). However, as Crang (1997)
argues, codes are not to be understood as an explanatory end in their own right.
Thus the interpretation of material was inextricably tied into the ontological
framework of critical realism. Hence, selective coding was closely aligned to
processes of retroductive inference and the search for the generative mechanisms
and contextual triggers (Collier, 1994) discussed in Chapter 4. Interestingly, the
value of the coding and interpretation stage was heighted by the fact that it
proceeded without access to standard qualitative analysis software (which,
working professionally as a qualitative researcher over the previous few years, I
had become accustomed to using). As troubling as this initially felt, the absence
of technological mediation in the interpretation of the raw interview data actually
appeared to prove beneficial. In being forced to approach the thorny issue of
coding and analysis from ‘first principles’, and in devising a tailored coding treeTheory and method
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based upon a series of separate working documents, I felt much more attuned,
and ‘closer’ to the data than I had initially thought possible―aiding both recall 
and interpretation.
The final point to make in relation to interpretation concerns the production
of a ‘good’ account. Traditionally, and perhaps in line with the etymology of the
term, the interpretive merits of ethnographic accounts were judged with respect
to the degree to which they convincingly reflected the worldviews of the
participants involved (Crang, 1997). Such a conception clearly chimes with the
requirements of Objective (A). Appreciating how the notion of ‘best practice’ is
understood and encountered in the UK active travel community necessitates that
interpretation and discussion remains faithful to these understandings, as to
deviate significantly from them would inherently jeopardise the quality of our
account. However, Objective (B)―together with critical realist 
convictions―demands that our account must go beyond participants’ immediate 
(and necessarily partial) understandings and attempt to trace the underlying
forces and ‘unsaid structures’ (Crang, 1997; Giddens, 1984) that might serve to
explain how and why the notion of ‘best practice’ continues to exist. There are,
of course, legitimate concerns that may be raised here with regard to the
‘privileging’ of the researcher’s voice. Again, it is a question of balance and
judgement. However, I feel strongly that―providing caution, sensitivity and 
reflexivity are humbly exercised―there ought to be room for researchers to 
make connections between phenomena and to draw attention to unrecognised
themes. Indeed, if this were not the case, it would be legitimate to question the
validity of social science as an enterprise per se.
The second substantive element in the research procedure, as noted above,
was a technique known as ‘cognitive mapping’. Essentially, cognitive mapping is
a means of diagrammatically representing an individual’s perception of a
particular issue through the depiction of salient causal relationships―perhaps 
most strongly epitomised by the work of Axelrod (1976), Eden (1992) or the
contributions to Huff and Jenkins’s (2002) edited collection Mapping Strategic
Knowledge. The bulk of the academic attention fostered on cognitive mapping in
recent decades has tended to come from scholars working in management
science and organisational behaviour, although limited usage is evident inTheory and method
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mainstream sociology, political science and economic geography (see,
respectively, Carley and Palmquist, 1992; Young, 1996; Pinch et al., 2010).
Before we discuss the justification for employing cognitive mapping in this
research, it is important to pre-empt two potential misinterpretations of the term.
First, the semantic associations of the term ‘cognitive’ in this context arguably do
more harm than good, for they tacitly endow the technique with greater
transformational significance than it genuinely merits (Pinch et al., 2010).
Importantly then, cognitive mapping is not concerned with representing a model
of cognition per se. Rather, it is viewed in this thesis as a useful heuristic device
with which to trace and interpret participants’ encounters with―and, indirectly, 
their understandings of―the notion of ‘best practice’ as it relates to their 
professional undertakings (ibid.; Eden, 1992). To state this plainly, a cognitive
psychologist would glean nothing of substantive interest from our approach.
Second, it is important to differentiate the form of cognitive mapping employed
here from that associated with the earlier work of Lynch (1960) and others in the
sub-discipline of behavioural geography, whereby cognitive mapping instead
refers to:
‘a process composed of series of psychological transformations by which an
individual acquires, codes, stores, recalls and decodes information about the
relative locations and attributes of phenomena in his (sic) everyday spatial
environment.’
(Downs and Stea, 1973, p. 9)
As should now be evident, cognitive mapping was primarily employed in
order to support the fulfilment of objective (A) and, to a lesser extent, objective
(B). Hence, the specific nature of the causal maps contained in this thesis, and
the manner in which they ought to be interpreted, are set out in Chapter 3 where
the first map to be discussed―Will’s (Case A)―will be thoroughly explained. 
The intention in this chapter, however, is to justify the use of cognitive mapping
in terms of its contribution to the research process beyond that afforded by semi-
structured interviewing alone. Specifically, I argue that cognitive mapping adds
value in two distinct ways. First, it offers what might be termed descriptive
benefits. That is to say, while the standard means for relaying significantTheory and method
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qualitative data consists of extended discursive narrative interspersed with
interview vignettes, cognitive maps―in providing a holistic and accessible 
summary of cause-effect relations―instead serve to ‘ground’ such discussion in 
terms of the overarching purposive context for each case. Hence, they ably link
participants’ actions to their wider objectives whilst retaining the discursive
flexibility afforded by qualitative data. Second, it offers analytical benefits.
Specifically, their focus on causal reasoning serves to clarify trains of argument
and provides a sense of how pertinent variables in a situation interact, thus aiding
interpretability of the data. Moreover, in following the same overarching
format―set out in terms of participants’ objectives, targets, audiences, actions 
and encounters with the notion of ‘best practice’―the cognitive maps enable 
readers to compare and contrast participants’ actions and perceptions at a holistic
level; something not usually possible in standard qualitative research without
poring over raw interview transcripts.
The existing literature sets out two principle approaches for cognitive
mapping (see Hodgkinson et al., 2004). The first of these involves asking
participants to complete what is commonly-termed an ‘implication grid’―a large 
matrix comprised of a set of variables set out along both the x-axis and the y-
axis―which provides space for participants to state their perception of postulated 
causal relationships. There are several disadvantages to this approach; however,
the main limitation is the need for the researcher to specify, ex-ante, the causal
variables that he or she is most interested in. Clearly, this is inappropriate for this
research as our aim is not to test a theory predicated on causal relationships, but
rather to create one. The second approach―freehand mapping―facilitates this 
through gleaning causal relationships from participants themselves, and is thus
the approach followed in this thesis. The standard method for freehand mapping
involves the researcher and participant co-producing a cognitive map in situ,
literally sitting down together with a pencil and a large sheet of paper and tracing
out the causal relationships linking numerous variables. The rationale for this is
easily appreciable; participants are in the best position to explicate their causal
understandings of a particular situation, while the researcher is assumed to play a
faciliatory role in the development of the map, prompting and probing for causal
relationships where they are not readily forthcoming.Theory and method
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However, having attempted this method several times in a previous project
(see Pinch et al., 2010), I am of the opinion that the in situ format is plagued by
numerous practical drawbacks. In essence, these can all be traced back to the fact
that it requires both the researcher and the participant to perform a raft of
complex mental processes in addition to those already required during the course
of a standard interview. Although relatively experienced in interviewing,
15 I still
find that it requires considerable mental effort to build and maintain
conversational flow and rapport, whilst ensuring the discussion is balanced with
respect to emergent and pre-specified themes and fits comfortably within an
allocated timeframe. Like a difficult game of tennis, this typically involves
thinking three or four ‘shots’ ahead―ensuring that each question or prompt 
makes a definite contribution, however small, to the end result. The added
burden placed on both parties through the addition of a cognitive mapping
exercise, therefore, is significant. To be performed properly, the time-consuming
process of extracting causal relationships in situ would involve making highly
unreasonable demands on the participants―something I was not prepared to do. 
I hence attempted to circumvent this issue by producing the cognitive maps
myself―based on the content of each semi-structured interview―and 
subsequently submitting these draft maps to the respective participants for
verification. This may be viewed as five-stage process. First, in the informal
preamble to each interview I made it clear to participants that my intention was
to create a cognitive map from the impeding discussion. At this point I also
showed them an example of a map I had produced for a previous project. Second,
during the interviews, I made a conscious effort to frame questions in such a
manner that participants often either responded directly or implicitly in causal
terms. Where these were not readily forthcoming, I often opted to posit a causal
relationship myself, and immediately gave participants an opportunity to either
confirm or refute my assertion. Third, I thoroughly read and re-read the interview
transcripts, extracting all stated or insinuated causal relationships and proceeded
to represent these in diagrammatical form, making a conscious effort to build
each map around the participants’ objectives, targets, audience, and the
15 Prior to the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis, I had conducted around 150 interviews under the
auspices of various academic projects. These covered a range of fields, including: social networking,
public health, commercial design and sustainable transport.Theory and method
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endogenous and/or exogenous influence of the ‘best practice’ notion. This
entailed several hours of concentrated thinking per map, testament to the
limitations of the in situ method. Fourth, acknowledging that this process builds
in plenty of opportunities for misinterpretation, participants were emailed the
draft maps and asked to check for errors of commission―where the nature of 
causal relationships and/or variables were incorrect―and errors of 
omission―where causal relationships and/or variables were missing. 
Conclusions
Drawing on a range of secondary literature, this chapter has discussed the
theoretical and methodological frameworks underpinning this thesis. First,
grounded in Bhaskar’s (1975, 1979) philosophy of science, it has articulated the
core ontological convictions of critical realism. The argument here concerned the
need to conceptualise reality as ‘stratified’ in character (avoiding the ‘epistemic
fallacy’ necessarily committed by empiricist reasoning). In addition, the need to
recognise the openness of social systems was heavily emphasised, leading to a
sustained critique of the Humean, successionist conception of causality. In its
place, a normic view of causality was advocated, discussed in terms of
tendencies and (contingent) generative mechanisms. Secondly, the
epistemological implications of critical realist ontology were explored. Here it
was stressed that the primary goal of social science is explanation, interpreted as
a process of detailed abstraction which, via transfactual argumentation, is
designed to reveal the generative mechanisms and structures acting to constitute
events. Given the nature of this abstraction, and the absence of meaningful social
laws, the value of both abductive and retroductive inference was highlighted.
Finally, the research design was discussed at length. After making the case for
pursuing an intensive approach, eight strategically-selected case studies were
briefly outlined. This was followed by a discussion of the methodological and
practical considerations involved in undertaking in-depth, semi-structured
interviews and cognitive mapping. Next, in Chapter 3, we shall trace the manner
in which the notion of ‘best practice’ is variously encountered and understood by
the research participants.Encountering ‘best practice’
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Chapter 3
Encountering ‘best practice’:
analytical description
‘In cities, formulaic responses thoughtlessly repeat what has gone
before. Issues are approached from narrow perspectives and fail to
capture reality. Solutions are driven by manageable financial calculation
with no room for insight and potential. Uncreative urban acts are all
around us in spite of the best practice exceptions and, as a result,
mainstream town planning interventions tend to disappoint. People seem
fearful of discussing what quality and 21
st century urbanism is or could
be...[I]f best practice were gathered in one place, our ‘dream city’ would
exist – perhaps.’
― Charles Landry (2008, p. 41)
Taken from The Creative City, this epigraph provides an illustrative insight into
the well-known urbanist Charles Landry’s understanding of the ‘best practice’
notion. Most evidently, we can see that he regards ‘best practice’ to be
emancipatory in nature; the notion is framed as the creative antithesis of a
‘formulaic’ status quo and is thus held to be symbolic of innovation and
potential. Ostensibly, this conceptualisation is highly compatible with the
received understandings of the ‘best practice’ notion outlined in Chapter 1.
Indeed, if we were to come across this passage in a different context―in 
developing a critique of mainstream urban planning, for example―the manner in 
which the notion of ‘best practice’ is employed would be of little interest.
On closer inspection, however, legitimate questions may be asked about
Landry’s position. Where he states ‘in spite of the best practice exceptions’, for
example, he implicitly characterises the notion of ‘best practice’ in relative
terms, asserting that ‘best practices’ are superior to typical ‘uncreative urban
acts’. Yet in speaking of a hypothetical ‘dream city’, the notion is additionallyEncountering ‘best practice’
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characterised in absolute terms, whereby the geographic accumulation of
disparate ‘best practices’ would be constitutive of an ‘urban utopia’ (ibid., p. xi).
Just what, then, does Landry (2008) mean by ‘best’? Should it be taken to mean
that (1) ‘best’ practice X is better than practices Y, Z, etc.? Or that (2) ‘best’
practice X corresponds perfectly to a facet of our urban ideal, whatever that may
be? These two senses are clearly conceptually distinct, yet this distinction has
gone unacknowledged.
I start with this epigraph because it neatly encapsulates the purpose of
Chapter 3. In addressing objective (A), we are here concerned with tracing the
nuanced, complex and sometimes contradictory manner in which the notion of
‘best practice’ is both encountered and understood within the sustainable
transport community (cf. Section 1.4). In critical realist terms, we are thus
undertaking processes of ‘description’ and ‘analytical resolution’ (Danermark et
al., 2002)―documenting how the research participants experience and makes 
sense of the ‘best practice’ notion in relation to their professional objectives and
activities. In so doing, emergent themes will together sketch out the ‘demi-
regularities’ of ‘best practice’ found in the domain of the actual―forming an 
empirical foundation for later theoretical work in Chapters 4 and 5 (Lawson,
2003; Bhaskar, 1975).
As with all case study research, there are difficult decisions to made here
concerning how the data ought to be reported and discussed (Yin, 2003). On the
one hand, arguments can be made for structuring this chapter on a case-by-case
basis―successively introducing and discussing each case in relative isolation. 
On the other hand, there are compelling reasons for arranging the discussion
according to pertinent theoretical variables. There are, of course, both advantages
and disadvantages to each of these positions. Following the former model
maintains the structural integrity of each case, and enables readers to understand
emergent themes in the context in which they have arisen. Yet, this occurs at the
expense of thematic discussion between cases―something rather central to the 
critical realist approach. In the latter model, this dilemma is turned on its head;
thematic discussion is easily facilitated, but there is little value added by the case
studies above and beyond a purely conceptual discussion based on ‘disembodied’
interview extracts.Encountering ‘best practice’
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Clearly, one way in which a balance might be struck between these two
alternatives is to briefly introduce each case in turn―conveying its basic tenets 
and retaining a degree of contextual awareness―before comparatively discussing 
emergent themes. However, when more than two or three cases are involved, this
dialectical approach risks placing a particularly onerous burden on both author
and reader alike as comparative discussion simply becomes too complex to
adequately manage and process. In order to avoid this, discussion in Chapter 3 is
thus separated into three manageable sections, structured according to the spatial
scales at which the eight participants perform their professional duties: first, we
shall focus on the experiences of Will, Sam and Chris who are directly involved
in local active travel policy within the same city, Marlsworth. Second, we will
examine the experiences of Martha, Harry and Graham, who are directly
involved in national active travel policy; and third, we will examine the
experiences of Lisa and Keith, who are indirectly involved with active travel
policy at both scales.
16
3.1 Interpreting cognitive maps
Before proceeding with the substantive content of this chapter, it is first
necessary to briefly explain how the cognitive maps that accompany the eight
cases ought to be interpreted. Figure 3.1 shows a segment of Will’s map (Case
A) that attempts to graphically represent the manner in which his ultimate
objectives are influenced by what we can loosely term ‘targets’ and, in turn,
‘audiences’. These overarching categories are represented by the light blue
shaded areas. Beyond denoting sections of the map that correspond to particular
issues, these are of no particular significance; they function as an orientation
device, similar to gridlines on an Ordnance Survey map. The small pieces of text
in the map, however, are important. These are termed nodes and represent the
basic concepts that Will refers to in the interview when he attempts to describe
and explain various issues relating to his professional position. The vast majority
16 It is important to note that this scalar differentiation is merely employed in order to facilitate comparative
analyses of participants’ experiences; cases are not purported to be ‘representative’ in an inductive sense.Encountering ‘best practice’
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of these nodes are variable in nature; they can increase or decrease according to
various influences.
17 For example, one or the nodes relating to ‘audiences’ reads:
‘Quality of practitioners’ strategic recommendations’ (Figure 3.1, left hand
side). This can, of course, improve or decline.
Vitalityofcityeconomy
andcommunities
OBJECTIVE(S) TARGET(S) KEY AUDIENCE(S)
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Solid lines in the map represent positive causal relationships between nodes and
dashed lines represent negative causal relationships, while the arrow at the end
of each line indicates direction of causality.
18 All else being equal, this means
that if nodes (A) and (B) are linked with a solid line that starts at (A) and ends at
(B), then as (A) increases, so too (B) increases. Correspondingly, as (A)
decreases, (B) will also decrease. If the two are linked with a dashed line, on the
other hand, as (A) increases, (B) will decrease and as (A) decreases, (B) will
increase. Crucially, the overall ‘magnitude’ of a particular node may well be
determined by its relations to several other nodes.
17 Occasionally, there will be nodes in the maps that refer to instances or events, such as ‘Wallborough study
visit’ (Sam’s map in Case B) where this is not applicable. However, this should not pose a problem for the
interpretability of any map.
18 Our discussion of causality in this context should not be read as following on from the discussion of
Humean and realist causality presented in Chapter 2. Rather, in cognitive mapping, we are concerned with
how the participants themselves view the nature of relationships between various concepts. Indeed, for our
purposes it is largely irrelevant whether or not a causal relationship specified by a participant is present in
‘reality’ or not. By default, if it matters to the participant, it matters to us.
Figure 3.1 A sample cognitive mapEncountering ‘best practice’
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Although this may sound complicated, the cognitive maps are really very
straightforward and intuitive to follow. Indeed, we can illustrate these points
using a well-known example from physiology. Leaving aside genetic factors, it is
widely acknowledged that if we consume more calories than we expend over a
certain period of time, our weight will increase. Using the same symbols found in
Figure 3.1, our causal reasoning about this simple system can hence be
represented as follows (Figure 3.2):
Body
mass
index Calorie
expenditure
Calorie
consumption
Desirability
ofmodal
split
Car split
PT split
W&Csplit
Now notice the similarity between Figure 3.2 and the adjacent extract from
Will’s map reproduced as Figure 3.3. In the same way that we can understand
body mass to be a function of calorie consumption and expenditure, we can
understand the desirability of a particular modal split―from Will’s 
perspective―to be a function of car use, public transport use and uptake of 
walking/cycling.
19 As the solid and dashed lines indicate, Will would find the
modal split to be more desirable if car use were to decline relative to usage of
public transport and active travel. In turn, this increase in the desirability of the
modal split has a positive causal influence on Will’s two objectives (Figure 3.1,
right hand side).
Finally, it must be noted that the maps presented in this chapter are not ‘to
scale’. This might sound like an odd point to make about cognitive maps, but it is
an important one to bear in mind for two reasons: (1) in their current format the
maps are unable to illustrate the relative importance of nodes or relationships as
19 Modal split refers to the proportion of trips undertaken by different modes of transport within specified
geographical and temporal parameters (e.g. 60% car; 20% public transport; 10% cycling; 10% walking).
Figure 3.3 Causal representation
of modal split
Figure 3.2 Causal representation
of BMIEncountering ‘best practice’
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participants perceive them; as a result, this should be solely inferred from the
chapter text; and (2), somewhat related to this, no significance should hence be
attributed to the amount of page space, length of lines or number of nodes used in
the maps to depict particular relationships. You will see that each of the eight
maps have been structured, from right to left, according to participants’
‘objectives’ (OBJ), ‘targets’ (TRG), ‘audiences’ (AUD), ‘activities’ including or
excluding endogenous functions of ‘best practice’ (ACT) and, in some cases,
‘exogenous functions of best practice’ (EXG). Beyond this structure, the specific
placement of nodes and lines mainly reflects the need to ensure that the overall
dimensions of the map are compatible with standard printing formats.
3.2 Local encounters: active travel in Marlsworth
In this section, we will focus exclusively on the manner in which the notion of
‘best practice’ is variously encountered by three key policy actors in the English
city of Marlsworth.
20 Case (A) concerns the experience of Will, a transport
planner working for Marlsworth County Council who has a significant degree of
responsibility for active travel policy in the city. Cases (B) and (C), respectively,
concern the experiences of two local policy campaigners, Sam and Chris. Sam is
the chair of an organisation called Marlsworth Bicyclists and Chris is the chair of
Marlsworth Pedestrians’ Association. Both Sam and Chris routinely lobby
Marlsworth County Council and local politicians with the objective of improving
conditions for cycling and walking in the city. Indeed, it is important to realise
that Will, Sam and Chris are well-known to each other. Sam and Chris are good
friends, and have joined forces on several occasions when the need to make
forceful points to Marlsworth County Council has arisen. Will, although a keen
cyclist himself, is often the target of these ‘forceful points’ and meets regularly
with Sam, Chris and representatives from other lobbying organisations every
four to five months.
Before we briefly introduce the three cases, it is worth reminding ourselves
that in Chapter 2, they were held to represent what Collier (1994) terms
20 Marlsworth is a pseudonym. In terms of population, it is larger than Bath but smaller than Plymouth.Encountering ‘best practice’
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‘pathological’ cases, whereby the appearance of a phenomenon (i.e. the ‘best
practice’ notion) is augmented through system flux and disruption. In the case of
Marlsworth, this relates to the fact that Will and his team at the County Council
are currently in the process of developing a new ‘local transport plan’ (LTP3),
which will govern local transport policy decision-making from 2011 to 2016. In
its proposal for LTP3, the County Council lists three high-level priorities. One of
these is ‘developing and increasing cycling and walking for local journeys,
recreation and health.’ As a result, an increased level of attention is currently
being paid to active travel in Marlsworth, and an opportunity for enacting change
is widely recognised amongst actors on all sides of the policy debate. Will is
currently drafting the active travel strategy for LTP3, while Sam, Chris and
others are seeking to influence its eventual content through lobbying and
responding to LTP3 consultation documents.Encountering ‘best practice’
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Case: A
Pseudonym: Will
Organisation: Marlsworth County Council (MCC)
Role: Transport planner
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
As a local authority planner, Will has wide range of responsibilities relating to
transport in the city of Marlsworth. As shown on the far right hand side of Will’s
cognitive map (Figure 3.4; OBJ), his overarching professional objective is to
‘ensure the city’s economy and communities continue to thrive, whilst protecting
and enhancing its unique environment’. The extent to which Will and his team
achieve this objective rests, in turn, upon their ability to address three ‘targets’
(i.e. measurable indicators of success): first, the desirability of the transport
modal split in Marlsworth, determined by relative increases in walking, cycling
and public transport, and relative decreases in private car travel; second, the
quality of Marlsworth’s urban realm; and third, the economic vitality of the city
centre. Underpinning all of these targets is the degree to which MCC develops
and implements high-quality transport policies. Through his work, Will seeks to
ensure that the planning team make high-quality, strategic policy
recommendations that directly improve the decision-making capacity of local
politicians.
***Encountering ‘best practice’
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Case: B
Pseudonym: Sam
Organisation: Marlsworth Bicyclists (MB)
Role: Chair
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
Sam founded Marlsworth Bicyclists approximately six years ago, after returning
to Marlsworth from an extensive period of overseas travel to find that the
‘cyclability’ of the city had deteriorated during his absence.
21 As of 2010, the
organisation has approximately 250 members, although the bulk of its activities
are undertaken by a small organising committee. The objective of MB is simply
to improve the quality of ‘cyclability’ in the city. For Sam, this is essentially
determined by the nature of MCC’s local transport policies, and the extent to
which these are adequately implemented by practitioners. The organisation thus
seeks to ensure that local transport policies include measures to support cycling
and reduce car use in the city. As a result, Sam and his team focus their campaign
efforts on increasing politicians’, practitioners’ and the public’s commitment to
cyclability.
***
21 ‘Cyclability’ and ‘walkability’ are simply shorthand terms for the quality of cycling or walking conditions
in a particular area. Areas considered to have high levels of cyclability or walkability will meet key
criteria related to safety, legibility, convenience, etc.Encountering ‘best practice’
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Case: C
Pseudonym: Chris
Organisation: Marlsworth Pedestrians’ Association (MPA)
Role: Chair
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
Chris is a long-standing campaigner for the rights of pedestrians in the UK.
Although presently retired, chairing MPA in a voluntary capacity, his previous
career involved periods as a transport planner, a university lecturer on traffic
engineering and a policy adviser to a national sustainable transport charity in
London. The fundamental objective of MPA, in Chris’s words, is to ensure
“intelligent delivery of walkability” within the city. In other words, MPA exists
in order to improve the quality of MCC’s local transport policy. Such
improvement, for Chris, pertains to both improved pedestrian facilities in the
city, and the adoption of measures designed to reduce adverse impacts of car use.
Exactly like MB (cf. Case B), therefore, MPA concentrate their campaign efforts
on increasing politicians’, practitioners’ and the public’s commitment to
walkability.
***Encountering ‘best practice’
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Figure 3.4 Will’s cognitive map (Case A)Encountering ‘best practice’
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Figure 3.6 Chris’s cognitive map (Case A)Encountering ‘best practice’
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Endogenous and exogenous functions of ‘best practice’
In what ways, then, do these three local policy actors encounter and understand
the notion of ‘best practice’? The most immediate observation we can make is
the marked differences between Will and Sam on the one hand, who both appear
to be relatively comfortable with ‘best practice’ in the context of their
organisational activities, and Chris on the other hand, who strongly objects to
‘best practice’ approaches and makes a point of never employing the phrase
himself. In the following discussion, therefore, we will first discuss the manner
in which Will and Sam encounter the notion, before exploring the reasons why
Chris finds the notion of ‘best practice’ so problematic.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the principle manner in which the notion of ‘best
practice’ is encountered by Will and his colleagues at Marlsworth County
Council is in relation to policy learning. Specifically, Will holds ‘best practices’
to represent tangible policy interventions that have performed successfully in a
different geographical context and which may, if replicated, perform similarly
successfully in Marlsworth:
“The notion of ‘best practice’ is the notion of success of various policies and strategies. So
what people have set out to achieve―have they achieved that? And if they have, what have 
they done to achieve that? And can that be taken and transplanted elsewhere? Can we use
that ‘best practice’?”
(Will, interview, original emphasis)
Although Will describes his involvement in active travel projects as being “from
cradle to grave”, the majority of his current work in relation to LTP3 is focused
on policy formulation―developing ‘packages’ of various policy measures, 
including those related to infrastructure improvement, parking management,
active travel promotion, safety and security. In so doing, Will emphasised that he
and his colleagues constantly undertake processes of policy learning, and
routinely examine national and international ‘best practices’ in the construction
of future policies and strategies:Encountering ‘best practice’
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“We do that a lot really, trying to gather best practices…especially with the public realm
stuff that we’re doing…we’re constantly using what best practice there is around, but
unfortunately, because we don’t have a huge number of examples in this country, we look
abroad.”
(Will, interview)
When “gathering” and “looking” for ‘best practices’ in this way, Will and his
colleagues typically draw upon three main sources of information (Figure 3.4,
left hand side). First, citing the internet as “a wonderful thing”, Will often
undertakes online research, which provides a straightforward, desk-based and
hassle-free means of acquiring information (albeit often superficial) about the
nature of myriad active travel interventions worldwide. Second, Will argued that
the collective experience of large consultancy firms can act as a rich depository
of international policy knowledge, and this can be tapped as and when the need
arises. Most significantly, however, Will thirdly stressed the importance of
informal communication and networking with fellow practitioners as a means of
both identifying and understanding ‘best practices’ in context:
“We’ll phone up another borough councils or district councils or transport authorities when
they’ve done something that we feel we could benefit from. And going to conferences and
things like that is invaluable, because the networking is invaluable, so I learnt a lot from a
conference I went to in Brighton and I got a personal guided tour of what they had done [in
their city centre], and what they are doing to get cycling city status, and that was really
helpful.”
(Will, interview)
Broadly speaking, this ‘learning-orientated’ understanding of the ‘best
practice’ notion is shared by Sam (Figure 3.5, ACT). Along with other senior
members of Marlsworth Bicyclists, Sam is highly aware of what might be termed
‘international cycling best practice’, and this awareness constitutes a notable part
of the organisation’s knowledge base:Encountering ‘best practice’
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“We have ideas about ‘best practice’ from the Netherlands and Germany and places like
that and we’re really aware of that and we go on the websites of places like
Copenhagenize.com and are aware of some of the cool things that are going on.”
(Sam, interview, original emphasis)
Interestingly, although Sam stressed that Marlsworth Bicyclists do not
consciously employ the ‘best practice’ notion in their lobbying activities, this
knowledge of ‘international cycling best practice’ is certainly drawn upon in the
course of campaigning. Indeed, rightly or wrongly, Sam clearly perceives a
degree of policy ignorance on the part of Marlsworth County Council and―in 
citing ‘best practice’ examples―attempts to ‘enlighten’ local practitioners and 
politicians to the extent that genuine cycle-friendly policies are included in the
forthcoming LTP3:
“there is a serious disconnect between some of the best practices―the really innovative and, 
you know, simple, interventions that are made in Northern Europe―and sort of the car-
based “choice” obsessed stuff that goes on [in Marlsworth]…For several years we’ve been
talking [to Marlsworth County Council] about a raised platform at the end of Frog Street
because the traffic lights there are a complete waste of time…so we’ve said well look Dutch
‘best practice’ would be to remove those lights, which cost a lot of money every year
anyway, and just put in a raised platform where no one has priority.”
(Sam, interview, emphasis added)
As one of the principle focal points for such campaigning, however, Will
expressed frustration with the ad hoc fashion in which such overseas examples
are employed by lobbyists, explaining this with reference to institutional context:
“Saying ‘this is what they do in Amsterdam’, ‘this is what they do in Copenhagen’, ‘this is
what they do in Freiburg’ [is unhelpful], you can’t just take that model and transpose it into
Marlsworth…We’re constantly being quoted the example of places on the continent where
cyclists can turn left at red traffic lights. Now that sounds all well and good, but a) we don’t
have the culture for that, and b) just suddenly implementing that would cause quite a few
accidents. Also it may encourage red light-jumping in general, which is something that we
are trying to discourage as well as cycling without lights and cycling on pavements.”Encountering ‘best practice’
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(Will, interview, original emphasis)
Indeed, echoing the tenets of the ‘pragmatic critique’ outlined in Chapter 1, the
saliency of institutional heterogeneity in policy-making was continually stressed
by Will throughout our interview. A keen cyclist himself, he appears to follow a
quasi-ethnographical approach in his appraisal of the spatial transferability of
both domestic and international cycling ‘best practices’, using his first-hand
knowledge of Marlsworth’s cycling culture to determine whether potential
measures would complement or contradict measures already in existence. This
‘instinctive’ awareness of cycling practice is supplemented by an informed
knowledge of jurisdictional constraints and baseline data from traffic counts,
together providing Will with what he took to be a relatively strong ability to
assess ex-ante the likely feasibility, effectiveness and acceptability of
implementing ‘best practice’ examples in Marlsworth. Given his awareness of
institutional constraints on policy convergence, it is thus unsurprising that the
apparent institutional naïveté of some lobbyists can be a source of irritation. For
Will, this is compounded by the fact that the various ‘best practices’ put forward
by different lobby groups are often incompatible amongst themselves. For
example, the Dutch ‘shared space’ approach to junction design advocated above
by Sam is largely at odds with the modal segregation favoured by disability
groups:
“So there’s a situation where you have one group telling you that ‘A’ is ‘best practice’ and
another group telling you ‘B’ is ‘best practice’ and the two aren’t compatible?”
(Interviewer)
“Yes, exactly, that’s what you find. And sometimes what you find is that in trying to make
everyone happy you make no one happy…what you have to be careful with in European
examples is the whole culture. Some countries may have a better-suited culture to shared
space for example, whereas we’re not really used to that, and again we have a fairly strong
disability lobby group that are opposed to that which we have to work around.”
(Will, interview)Encountering ‘best practice’
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It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that Sam and the
Marlsworth Bicyclists are genuinely naïve with respect to the saliency of
institutional heterogeneity. Indeed, in addition to maintaining a presence in local
media, public campaigning, participating in policy meetings and consultation
exercises, Sam recently arranged a study visit for local politicians and
practitioners to another UK city which we shall call ‘Wallborough’ (Figure 3.5;
ACT). The purpose of the visit was to help address what Sam perceived as
Marlsworth politicians’ narrow mindsets and the inability of Marlsworth
practitioners to meet basic standards of implementation in relation to active
travel. Wallborough was selected as the location for the visit precisely because it
was perceived to have very similar institutional characteristics to Marlsworth,
whilst simultaneously representing a site of cycling ‘best practice’. As Sam
explained:
“Wallborough is a very similar city, with a similar political make-up; conservative county
council in a non-conservative city. In other words a city that has quite a strong desire to
cycle and is quite happy with measures that prevent the easy use of cars everywhere… so
we wanted to show the local Marlsworth politicians and planners what was going on there
and how [Wallborough County Council] had fitted that round peg into the square hole.”
(Sam, interview)
“I feel like there is an awful lot that can be learned from Northern Europe and from best
practice in Wallborough where, for example, they have done filtered permeability which
means that bicycles can go through little road blocks, but cars can’t. And [the visit] was
really interesting, we were taken on a ride around Wallborough to look at some of the
facilities they’ve got, and given a short lecture on how they had gone about it.”
(Sam, interview)
Interestingly, three things appear to have led to Sam conceptualising
Wallborough as a site of cycling ‘best practice’: first, and most significantly, the
fact that it has a higher cycling modal share than Marlsworth; second, the fact
that Wallborough County Council employ a dedicated cycling officer, something
Marlsworth County Council feel is unnecessary; and third, the presence of novel
infrastructural measures such as the filtered permeability example mentionedEncountering ‘best practice’
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above. In Chapter 5 we will explore the implications of using modal share as a
criterion for identifying ‘best practices’ in more detail. However, it is interesting
to note here that while Sam perceives Marlsworth’s cycling modal share to be
inferior to Wallborough’s, Marlsworth actually has a relatively high rate of
cycling by national standards. As a result, it is implicitly seen by other UK
practitioners to be a source of ‘best practice’ from which to draw lessons
themselves (Figure 3.4; EXG).
“So do people approach you as a site of ‘best practice’?”
(Interviewer)
“Quite a few, yes, people contacting us, either through networking or they just sort of know
that Marlsworth is that kind of place...[We’re] held up there as the demand management
forerunner for a lot of places…if you ask any transport professional outside the county
‘what is your image of transport in Marlsworth?’, they’ll tell you it’s cycling”
(Will, interview)
In such situations, Will is more than willing to assist fellow practitioners in
learning about particular active travel interventions that have worked
successfully in Marlsworth. Once again, however, he maintained the need for
such practitioners to appreciate the fact that major cultural differences exist
between cities, even within the UK:
“In Marlsworth we have a cycle culture, so if someone from Lancaster phoned up we would
say, you know, ‘we have 20,000 cyclists coming in and out of the city centre each day,
whereas you might just have 2,000, so that’s going to have a huge impact on how something
will operate, given that we start from such a high baseline’. So that would be something I
would be wary of. Just because something may work in Marlsworth―just as something 
may work in Copenhagen―it may not work elsewhere.”  
(Will, interview)
Like Sam and Marlsworth Bicyclists, the organisational activities
undertaken by Chris and Marlsworth Pedestrians’ Association also take severalEncountering ‘best practice’
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forms, including high-profile petitioning, responding to policy consultations by
“saying intelligent things”, holding meetings with local politicians and
publishing position documents (Figure 3.6; ACT). The organisational knowledge
underpinning these activities, in turn, stems from three principle sources: Chris’s
extensive professional experience; up to the minute knowledge of UK national
active travel policy; and policy evidence from elsewhere in the UK. Given this
latter source, one might expect Chris to be a strong proponent, tacitly or
explicitly, of ‘best practice’ thinking. However, the opposite is very much the
case; Chris strongly objects to the notion of ‘best practice’ and associates it with
what he perceives to be a dearth of analytical thinking amongst active travel
practitioners.
Having spent many decades as a practitioner himself, Chris believes that the
vast majority of practitioners are unable to conceptualise active travel
interventions in a holistic manner. A focus on ‘best practice’ is thought to
reinforce this lack of critical thinking by placing an artificial restriction on
problem scope through highlighting overly-detailed points at the expense of
broader strategic perspectives (Figure 3.6; EXG). As a result, active travel
interventions often fail to meet basic standards of quality, clearly running
contrary to Marlsworth Pedestrians’ Association’s objective of ensuring
“intelligent delivery of walkability”. It is worth quoting Chris at length here, as
he explains his reasoning by way of an example:
“So why don’t you like the term ‘best practice’?”
(Interviewer)
“I think it’s very limiting. Let’s take a step back first, James, this is potentially controversial
but it’s my view acquired over many years of watching people that work in the game of
supplying transport solutions. Most people who call themselves traffic engineers aren’t
engineers; they’re technicians and that means that they’re competent at reading technical
advice and implementing that advice. It doesn’t necessarily mean that they are able to make
value judgements about whether one thing or another should be delivered. They’re recruited
to deliver design solutions and what do they do? They look to best practice
recommendations for those...Take Long Street, for example; [Marlsworth County Council]
put the dropped kerbs in but they didn’t think about the effects of rainfall and drainage. So
the dropped kerb with its tactile surface, installed in order to provide guidance to the poorly-Encountering ‘best practice’
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sighted pedestrian on where to cross the road actually delivers pedestrians into water after
rainfall. ‘Best practice’ says ‘put this colour of tactile surface in’, but ‘best practice’ forgets
about the basics and they’re not done. That’s why I think worst practice is what you should
guide people towards rather than giving them specific, tightly-bound advice about how to
deliver outcomes.”
(Chris, interview, emphasis added)Encountering ‘best practice’
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3.3 National encounters: active travel in the UK
In this section, we will examine the manner in which three policy actors in the
active travel community encounter and understand the notion of ‘best practice’ at
the national scale. To provide some context to the following discussion, it is
important to note that the vast majority of decisions relating to specific walking
and cycling interventions in the UK are devolved to local government, with local
authority officials largely responsible for implementation (cf. Case A).
22 As a
result, the focus of national debate on active travel instead tends to concern
agenda-setting, overarching policy trajectories, high-level funding priorities and
the viability of appraisal mechanisms (Macmillen et al., forthcoming).
Case (D) relates to Martha, a senior Whitehall civil servant with significant
responsibility for the UK government’s active travel policy, while Case (E)
concerns Harry, a campaigns director for a major sustainable transport charity
and Case (F) concerns Graham, campaigns and policy manager for a national
cycling organisation. As with Section 3.2, we are thus exploring usage of the
‘best practice’ notion within in a tight nexus of supply-side and demand-side
actors; Martha is responsible for developing overarching active travel strategies,
and both Harry and Graham seek to lobby Martha and other national-level
decision-makers in order to ensure that the chosen policy direction is
‘sustainable’ and genuinely supports the needs of cyclists and pedestrians.
In Chapter 2, Graham was highlighted as an ‘extreme’ case (Denscombe,
2007) with respect to his organisation’s prolific usage of the ‘best practice’
notion. Martha and Harry, however, like Will, Sam and Chris discussed
previously, were held to represent ‘pathological’ cases (Collier, 1994), affected
by system flux and disruption. The reason for this characterisation is due to the
profound political changes that occurred in the UK during Spring/Summer 2010
with the election of the new coalition government. Although the coalition has
pledged to ‘support sustainable travel initiatives, including the promotion of
cycling and walking’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p. 31), broader political priorities
have led to a major review of government spending, with the UK transport
22 Indeed, motorways and major A-roads are the only sections of the UK road network managed by central
government―neither of which relate to active travel.Encountering ‘best practice’
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budget reduced by £682 million in the Chancellor’s emergency budget of June
2010. Indeed, the scale of the upheaval in Whitehall was such that the interview
with Martha had to be postponed for a significant period.
Case: D
Pseudonym: Martha
Organisation: Whitehall
Role: Senior Civil Servant
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
Martha is a senior Whitehall official who works closely with government
ministers and has a significant degree of responsibility for overall UK active
travel policy. Her ultimate objective is to increase the uptake of cycling and other
means of sustainable travel throughout the UK population (Figure 3.7; OBJ).
Although she liaises with primary care trusts and various bodies undertaking
school-based cycling proficiency training, Martha’s principle role is to manage
the calculated transfer of funding and policy guidance to UK local authorities
from Whitehall in order to improve the extent to which active travel is catered for
in local transport plans (e.g. Marlsworth County Council’s LTP3 discussed in
Section 3.2). She summarises her role as “worrying about cycling policy in the
round.”
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Case: E
Pseudonym: Harry
Organisation: Organisation for Sustainable Transport (OST)
Role: Campaigns Director
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
Harry joined this small but influential sustainable transport charity in 2009,
having previously worked for a similar charitable organisation that specialised in
campaigning for the rights of pedestrians.
23 The overall objective of the
Organisation for Sustainable Transport is to reduce the distance travelled by car
in the UK by reducing the need to travel and encouraging modal shift (Figure
3.8; OBJ/TRG). Broadly, in his current role, Harry thus focuses on three policy
targets: improving public transport; combating anthropogenic climate change
through anti-road building campaigning; and encouraging walking and cycling
through planning policy and traffic reduction. Harry stressed that OST are very
much a pragmatic organisation; rarely involved in ‘blue skies’ thinking around
active travel, and instead focussed upon the minutiae of government policy-
making. Their primary audience thus consists of government ministers, shadow
ministers, Members of Parliament and senior civil servants (i.e. Martha, Case D).
***
23 Interestingly, Chris (Case C) also used to work for this other charity.Encountering ‘best practice’
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Case: F
Pseudonym: Graham
Organisation: Cycle UK
Role: Campaigns and Policy Manager
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
Cycle UK is a national charity that represents the interests of cyclists across the
United Kingdom. The organisation primarily aims to influence national transport
policy, ultimately seeking to improve the ‘cyclability’ of the UK urban and
suburban road network (Figure 3.9; OBJ). Graham has been Cycle UK’s
campaigns and policy manager since the 1990s and is responsible for articulating
and communicating the organisation’s policy stance to government ministers,
senior civil servants and to relevant Members of Parliament. This stance is
twofold: first, Cycle UK wish to see significant nationwide improvement in
cycling facilities; and second, they wish to see a significant reduction in both the
volume and speed of motor traffic on UK roads. Beyond an engagement with
national policy formulation, Cycle UK also advise NHS trusts and rail operators
on cycling issues and seek to enhance the public image of cycling in local and
national media. In addition, Cycle UK maintains a nationwide network of over
400 local volunteers who complement the organisation’s national focus with
targeted campaigning at the local authority level.
***Encountering ‘best practice’
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Endogenous and exogenous functions of ‘best practice’
When discussing local actors’ encounters with the notion of ‘best practice’ in
Section 3.2, we firstly charted how the notion was broadly used and understood
before exploring some of the notion’s nuances and perceived limitations. For
continuity, our discussion here broadly follows this same format. Again, we
begin with a focus on policy learning―something that Martha, Harry and 
Graham all variously engage in―before subsequently examining some of the 
more ‘unorthodox’ manifestations of ‘best practice’ present in national policy
circles. We finish with a discussion of Graham’s fascinating and multifaceted
experiences of ‘best practice’ in the context of Cycle UK’s campaigning
activities.
As shown in Figure 3.7 (ACT), one of Martha’s main professional
responsibilities is to oversee the variegated process of distributing central
government funds to local authorities. Although the bulk of the funding that local
authorities receive for active travel from Whitehall takes the form of a lump sum
earmarked for their local transport plans (cf. Marlsworth’s LTP3 currently in
preparation), Martha additionally supervises the allocation of additional funds to
a limited number of local authorities on a competitive basis. It is in managing
this additional funding that Martha principally encounters the notion of ‘best
practice’:
“We have smaller amounts of separate funding streams which is very much ‘best practice’
related around demonstration projects to show how good cycling could be in certain places,
and this is allocated on a bid basis…you want [local authorities] to do their cycling
infrastructure, or their cycling schemes or their coaxing people into cycling a bit better, so
you give them some dedicated funding to do it and you monitor and evaluate it rigorously.”
(Martha, interview)
As she states herself, Martha and her Whitehall colleagues “don’t want to see
[their] money spent in ways that are unwise”, and thus fund ‘best practice’
demonstration exercises as a means of both creating and disseminating
knowledge of particular local authority interventions that meet national active
travel objectives in a “cost-effective and well-planned” manner. For example,Encountering ‘best practice’
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Whitehall currently invest approximately £20 million in a highly-competitive
programme designed to encourage uptake of active travel and public transport
use through the provision of infrastructure improvements and so-called ‘smarter
choice’ measures. Of the fifty local authorities that initially applied to the
programme, only three were awarded funding. As a condition of the funding, the
success of the specific interventions implemented by these three local authorities
is rigorously evaluated, with ‘lessons learned’ consolidated into…
“…guidance that goes out from the department to local authorities saying ‘have you thought
about this?’ ‘Why don’t you try that?’ ‘Wouldn’t it be better if you did this?”… [This] has a
more widespread impact in that other local authorities notice that Whitehall still cares about
these things, because they want to do what’s overall, kind of, finding favour, so it helps to
make [such interventions] more widespread.”
(Martha, interview)
Although Graham encounters the notion of ‘best practice’ in two distinct
senses―as we shall discuss below―the first of these is very much akin to 
Martha’s experience, insofar as it explicitly concerns peer-to-peer learning
amongst local authority practitioners. Specifically, over the last decade, Cycle
UK have developed what we shall term their ‘Learning Project’, a high-profile,
nationwide scheme whereby local authority practitioners from across the UK are
invited to participate in a series of two-day exchange visits to their peers’ towns
and cities. The overarching intention of the Learning Project is thus to enable
practitioners to gain first-hand experience of their peers’ active travel
interventions and to give them:
“the opportunity to probe into the processes behind examples of good practice to understand
the key factors that contribute to their success, and to identify best practice through a
process of peer review.”
(Cycle UK, Learning Project statement)
While Martha and Graham both directly engage with local practitioner
learning through ‘best practice’, however, Harry’s role is more
indirect―focussing instead upon “[policy] levers at a national-level that can Encountering ‘best practice’
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impact upon what local authorities do.” Indeed, the Organisation for Sustainable
Transport aim to be an “insider” campaign group, involved in early stages of
strategic policy formulation through close dialogue with ministers and Whitehall
officials.
24 Nevertheless, an awareness of current ‘best practice’ in local
sustainable transport decision-making is certainly present―enhancing the depth 
and breadth of their analytical knowledge base (Figure 3.8; ACT):
“We are interested in ‘best practice’ and we do talk to particular local authorities that are
developing what we think are interesting ideas...[For example] we’re sketching out a project
with local authorities about good practice and how you improve transport in suburban areas
rather than new-build areas or town centres.”
(Harry, interview)
In addition, Harry noted how the tangible, upbeat and anecdotal character of
‘best practice’ examples is also rhetorically advantageous in his interaction with
senior policy figures, enabling him to both adopt a compelling, positive tone in
campaign messages and to tailor such messages to key individuals’ learning
styles:
“…So does the organisation advocate a ‘best practice’ approach?”
(Interviewer)
“Yeah, as a campaigning organisation we don’t want to be just a negative carping
organisation banging on about how terrible everything is with visions of doom, anger and
outrage, so we always want to have a positive message to tell… [Best practice] actually
does encourage people to think a little bit and you get a process of change, rather than just
stasis. So you can get people to walk and cycle; its not just about giving up and saying ‘its
been in decline for the last 30 years, therefore it will always be in decline’, its recognising
that things can be different and they can be done as well; it’s not completely cloud cuckoo
land.”
(Harry, interview, original emphasis)
24 Harry holds policy meetings with Whitehall officials on a weekly basis.Encountering ‘best practice’
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“‘Best practice’ is also really important in terms of making your case seem real and giving
people something to fasten onto and from a campaigning and lobbying point of view, then
obviously it’s about how you engage with people with different ways of thinking. So ‘best
practice’ is useful for some people; it’s that anecdotal evidence which appeals to some
people, whereas others want more of the overarching, numbers-based, fact-crunching,
benefit-cost ratios, that kind of narrative.”
(Harry, interview, original emphasis)
This former view is partly shared by Martha:
“[In using the ‘best practice’ notion] you might want to highlight a particular case even
though you expect that everyone is meeting the national standard and doing it properly, you
might want to show examples to try and encourage people to come up [to that standard]. It
can be a more positive way of going about things than inspecting and penalising people for
not delivering.”
(Martha, interview, emphasis added)
Despite these advantages bestowed by the ‘best practice’ notion, however,
Harry and his colleagues are often deeply sceptical of individual ‘best practice’
examples promulgated by policy actors in the sustainable transport community.
In essence, this scepticism arises from the often ambiguous and opaque manner
in which certain practices come to be labelled as ‘best’, at the expense of
alternative approaches to active travel management (Figure 3.8; EXG). First, the
‘best’ title is often conferred upon interventions that have put themselves forward
as nominees for professional award ceremonies. Although such ceremonies
ostensibly claim to recognise ‘best practice’ in an official capacity, Harry is left
unconvinced:
“A lot of the award-winning schemes are just [rewarding those] who happened to apply for
them and its not at all a rigorous process…the things that appear to be a more formal
process are completely rubbish in terms of being able to say whether [interventions] are
good or not.”Encountering ‘best practice’
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(Harry, interview)
Second, similarly regardless of whether interventions have made bona fide
contributions to sustainable travel objectives, Harry suggested that the ‘best
practice’ label often goes hand-in-hand with capital-intensive, ‘flagship’ projects:
“Have there been cases that you’ve come across that are labelled ‘best practice’ that you
look at and think, ‘that’s not what I would consider to be ‘best practice’’?”
(Interviewer)
“There probably are; I can’t think of any off-hand. I mean it tends to be more when there
has been large expenditure on large developments or regeneration that doesn’t take into
account how people use spaces. So it looks good and the architects’ plans…can look really
amazing with all these people in the artist’s impression, but actually in practice there’s quite
a difference. One example actually is the Westfield Shopping Centre. I went to a talk about
it and they were portraying it as a great shiny example of sustainability, building a new
community that was going to be amazing etc., but in practice it’s got loads of parking, so its
very much car-orientated.”
(Harry, interview)
Third, Harry argued that many ‘best practice’ interventions suffer from a lack of
longevity, possessing a risky, fleeting existence often contingent on seed
funding:
“If you look at a lot of these [best practices], they are put up and everyone forgets about
them rather than trying to maintain them, or they were designed to look good for a short
period of time, but actually a few years down the line you discover that the cutting edge
stuff you put in at the time actually doesn’t work very well and looks a bit sorry for
itself...[For example] in Wiltshire, there’s a demand responsive transport services in one of
the rural areas and its being cut because finding is tighter…I think it had some external
funding at the beginning or started as a trial service, and it will, I’m sure, have been
described as ‘best practice’ in some guidance on rural transport. But it isn’t being
maintained because the local authority doesn’t see it as being important anymore. It is a
classic thing where you’ve got ‘best practice’ and then as soon as money is tight, or you
don’t have external funding coming in, then it goes.”Encountering ‘best practice’
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(Harry, interview, emphasis added)
Finally, and most intriguingly, Harry argued that the labelling of particular
practices as ‘best’ may result not from proven success, but from clandestine,
bureaucratic mechanisms acting at both local and national scales. On this point, it
is worth quoting him at length:
“Well, there are people in [Whitehall] looking for examples to use to shape discourse on
walking and cycling and transport more widely; and then people at a local level―local 
authorities primarily―who want to promote what they’re doing to make their organisation 
look good, and to make them individually to look good as well to help in terms of their
career progression. So there are people looking for different things out of ‘best practice’
stuff, and why they want to push something forward as ‘best practice’. So in
[Whitehall]…they would want to be looking for examples where they can be seen to be
pushing things forward a bit, and pushing innovation, but not too radical that might scare
people or might have negative comeback for them as individuals within [Whitehall] and
their status within [Whitehall], or the status of their team within [Whitehall].
So you’ve got those things, [and] whether there are politically-negative things…so the
[Whitehall] conception of ‘best practice’ will also involve political controversy, so ‘best
practice’ for them won’t be a particularly controversial scheme...[I]f the congestion charge
had been very unpopular after it was implemented, they wouldn’t have put that forward as
‘best practice’, but now they’re probably more comfortable with the idea of it being ‘best
practice’. So if ministers get lots of letters complaining about something, then that probably
doesn’t count as ‘best practice’, even if it has some of the positive impacts that make it what
we consider to be ‘best practice’!”
(Harry, interview, emphasis added)
Because Martha’s interview was postponed due to the aftermath of the UK
2010 general election, and thus took place after Harry’s interview had been
analysed in detail, an opportunity arose to ask her directly about such
‘disingenuous’ usage of the ‘best practice’ notion. As shown, she candidly
acknowledged that sometimes the ‘best practice’ label is indeed capitalised on
for “tactical” reasons, specifically related to funding-constraints:Encountering ‘best practice’
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“There’s also a more tactical aspect to [best practice] where you’ve only got a pot of money
that’s so large you can’t afford to fund everybody, [so] you present it as a demonstration or
‘best practice’ pot―although actually what you’re trying to achieve is to at least get 
something to happen somewhere. You would never describe it that way, because it would
look like you hadn’t won the argument to get lots of money…I think sometimes [best
practice] is used not to demonstrate ‘best practice’, but its all the money that you think
you’ve got to spend on a particular thing and you just, you want to spend it on that, you
want to try and encourage, I don’t know, bus use or something, so you have a fund of
money to get greener buses or something, and you’d actually like to do this universally. It’s
not a kind of experiment or having some kind of beacon that illuminates everywhere else,
it’s just that, resource-wise, it’s all you can afford―which is slightly different.” 
(Martha, interview, emphasis added)
In light of his extensive reservations about alleged ‘best practices’, therefore,
it is perhaps unsurprising that Harry and his colleagues follow what is arguably
the most fastidious approach in engaging with ‘best practice’ of all the eight
cases studied (although cf. Keith, Case H). Understandably reticent to take
externally-promoted ‘best practices’ at face-value, they aim to offset the
ambiguity that such examples introduce into policy debate by actively learning
from two sources of ‘best practice’ knowledge that are perceived as more
trustworthy (Figure 3.8; EXG): first, Harry pays significant attention to the
output of detailed appraisals on sustainable transport and active travel from
organisations such as the Audit Commission and the National Institute for
Clinical Excellence; second, he and his colleagues participate in online
‘communities of practice’, which support informal, yet detailed, peer-discussion:
“I think communities of practice are quite useful, so there’s the ‘Streets’ mailing list which
deals with the design of streets, and its mainly a group of urban designers, road safety
officers and local authority officials and they’re quite good about discussing, via email,
particular schemes and whether they are good practice or not; what’s good about them,
what’s bad about them. And you get a nice process by which discussion takes place and for
getting different viewpoints on what is successful.”
(Harry, interview)Encountering ‘best practice’
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In addition to raising their confidence in externally-promoted ‘best
practices’ in this manner, Harry and his colleagues also appear to adopt a
relatively formal approach when pro-actively undertaking in-house policy
learning (Figure 3.8; ACT). Specifically, Harry noted that his team have, on
occasion, created an electronic ‘research matrix’, designed to highlight pertinent
criteria for policy learning and grounded upon their shared, tacit understanding of
what ‘good practice’ ultimately corresponds to. In turn, this matrix serves to
structure their reviews of academic literature, ‘grey’ literature and so-called
“promotional guff” and facilitates subsequent engagements with project delivery
actors.
Yet although Harry’s experiences ably illustrate some of the ambiguity
surrounding the notion of ‘best practice’, arguably the most fascinating insights
into its multifaceted character are to be found in Graham’s experiences at Cycle
UK. Interestingly, this concerns the very same conceptual conflation that Charles
Landry made in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, whereby the notion
of ‘best practice’ can be simultaneously interpreted in both a ‘relative’ and
‘absolute’ sense. As we implied above when discussing the ‘Learning Project’,
Cycle UK’s explicit engagement with the notion of ‘best practice’ has
historically been very much aligned with the ‘relative’ sense. As Graham makes
clear when explaining the central tenets of the Learning Project:
“It is not us lecturing to the local authorities who participate in the scheme about what
Cycle UK thinks is best practice, it is encouraging them to identify it. So it is at the level of
identifying best practice [as] ‘best in class’…it is very definitely the relative best.”
(Graham, interview, original emphasis)
However, as evidenced by Graham’s cognitive map, his organisational role
within Cycle UK is by no means restricted to the Learning Project and
practitioner support (Figure 3.9; ACT/AUD). On the contrary, he and his team
undertake a wide range of campaigning activities, which manifest themselves in
two forms. The first, following bureaucratic policy channels, involves
disseminating briefing papers, responding to policy consultations and submitting
evidence to parliamentary select committees. The second―used when the first Encountering ‘best practice’
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does not achieve its desired outcomes―involves resorting to direct action, 
“making noise” through the media and calling on Cycle UK’s local volunteers to
write to their MPs. Crucially, for both of these campaigning strategies to be
effective, Graham recognises that he must be able to articulate comprehensive
and coherent stances on a range of cycling issues. Yet although the organisation
certainly aims to keep abreast of current debates in cycling policy―following the 
work of other active travel NGOs, for example―Graham stressed that Cycle 
UK’s core policy stance has remained ultimately unchanged for many years, and
remains predicated on the need for reductions in both the volume and speed of
motor traffic on the UK road network (cf. Figure 3.9; TRG).
It is here that we can see how Graham encounters the notion of ‘best
practice’ in an ‘absolute’ sense. For him, ‘best practice’ for cycling does not
correspond to the ‘best’ interventions currently in place in the UK, but rather the
notion is analogous to this vision of a low-speed, low-car future. Indeed, it is the
future realisation of this vision that fundamentally guides and inspires Graham
and his team, and it is toward this ‘absolute best practice’ that policy
interventions ought to be directed:
“So how would you define the notion of ‘best practice’?”
(Interviewer)
“I think…there are two possible definitions. One is the dictionary definition if you like,
which is ‘what is the best in class?’―whether or not it’s any good―and the other is ‘what 
is the stuff you want to recommend?’, you know…and two are out of kilter, particularly on
infrastructure things.”
(Graham, interview)
“So there’s a mismatch between what is labelled as ‘best practice’ and what is [ultimately]
fit for purpose?”
(Interviewer)Encountering ‘best practice’
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“Yes, and that’s even before you start raising that wider question of ‘is society in general
responding adequately to climate change?’ Even if we took a narrow focus―‘are we doing 
a good enough job of catering for cyclists?’―I couldn’t really say that there’s an awful lot 
of [absolute] ‘best practice’ on infrastructure. Often we’ve wanted to get a good local
authority speaker to speak to other local authorities and say ‘here are the kind of things
we’re doing’, and inspire people that it can be done. But is there really anyone that fits the
bill? Not really…[because] best practice is a willingness to reduce volumes and speeds of
traffic.”
(Graham, interview, emphasis added)
Moreover, quite unlike Sam (Case B), and even Will (Case A)―discussed in 
Section 3.2―not only is Graham highly critical of efforts to transpose 
international examples of ‘relative best practice’―citing legal and cultural 
discontinuities between the UK and the Netherlands with respect to Dutch
‘shared space’ schemes, for example―he simply does not recognise such 
transfers as particularly worthwhile endeavours per se, precisely because such
examples of ‘relative best practice’ still fall short of Cycle UK’s ‘absolute best
practice’ vision for UK cycling:
“We do not advocate that ‘best practice’ would be ‘follow what they do in the Netherlands’.
Now, what is the thinking behind that? Well, there are different lines of thinking. As an
organisation, we’re pretty sceptical of putting cyclists on the pavement, you’ve probably
gathered that. So…there is one line of thought which says, ‘well, actually, even what they
do in Holland is in some ways flawed; because actually what we should be doing is simply
reducing the volume of traffic on the roads rather than getting cyclist out of the way of
it’…We shouldn’t need to even do what the Dutch do…the Dutch approach is not [absolute]
‘best practice’. Real ‘best practice’ would be drastic reductions in car use.”
(Graham, interview, emphasis added)
In theory of course, there is no inherent reason why these two senses of ‘best
practice’ cannot reasonably co-exist, even within a single organisation such as
Cycle UK; in many ways they are complementary. However, when the two
distinct senses are tacitly conflated, this can have direct and indirect
ramifications for a broad range of policy actors, as the critical reception of CycleEncountering ‘best practice’
- 91 -
UK’s Learning Project brilliantly illustrates (Figure 3.9; EXG).
25 Indeed,
somewhat ironically, the Learning Project’s high-profile in the active travel
community, coupled with its ostensible success, has led to a situation whereby
some of the ‘relative best practices’ identified by practitioners through peer-
review―in the form of case studies and photographs―have been incorporated 
into official Whitehall guidance as normative examples of ‘best practice’, tacitly
cast in the ‘absolute’ sense. As Graham frustratingly recounted:
“They were turned from ‘best practice’ into guidance – how to do it. And we were saying
‘Hey, no! It might be better in relative terms to a lot of what goes on, [but] that doesn’t
mean that it’s right and it doesn’t mean that it should end up in a document saying ‘this is
how to do it’”
(Graham, interview, original emphasis).
For Graham, the fallout from this conflation is significant because, in explicitly
endorsing arguably mediocre practice, the scope for genuinely radical policy
change was diminished. Yet, arguably, the most fascinating consequence of this
conflation is to be found in the organisational dynamics of Cycle UK itself.
Specifically, in labelling certain active travel interventions as ‘best practice’, the
Learning Project inadvertently served to publicly endorse any local authority
practitioner who subsequently decided to implement them. As a result, this
official ‘seal of approval’ drastically curtailed the ability of Cycle UK’s local
volunteer base to pose valid concerns about such interventions, despite the fact
that they all fell far short of ‘absolute best practice’:
“The fact that [the practitioners] were participating in the Learning Project where some of
their things were being highlighted as ‘best practice’ meant that they could say ‘piss off
local campaigner, your own bloody national office programme said that what we’re doing is
best practice!’ You know, they were using it as a seal of approval which it was never meant
to be. We were clear within the project that it was [about] learning, not an endorsement
process. But some [practitioners] were using it that way, particularly to keep our own local
campaigners in check―which was quite rightly resented. So yeah, we’re well aware about 
25 We can think of this conflation in terms of Saussure’s ([1910] 1993) semiotics, as the signifier ‘best
practice’ simultaneously corresponds to two distinct signified concepts: ‘the best existing practice’ and ‘the
ultimately desired practice’.Encountering ‘best practice’
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that potential mismatch…local authorities themselves might use this label ‘best practice’ in
different ways to how we intended it within that Project.”
(Graham, interview, emphasis added).Encountering ‘best practice’
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3.4 Overarching encounters: active travel ‘facilitators’
In the preceding sections, we focussed upon a sample of local and national actors
who are all directly engaged in decision-making on active travel policy. We have
seen that, on the supply-side, Will (Case A) and Martha (Case D) perform a
variety of functions relating to policy formulation and implementation while, on
the demand-side, Sam (Case B), Chris (Case C), Harry (Case E) and Graham
(Case F) all seek to shape the outcome of policy decisions through targeted
campaigning. In this final section, however, we instead examine the manner in
which the notion of ‘best practice’ is encountered by two actors who do not seek
to intervene in specific policy decisions per se, but nevertheless seek to influence
the policy-making process in an overarching, facilitatory sense, whereby their
actions ‘make (an action, process, etc.) easy or easier; to promote, help forward;
to assist in bringing about (a particular end or result)’ (OED, 1989, np.). In other
words, both actors discussed in this section tend to ‘sit above’ the complex,
context-dependent churn of material decision-making and instead, through their
professional undertakings, aim to shape meta-level policy discourse (Case G) and
other actors’ capacity for knowledge dissemination (Case H).
Case (G) concerns the experience of Lisa, an academic researcher who plays
a central role in the ‘Futures Project’ first described in Chapter 2, and Case (H)
relates to Keith, the chairperson of an international professional network
concerned with worldwide development of walking policy. In Chapter 2, like
Graham (Case F), both of Lisa and Keith were highlighted as ‘extreme’ cases
(Denscombe, 2007). With respect to Lisa, this designation corresponds to the fact
that the notion of ‘best practice’ is exceedingly prevalent in the Futures Project
and that, within the project, she has played a central role in generating this
prevalence. With respect to Keith, extensive references to ‘best practice’ are to
be found in his organisation’s publicity materials, and the notion is broadly
embraced by its members. However, as we shall see, he is less than enthusiastic
about the ‘best practice’ notion himself.Encountering ‘best practice’
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Case: G
Pseudonym: Lisa
Organisation: University of Eastbrook (UE)
Role: Academic researcher
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
Lisa is a principle researcher on the Futures project, which seeks to develop and
explore a range of potential urban futures for UK cities, with a particular focus
on improving the quality of the urban environment for walking and cycling.
Specifically, the project involves the creation of internally-consistent mobility
scenarios, sensitive to various societal, economic and environmental priorities,
the development of multimedia narratives for use with stakeholders and the
public, and the development of multi-criteria analysis methods to assess the
likely implications of alternative futures. The overarching objectives of the
project are to improve the quality of ‘walkability’ and ‘cyclability’ in UK cities
and to reverse the steady decline of walking and cycling rates in the UK (Figure
3.10; OBJ). Uniquely, the Futures project seeks to broaden the temporal focus of
the national active travel policy, concentrating on medium- to long-term planning
strategies rather than short-term interventions. The target for the project is thus to
improve the quality of national and local UK active travel policy (Figure 3.10;
TRG). Lisa aims to achieve this by increasing policy-makers’ appreciation of the
potential benefits of active travel and encouraging them to “think differently”
about the role of walking and cycling in 21
st Century urban transport systems.
***Encountering ‘best practice’
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Case: H
Pseudonym: Keith
Organisation: MoveIT
Role: Chair
Objective(s), target(s) and audience(s)
MoveIT is an international network of policy professionals that seeks to facilitate
the growth of walking as a means of improving global environmental quality and
public health. More specifically, MoveIT aims to increase the effectiveness of
policy interventions made relation to walking worldwide. The network is hence
designed to provide peer-to-peer support and learning opportunities for policy-
makers and practitioners―underpinned by the extensive development and 
sharing of ‘best practices’. MoveIT launched in the late 1990s, with 400
members from 35 different countries. These members hail from a variety of
professional backgrounds, and include transport engineers, urban planners, health
professionals, community organisers and a small number of politicians. Keith has
been chair of the network since its inception. He is based in the UK where he
also works as an active travel consultant.
***Encountering ‘best practice’
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Endogenous and exogenous functions of ‘best practice’
In common with the preceding sections in this chapter, we shall begin our
discussion here by examining the manner in which Lisa and Keith employ the
notion of ‘best practice’ in the course of their professional activities, and the
perceived strategic benefits that this yields. As can be seen from Figures 3.10 and
3.11, the empirical material generated with respect to both of these cases is
exclusively concerned with such ‘endogenous’ encounters. Indeed, Lisa made
almost no references in her interview to other actors’ usage of ‘best practice’ and,
although Keith discussed different actors’ conceptions of the notion at length,
this was solely within the immediate context of the MoveIT network. Following
this examination, we shall subsequently explore the participants’ conceptual
understandings of the ‘best practice’ notion―focussing predominantly on 
Keith’s reflective and highly-critical perspective. As noted previously, the notion
of ‘best practice’ is extremely prevalent throughout both the Futures Project and
the MoveIT network. As a result, the following discussion is interspersed with
contextual details in order to afford a fuller appreciation of Lisa and Keith’s
respective experiences.
While an overview of the Futures Project has already been provided, its
specifics merit fuller discussion. In essence, Lisa and her academic colleagues
have used a series of computer-generated urban environments in order to
manipulate various aspects of the public realm―such as roadways, pavements 
and street furniture―and thus develop a range of future ‘active travel scenarios’ 
for UK cities. At the time of Lisa’s interview, three of these scenarios had been
fully developed and were about to undergo an extensive period of testing,
whereby their respective feasibility and popularity would be established through
a series of focus groups, variously involving the public, key stakeholders and the
Futures Project’s own advisory network.
26
Importantly, each of these three scenarios were developed in accordance
with a unique guiding principle, or ‘storyline’. The storylines underpinning
Scenarios 2 and 3 were relatively radical in character and implied significant
social upheaval―concerned with major political change and a severe energy 
26 From which the eight participants discussed in this thesis were drawn (cf. Chapter 2).Encountering ‘best practice’
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crisis, respectively. Scenario 1, however, was designed to represent a
hypothetical walking and cycling future for the UK comprised entirely of current
global ‘best practices’ in active travel, variously drawn from countries such as
the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the United States of America (Figure
3.10; ACT). The actual ‘best practices’ included in Scenario 1 ranged from ‘soft’
interventions, such as US-style ‘share the road’ campaigns, to substantial
infrastructural interventions, such a Dutch-style, cycle-friendly roundabouts
(Figure 3.12).
Within the Futures Project team, Lisa was the researcher responsible for the
development and coherence of Scenario 1. As we can see, she went about
selecting particular ‘best practices’ for inclusion in the scenario in two ways.
First, on the basis of her personal cycling experiences in different national
contexts; and second through reviewing academic and ‘grey’ literature―basing 
her search on locations with relatively high cycling rates via a focus on modal
share:
“You know, no one mentions Sweden next to the Netherlands, but I thought it was fantastic
for cycling, everything was there, it was integrated, you know…I’ve cycled in all those
places as a utility cyclist, not a leisure cyclist; and I thought of those places because they’re
Figure 3.12 Dutch ‘best practice’ for the UK
Source: Futures ProjectEncountering ‘best practice’
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easy to cycle in, and they have examples of similar things that I would call ‘best practice’
[such as] dedicated cycle lanes.”
(Lisa, interview)
“In the first stages when we were thinking about the scenario we thought ‘well we don’t
have anything [to structure our search around] so lets do mode split…My Scenario 1 review
started with looking at journal papers which all discuss mode split. I think at first though it
was just a broad literature review, where I read journal papers and there’s the paper about
lessons from Germany, Netherlands and Denmark, they’re the big three I suppose…I
basically got examples from everywhere and just sort of thought about what’s achievable.”
(Lisa, interview)
Lisa first encountered the notion of ‘best practice’ while studying for a
degree in environmental science and broadly conceptualises it in terms of
‘instructional guidance’. Fundamentally, therefore, her rationale for following
this ‘best practice’ approach in the Futures Project relates to the fact that
international active travel ‘best practices’ have been proven to work effectively
elsewhere and may thus prove effective in the UK.
“I think the first time I came across best practice, it was not transport related, it was
sustainable storm water, and that’s where you build bioswales and natural drainage, and that
was like a design manual basically: ‘[use] this depth, this substrate, these plants, this is the
‘best practice’ for building one of these, because if you use these other plants, or build it
from concrete, it won’t work, right?’ So I understand best practice to be an idea of how you
would do something so that it works…as ideas that you can take from other places that
ideally have been replicated… ‘Best’ is an example that has been set for people.”
(Lisa, interview)
In addition to this emphasis on effectiveness and replicability, Lisa
interestingly also stressed that the notion of ‘best practice’ served to partly
‘legitimise’ the overall approach of the Futures Project, which, by its very nature,
has proved relatively controversial with some audiences (Figure 3.10; ACT). As
noted, a substantial component of the project involves ‘testing’ the scenarios withEncountering ‘best practice’
- 101 -
members of the public and other policy stakeholders in order to arrive at a
collectively-desirable future image of UK active travel. In this process, Lisa
argued that the ‘best practice’ emphasis of Scenario 1, unlike the radical nature
of Scenarios 2 and 3, meant that it was relatively ‘tangible and thus “grounded in
some sort of reality”―serving to counter the inevitable public and political 
scepticism of the ‘anti-car’ approach taken in the project as a whole.
“So [the best practice emphasis] helps to present the scenarios does it, because someone
can’t just say ‘this is fanciful’, because it exists?”
(Interviewer)
““Yeah, I think it’s really helpful. Because I think when we get to talking to the public
more, there’s going to be some fear from some people, that Scenario 3 is too far, or
Scenario 2 is like ‘What!?? There are no cars anywhere?’
(Lisa, interview, original emphasis)
For Keith, however, the notion of ‘best practice’ remains very much about
policy learning. Although the MoveIT network maintains a permanent presence
on the internet, its principle organisational activity is a high-profile, annual
members’ conference, hosted in a different country each year. In providing this
platform for discussion, Keith intends to reassure MoveIT members that they are
not alone in their efforts to improve walkability and, more significantly, aims to
provide a means for practitioners to reflect on their policy experiences and to
openly share knowledge with each other about “what works”:
“Very often there is a practitioner who ‘gets it’; they’ve got all the knowledge, all the
manuals all the tools, but they haven’t necessarily got the political support for [improving
walkability]. And our opportunity is to grow a movement of people where we can support
them; they may only need to come [to the conference] once to realise they’re not alone.
Because sometimes I think people quite often feel that in this sort of world they are the only
people doing [walkability interventions]―particularly inside their own organisations; 
they’re probably at the bottom of the pile and don’t feel particularly supported. [So we] give
them connections to learn from each other, and [to] realise that actually most ideas could beEncountering ‘best practice’
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adopted and adapted and made relevant to their own place without having to think about it
for themselves.”
(Keith, interview)
“I think what we mean by ‘best practice’ is to try and expose the visibility of what’s
happening and to recognise the value that that is currently playing and to ensure within
professionals that they have some check to see whether those sorts of things are happening
equitably across their own authority areas, or whether there are things that they could learn
from outside of their discipline or outside of their area that would add value to their existing
work.”
(Keith, interview)
Within this context, the notion of ‘best practice’ enjoys a great deal of
currency. For Keith, the primary reason for this relates to the fact that, for the
most part, MoveIT members appear desperate for knowledge about policy
implementation:
“There are so many strategies and tools; I’ve just been to a meeting today to talk about
providing yet another ‘toolkit’. If I’m a practitioner in any field, I’m awash with tools that I
could use, and in every project with every bit of research, there’s yet another tool and yet
another paper. So we’re not short of information, but it is their applicability that I think is
difficult to understand or to value. So I think what ‘practice’ has is that opportunity to say
‘we gave it a go.’”
(Keith, interview, original emphasis)
In omitting ‘best’, however, this quote also serves to hint at Keith’s highly-
critical attitude to the notion of ‘best practice’. As can be seen in his cognitive
map (Figure 3.11; ACT), Keith discussed the value of the notion at some length,
charting the manner in which it is both advantageous and disadvantageous in the
context of the MoveIT. Essentially, Keith argues that while focussing on the
nature of ‘practice’ is highly valuable, a focus on ‘best’ is less so:Encountering ‘best practice’
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“Best practice in my mind, therefore, is more about the sharing of practice than necessarily
an emphasis on best…I’m as interested in exposing the processes as I am about the
outcomes themselves. And very often, too many write-ups of what are technically called
‘best practice’ just tell you what they’ve achieved and they have a councillor who says [we
achieved] 20% this and 20% that―the point being how the hell did they get there in the first 
place so that someone even agreed to let that sort of thing happen? And did they even know
that it was the right sort of thing to do before they did it, or did they just get lucky?”
(Keith, interview, original emphasis)
Indeed, Keith went to great lengths to explain why he believes that placing
too great an emphasis on ‘best’ is detrimental to the overall quality of policy
learning within the MoveIT network. First, and perhaps least surprisingly, Keith
echoed the ‘pragmatic critique’ in noting that interventions that ‘work’ in one
location are unlikely to ‘work’ in all locations (cf. Chapter 1; see also Cases A
and F). Interestingly, however, in stating this opinion, he implied that the
institutional limits to genuine policy convergence do tend to be widely-
recognised within the MoveIT community:
“I don’t think anyone would claim that they have the best answer. They might have an
answer that suits their location but that doesn’t mean that’s the best for everybody else’s
location anywhere in the world.”
(Keith, interview, emphasis added)
Second, and extremely relevant to MoveIT―given the heterogeneity of its 
membership base―Keith argued that what is ‘best’ for walking policy with 
respect to the criteria of one professional discipline (e.g. public health) may not
be ‘best’ for walking policy with respect to those of another (e.g. sustainable
transport):
“I think [policy actors] get away with the ambiguity of using the word ‘best’ because we’re
not all measuring the same things…If I’m a health practitioner and my goal is to get peopleEncountering ‘best practice’
- 104 -
who are sedentary to be more active, then clearly, almost anything I do to encourage them
to walk is likely to be positive…it’s much more likely that I am going to be ‘best practice’
in the fact that my measure of success will be more people [walking]. However, in the
transport world, I don’t really care whether someone who is sedentary is going to be more
active or not―what I’m interested in is whether someone who is driving short distances is 
going to be willing to transfer to walking or cycling instead. So my measures from the
beginning are different and they may well be different people; they are certainly not sitting
on the sofa, they’re sitting in their cars!”
(Keith, interview)
Third, related to this ambiguity, Keith argued that labelling a particular
intervention as ‘best’ can reassure other practitioners that it is inherently
effective, leading them to justify a similar course of action within their own
jurisdictional-spheres. While not inherently problematic, Keith clearly views this
phenomenon with an element of discomfort:
“The trouble I have with [best practice], is that there’s very little system for anybody to
decide whether that value has been positive or is actually ‘best’, which is the point I keep
making. But somehow or other it reassures people that its being done already to make you
think that actually there’s less risk of it all going pear-shaped or getting no return out of it
whatsoever. And I think where people have to make a justification before they want to make
a decision or do something, they have to, there’s normally – even in a committee paper –
there’s some area that says ‘what is the risk?’ and ‘what is going to be the impact of this?’
And you cannot afford for that element of risk to be unconsidered and you cannot afford for
that impact not to be positive. and normally, if you’re going to stand up in front of that
committee and make a recommendation for that decision before that policy or that
investment is agreed, then you’ll want some evidence in your favour when cross questioned
against it to say well actually its been done before and its had this positiveness about it. And
I think very often we describe ‘best’ as meaning ‘something that wasn’t negative happened’,
and that’s quite an interesting thing.”
(Keith, interview)
Finally, although an intervention labelled as ‘best’ may have resulted in a
positive impact, Keith argued that it may nevertheless have been poorly designedEncountering ‘best practice’
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and/or fallen short of what was actually possible in the circumstances. Here, it is
worth quoting a frustrated Keith at length as he articulates this by way of a
fascinating example from his experience as an active travel consultant:
“I did a job recently for [a UK local authority]...They had to bid for funding with a whole
load of ideas about what they were going to do to try and make their citizens more healthy
[via active travel]. The first thing they did with the money was a questionnaire―they got an 
80% response rate and they ‘ticked the box’. And then they put in the cycle lanes, parking
and signage. [However] if you’d actually analysed the questionnaires, what [the local
residents] all said is ‘we’re disjointed from our community; we haven’t got bikes and we
want to walk’...[So] actually they had to spend more money on marketing at the end to say
‘we’ve just built you this bloody cycle path, for goodness sake use it! I know you didn’t
want it and you didn’t ask for it but please use it!’ And of course they’ll get 20% more
people using it and they will show it up as ‘best practice’: you know, ‘we said we’d do a
bike lane, we did a questionnaire and we did a bike lane and we got 20% of people using it’
and that will be held up as ‘best practice’. But, if you explore the processes and find out that
80% of people didn’t want it and would have been much happier with a led walk once a
week going into town and exploring how the rights of way network could be slightly
tweaked to be better connected to where they live, to get them to the shop and to get them
home again, they could have spent maybe only 10% of the cash [and] they could potentially
have had an 80% greater impact on physical activity for a tenth of the cost…and that is the
different between ‘practice’ and ‘best practice’ for me―actually being able to be clear from 
the beginning about what the measures of success are and that they are based on an
understanding of behaviour before you start. And without that benchmark you’re never
actually going to be able to define ‘success’ or ‘best’ and that’s the problem.”
(Keith, interview)
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to describe the manner in which the notion of ‘best
practice’ has been encountered within a particular subset of the UK active travel
policy community. Its purpose has been to investigate, in detail, how the notion
is both used and understood in order to build an empirical foundation for
subsequent theoretical explanations. As a result, this chapter has attempted to
avoid premature interpretation and discussion, with cognitive maps and verbatimEncountering ‘best practice’
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interview extracts instead used to capture the core essence of actors’ encounters
with ‘best practice’ in relation to their respective professional objectives, targets,
audiences and activities.
Even within this small policy community, the content of this chapter
demonstrates a striking degree of variation in the purposive functions of the ‘best
practice’ notion and it is clear that the actors both encounter and ‘define’ the
notion in diverse and nuanced ways. Some are exponents of the notion. For these
actors, ‘best practice’, while certainly not unproblematic, can prove relatively
expedient as a means of reaching their wider policy targets and objectives. For
Will (Case A), for example, ‘best practice’ is a helpful concept for structuring the
policy learning process; and for Sam (Case B), it represents a valuable tool for
achieving leverage in his policy campaigning. Chris (Case C), however,
vehemently opposes the notion of ‘best practice’ as he sees it as both placing
artificial restrictions on problem scope and being complicit in the lowering of
professional standards. While the majority of actors conceptualise ‘best practice’
in a relative sense, Graham (Case F) views it largely in absolute terms, whereby
judgements of performance are made not in relation to other practices, but in
relation to an imagined utopian future. Similarly divergent were conceptions of
‘practice’. For most actors, ‘practices’ correspond to material policy
interventions, whereas for Keith (Case H) and Harry (Case E) greater emphasis is
placed upon the processes by which such interventions come to fruition.
However, regardless of such functions, opinions and conceptual ambiguities,
perhaps the most striking finding from this chapter is the sheer extent to which
the notion of ‘best practice’ has registered so fundamentally in the actors’
collective consciousness. Next, in Chapter 4, we shall attempt to develop a
formal explanation of this present ubiquity of the ‘best practice’ notion in the
sustainable transport policy community.Explaining ‘best practice’
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Chapter 4
Explaining ‘best practice’:
transfactual argumentation
‘Stripped of any special significance by a generation of bureaucrats, civil
servants, managers and politicians, lazily used as ‘political margarine’ to
spread approvingly and inclusively over any activity with a non-material
element to it, the word ‘creative’ has become almost unusable.’
―John Tusa (2003, p. 6) 
A recurrent feature of the popular BBC television series Have I Got News For
You is the ‘missing words round’, in which the show’s contestants are shown a
partially-obscured phrase from a particularly unassuming ‘guest publication’ and
are asked to guess specific words that have been concealed. In this spirit, it
would be interesting―although admittedly not particularly humorous―to 
present this epigraph from John Tusa to a selection of social scientists and ask
them to suggest which policy buzzword might have been omitted. Perhaps
Martin and Sunley (2003) and their adherents would suggest that ‘cluster’ fits the
bill, or maybe Marshall and Toffel (2005) would opt for ‘sustainability.’ Indeed,
although the actual word missing from Tusa’s passage is ‘creative’, we can
probably imagine a whole swathe of definitionally-dubious terms in
contemporary public policy to which this ‘political margarine’ analogy might
apply, including―given the empirical material presented in the previous 
chapter―‘best practice.’  
Taking the presence of this conceptual ambiguity as a point of departure, our
task in this chapter is one of explanation (cf. Objective B). Specifically, through
retroductive, transfactual argumentation we are here concerned with establishing
the structure of the ‘best practice’ notion, for it is the causal powers andExplaining ‘best practice’
- 108 -
tendencies derived from this structure, when exercised under certain conditions,
which can account for the notion’s present ubiquity and heterogeneous
deployment within the UK transport policy community. Of course, while the
strength of critical realist explanation lies in its concern for detailing the internal,
necessary relations between objects, this logic of inquiry has concomitant risks.
Not least among such risks is the propensity for realist abstraction to become an
insular process, in which theory is built from first principles in comparative
isolation. To counter this, while discussion and interpretation in this chapter will
draw heavily on the empirical material presented in Chapter 3, it will also seek to
incorporate a number of contextual and theoretical insights from Ed Page, Harriet
Bulkeley and Luciano Vettoretto, the existing contributors to the nascent ‘actor
critique’ of ‘best practice.’
This chapter is comprised of three sections. First, I abductively contextualise
the central discussion by offering a perspective from political science on the
complex and antagonistic nature of contemporary UK transport policy. Second,
within this ‘conditional’ context (Sayer, 1992), I characterise the ‘events’
described in Chapter 3 as manifestations of five causal powers, which, taken
together, necessarily constitute the structure of the ‘best practice’ notion. Finally,
I briefly attempt to synthesise the discussion in accordance with the principles of
critical realist research outlined in Chapter 2.
4.1 Intractable conflict and advocacy coalitions
If we are to have any hope of producing a meaningful and comprehensive
account of the ‘best practice’ notion, it is imperative to reflect more deeply upon
the nature of contemporary policy issues, the manner in which they are governed
and the inherent challenges facing those actors involved. Given that Chapter 3
demonstrated that encounters with the notion of ‘best practice’ are genuinely
variegated and appear irreducible to policy learning per se, we shall here abduce
that the notion’s transfactual conditions may instead reside in the complexities of
what have been termed ‘messy’ (Ney, 2009) or ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber,
1973) policy problems.Explaining ‘best practice’
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As the political scientist Steven Ney (2009) notes, while vast amounts of
financial and intellectual capital are ostensibly devoted to solving contemporary
policy problems, it is an extremely rare event when such problems are considered
to have been successfully addressed. This paradox has been characterised in
terms of ‘intractability’ (Rein and Schön, 1993) or a ‘dialogue of the deaf’
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) and is patently visible across a range of
spatial scales and jurisdictional domains. Consider, for example, recent attempts
at healthcare reform in the United States (Gostin and Connors, 2010), or
international legislative efforts made in relation to anthropogenic climate change
(Hulme, 2009). In each case, bona fide ‘progress’ is nowhere to be found;
innumerable policy actors are locked in perpetual disagreement and hostility
while associated policy activities continue apace.
For some, the causes of such intractability are to be found in the nature of
contemporary policy processes per se (see, for example, Reich, 2007; Wilby,
2009). Although this position is often caricatured in the literature and represents
something of a ‘straw man’, its ethos nevertheless resonates strongly with
popular, normative conceptions of what policy-making ‘ought to be about’. In
essence, subscribers to this school of thought argue that hyper-pluralism, self-
serving political gamesmanship, rampant lobbying and corrupt pork-barrelling
together serve to needlessly complicate the policy process and hence obstruct
rational and judicious decision-making (Tsebelis, 2002). Implicit in this view is
thus the assumption that policy-makers are tasked with effectively and efficiently
addressing theoretically-achievable and self-evident policy problems through
carefully-formulated policy interventions that are predicated on expert
knowledge. Of course, this remains appreciably difficult in many respects;
policy-makers must take into account how proposed measures are likely to
interact with those already in existence and may also need to consider the extent
to which the deployment of multiple measures can avoid contradictory or
unintended effects (see OPTIC, 2009). Nevertheless, according to this
perspective, given policy problems are still presumed to ‘have answers’, which
would be readily forthcoming if it were not for distracting and obstructive
interferences.
Admittedly, this viewpoint is not completely outlandish; there would be little
point in policy-making whatsoever if genuine progress were impossible. YetExplaining ‘best practice’
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when one considers the nature of the policy domains in question―such as 
welfare reform, environmental regulation, transport management or financial
governance―it becomes increasingly clear that they are not only characterised 
by inordinate technical complexity, but also by profound and entrenched value-
laden disagreement which cannot be transcended through recourse to ‘fact’
alone; hence, they are ‘messy’ (Ney, 2009).
Indeed, far from lacking a factual basis, messy policy problems abound in
data. Take the case of anthropogenic climate change, perhaps the epitome of a
messy policy problem. Here, literally thousands of climate scientists are in near
unanimous agreement that emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere is a
direct cause of global warming (IPCC, 2007). Yet although this fact has certainly
proved instrumental in elevating the issue of climate change to the fore of
international political debate, its existence per se has proved insufficient for the
realisation of genuinely significant policy change. To be sure, there are those
who dispute the facts of climate change directly, whether through advancing
‘facts’ of their own, or attempting to debase those that predominate (e.g. Booker,
2009).
27 Yet even if we focus upon those who accept the validity of climate
change, there is little evidence of agreement as to the optimal course for policy
action. Some voices in the debate gravitate to the poles of the argument, arguing
that nothing whatsoever needs to be done (Griffin, 2007), or that a wholesale
rejection of capitalism is warranted (Bergmann, 2008). Many on the political
right advocate market-based solutions (CBI, 2009a) while many on the left
favour a strong role for government and supranational institutions (Obama,
2009). Some see technological developments as the only viable solution
(Robinson, 2009), while others view such developments with suspicion and
hostility (Godhaven, 2009). Moreover, policy debate on climate change is far
from discrete and self-contained; it spans an almost limitless spectrum of policy
domains, implicating secondary issues in energy, transport, international
development, healthcare, agriculture and defence.
27 Indeed, if we consider the fact of anthropogenic climate change to represent ‘a particular truth known by
actual observation or authentic testimony’ (OED, 1989, np.), we have unfortunately seen in the so-called
‘Climategate’ affair how fragile and unstable such ‘authentic testimony’ can be (House of Commons,
2010).Explaining ‘best practice’
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Far from representing a theoretically-straightforward process of factual
resolution, therefore, policy-making essentially ‘becomes a process of exchange,
transaction and bargaining between different institutions and policy actors’ (Ney,
2009, p. 27). One of the most palpable indications of this can be seen in what
Chris Ansell (2000) terms the ‘networked polity’. In previous generations, it is
argued, public policy was almost exclusively concerned with ‘classical duties’
such as public finance, defence and law and order. However, in recent decades,
the scope of this portfolio has expanded greatly; encompassing social welfare,
healthcare provision, transport, sports, the arts, the environment, regional
development, science and a host of other issues (see Ney, 2009). As a result of
this expansion, so the argument goes, political stewardship has become so
specialised that the state can no longer manage this diverse and substantively
complex portfolio ‘in house’. Therefore, in order to obtain the detailed technical
knowledge necessary for effective government, we have witnessed a protracted
period of state ‘outsourcing’, whereby certain functions and competencies in the
policy-making process have been informally devolved to a multifaceted array of
non-state actors, which, taken together, form what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1993) term ‘policy subsystems’.
Of course, it would be naïve to interpret this shift from ‘government’ to
‘governance’ solely in terms of a ‘coping strategy’; a full account must
acknowledge the agency of neo-liberalism and ideological state retrenchment
(see Docherty and Shaw, 2009). However, regardless of how the ‘networked
polity’ has come about, the concept certainly resonates strongly with the nature
of UK transport policy in its present form. As we noted in Chapter 1, the
overarching project of mobility governance in the UK is informed and produced
through the activities of countless politicians, civil servants, think tanks,
academics and interest groups. Indeed, this heterogeneous assemblage of policy
actors is a perfect example of what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 135)
hold to be a ‘mature’ policy subsystem, characterised by:
‘a set of participants who regard themselves as a semi-autonomous
community who share an expertise in a policy domain and who have sought
to influence public policy in that domain for an extended period.’Explaining ‘best practice’
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Broadly then, in contrast to the traditional policy model, relationships
between actors in the UK transport policy subsystem are heterarchical in nature.
As evident in Chapter 3, while the conventional channels of policy
communication tended to involve ‘many to one’ associations between disparate
actors and the state, the networked polity involves a constellation of ‘many to
many’ associations existing across the entire assemblage of policy actors
involved in the subsystem (Ney, 2009). Crucially, these ‘many-to-many’
associations function as the gladiatorial arena in which the intractable, value-
laden conflicts that define messy policy problems are played out. Specifically,
within any given policy subsystem, the materiality of such conflicts can be
attributed to the presence of two or more competing ‘advocacy coalitions’, which
can be understood as functionally-diverse alliances of policy actors who coalesce
around a shared set of core beliefs and engage in a concerted degree of policy
coordination (see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007).
For Rein and Schön (1993, p. 146), these ‘core beliefs’ can be viewed as
cognitive ‘frames’―perspectives ‘from which an amorphous, ill-defined, 
problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon.’ Importantly, in
recognising that advocacy coalitions thus rely on policy framing as ‘a way of
selecting, organising, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to
provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading and acting’ (ibid.), we
can begin to appreciate the existence of the ‘factual paradox’ noted above,
whereby factual statements proliferate in messy policy problems despite their
inability to instigate change per se. In essence, frames orchestrate and impose
cognitive order on data: they provide the means by which data can be considered
relevant, valid and worthy of attention; they underpin the interpretation of data;
and they contextualise data in terms of actors’ overarching political objectives. In
seeking to influence policy outcomes, therefore, advocacy coalitions create
arguments that remain inherently contingent upon, and refracted through, the
nature of their respective frames. Hence, as numerous advocacy coalitions put
forth competing policy claims, ‘facts’ abound. Yet because opposing coalitions’
frames are so intrinsically different, such ‘facts’ do not register in the subsystem
to the degree that their proponents may wish (Ney, 2009).
Despite writing from outside the transport discipline, Ney (2009) identifies
three core advocacy coalitions present in the contemporary UK transport policyExplaining ‘best practice’
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subsystem, which he dubs ‘efficient mobility’, ‘sustainable mobility’ and
‘balanced mobility’, respectively. Although these coalitions are inevitably a little
stylized, they represent a valuable means of approaching and contextualising the
various causal powers of the ‘best practice’ notion that will be imminently
discussed. Let us briefly expand upon each of them in turn, albeit with some
degree of artistic license.
First, the ‘efficient mobility’ coalition is comprised of a range of policy
actors who maintain that efficient transport systems are the lifeblood of a strong
UK economy, and that failure to ensure adequate capacity in the system will have
an adverse and sustained impact on economic growth. The supposed role for
policy-makers is thus broadly analogous to the ‘predict and provide’ approach
outlined in Chapter 1, whereby additional capacity to the transport system should
be supplied in response to increasing demand for travel. What policy-makers
must not do is to interfere in market mechanisms through wasting tax-payers’
money on subsidising the inefficient rail sector, or taking up scarce road space
with unused cycle lanes. In terms of land transport, this coalition essentially
seeks to lower the cost of moving people and freight by road, as this is the most
flexible and thus most business-friendly form of transport in a post-Fordist
economy. There two forms of cost that typically incurs their wrath: first, the
opportunity cost incurred to the economy as a result of traffic congestion; and
second the high cost of fuel duty, which many perceive to be a fiscal exploitation
of motoring’s high inelasticity of demand.
At the national scale, particularly vocal and influential actors in this
coalition are organisations such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI),
the Automobile Association (AA), the RAC Foundation, Drivers’ Alliance,
TaxPayers’ Alliance and a number of right-wing, populist newspapers. These are
joined at a local scale by organisations that seek to combat what they perceive as
an anti-car sentiment in UK policy circles.
28 The essence of the ‘efficient
mobility’ coalition is easily ascertainable from these recent statements from
Edmund King, president of the AA, and Andy Godfrey, spokesperson for the
CBI:
28 Such as the lobbying group ‘Rescue Oxford’, for example.Explaining ‘best practice’
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‘A majority of AA members want to see a reduction in fuel costs even
though duty increases are scheduled for October and rumours abound
concerning an increase in VAT. Escalating fuel costs will hinder economic
recovery.’
(King, 2010, p. 1, emphasis added)
‘Capacity constraints on the UK transport infrastructure are making it
increasingly difficult for companies to reach their customers, attract staff
and manage the delivery of their goods. Footfall is crucial for a successful
retail business. Equally, deliveries need to be reliable to ensure stores are
well stocked, and staff need to be able to access their jobs in a stress-free
way. Poor accessibility threatens the future vitality and viability of a retail
location.’
(CBI, 2009b, p. 11, emphasis added)
In direct contrast to the ‘efficient mobility’ coalition, the ‘sustainable
mobility’ coalition consists of actors at the opposite end of the political spectrum
who feel that the UK transport system, in its current guise, serves to entrench an
inherently unfair and exploitative socio-economic order―degrading both the 
social and natural environment by catering for the indulgent wants of a wealthy,
hyper-mobile minority. The costs of the transport status quo are disproportionally
borne by the elderly, children, and those without access to private motor
vehicles, while the benefits are reaped by multinational corporations in the
automobile and energy industries. Uncurbed growth in private car travel is the
major villain for this coalition, who point to its disbenefits at a range of spatial
scales. Locally, the private car has forever decimated the fabric of urban life; car-
induced urban sprawl has resulted in a bland, homogeneous built environment,
and ever-present, speeding traffic has monopolised public space at the expense of
alternative modes of transport, such as walking and cycling, which contribute to
our physical and mental well-being. Globally, the transport sector is a major
contributor of greenhouse gas emissions and thus, through anthropogenic climate
change, directly harms both present and future generations worldwide. The taskExplaining ‘best practice’
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for policy-makers is hence as a major one. They must act to internalise the social
and environmental costs of car and air travel, strictly enforce concentrated land
use planning, oversee radical investment in public transport, and reverse the
long-term decline in active travel.
Nationally, key policy actors in the ‘sustainable mobility’ coalition include
major environmental NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace,
together with the UK Green Party, and high-profile figures such as the columnist
George Monbiot. At the local scale, numerous campaign groups are also active,
especially those representing older people and the interests of pedestrians and
cyclists. The following quotes from Tony Bosworth of Friends of the Earth and
the UK Green Party’s Manifesto for a Sustainable Society, neatly illustrate the
stance of the ‘sustainable mobility’ coalition:
‘The government's transport strategy is a shambles. Despite promising to cut
traffic and get people on to public transport, little has been
achieved...Motoring costs have fallen under Labour, while the cost of using
buses and trains has risen. On top of this, it is building bigger roads that will
eventually lead to more traffic and more congestion.’
(Bosworth, 2002, p. 1)
‘[Our aims are for:] transport to be equitably accessible to all people
irrespective of their age, wealth or disability, with local needs given priority
over travelling greater distances; degradation of community life by
inappropriate transport modes, especially excessive car use, to be reduced
and reversed wherever possible; [and] where mobility is desired or needed,
to satisfy this through sustainable modes of transport.’
(Green Party, 2009, p. 1)
Finally, attempting a degree of dialectic mediation between the ‘efficient
mobility’ and the ‘sustainable mobility’ coalitions, those policy actors who
subscribe to the ‘balanced mobility’ coalition recognise the complexity of
contemporary transport problems and seek to reach a point of policy equilibrium.
These actors argue that the transport policy debate ought not to be cast in terms
of stark choices, but rather must acknowledge the genuine economic and socialExplaining ‘best practice’
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benefits that contemporary transport systems can yield, while conceding that in
their current form they generate significant environmental and social costs. In
order to find a point of equilibrium between these aspects, policy-makers must
thus strategically intervene in the transport system―implementing systematic, 
holistic and long-term packages of policy measures that serve to ‘decouple’ the
link between economic growth and the demand for transport. However, if such
interventions are poorly-designed with little foresight, they will be swallowed in
the sheer complexity of the system, and genuine progress in transport policy will
not be forthcoming. Measures that are typically favoured by the ‘balanced
mobility’ coalition include: market-based pricing instruments, such as the
London congestion charging scheme; technological instruments, such as the use
of global positioning systems to maximise efficiency in the logistics sector; and
measures designed to reduce the need to travel, such as mixed land use regulation
and support for teleworking initiatives.
Judged in terms of substance, authentic membership of the ‘balanced
mobility’ coalition is mainly limited to transport-related academics and a number
of non-governmental organisations, such as the Campaign for Better Transport,
the Commission for Integrated Transport and Sustrans. However, in rhetorical
terms, a variety of other policy actors are affiliated, including the UK
government and the European Commission. The following quotes from David
Banister, director of the Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford, and
Stephen Joseph, executive director of the Campaign for Better Transport
exemplify the coalition’s perspective. Note in particular how Joseph addresses
the issue of ‘decoupling’:
‘Within the framework of sustainable development, it is important to
balance the positive role of transport in contributing to economic prosperity
with negative factors relating to environmental, social and health
implications. There are no simple solutions to these conflicting factors.’
(Banister, 2005, p. 11, emphasis added)
‘We pulled together unions, businesses and civil society groups to argue that
Heathrow should be improved, not expanded, and we conducted researchExplaining ‘best practice’
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into alternatives, including rail upgrades and information technology, to
show that a twenty-first century economy wasn't dependent on people in
metal boxes zooming through the sky.’
(Joseph, 2010, p. 1, emphasis added)
4.2 Causal powers: heuristics and rhetoric
In this context, then, how can we come to understand the ubiquity of the ‘best
practice’ notion in the UK transport policy subsystem? What function(s) does it
perform in this networked polity, within and between competing advocacy
coalitions? Just why is it used in the way that it is? Given the events we have
discussed and highlighted in Chapter 3, and the preceding discussion of advocacy
coalitions, I shall here argue that the notion of ‘best practice’, as encountered in
the UK transport policy subsystem, can be considered as possessing five ‘trans-
frame’ causal powers (Sayer, 1992). By virtue of these powers, and under
specific conditions, the notion of ‘best practice’ is employed by policy actors,
both within and between particular advocacy coalitions in the networked polity,
in order to enhance their ability to realise certain policy objectives.
These causal powers may be broadly characterised as follows: (i) the power
of heuristic learning; (ii) the power of discourse manipulation; (iii) the power of
egoistic promotion; (iv) the power of affiliative justification; and (v) the power of
strategic articulation. We shall now examine each power in turn, drawing on
empirical material from Chapter 3 to contextualise our argument where
appropriate. To facilitate this discussion, Table 4.1 summarises the presence of
these five powers in the eight cases used in this research.Explaining ‘best practice’
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(i) Heuristic learning
Viewed as a networked polity, we have thus far seen that the UK transport policy
subsystem is dominated by the presence of three antagonistic advocacy
coalitions, each possessing a distinctive, normative identity predicated on their
respective cognitive ‘frames’. However, amongst this mêlée, decisions on
transport policy clearly do not place in a vacuum. The polity consists of
numerous policy actors performing an array of functionally-diverse roles at a
range of spatial scales. For example, as we have seen in Chapter 3, Will (Case A)
and Martha (Case D) are both policy-makers. Although their decisions are
continually vetted and constrained by elected politicians, these actors
nevertheless possess a certain degree of power and, through their actions, directly
shape the course of active travel policy at the local and national scales. Sam
(Case B), Chris (Case C), Harry (Case E) and Graham (Case F), on the other
hand, are all campaigners. Regardless of which advocacy coalition they belong
to, they are all united in their dissatisfaction with the status quo and seek to
influence policy-makers and elected politicians in order to align the status quo
with their frame-conditioned objectives. Finally, Lisa (Case G) and Keith (Case
H) are facilitators. Unlike campaigners, they do not engage in direct dialogue
with decision-makers or elected politicians on specific policy issues. Rather, they
Power
Case
Heuristic
learning
Discourse
manipulation
Egoistic
promotion
Affiliative
justification
Strategic
articulation
A. Will 
B. Sam  
C. Chris  
D.
Martha   
E. Harry    
F.
Graham   
G. Lisa   
H. Keith   
Table 4.1 Actors’ encounters with the causal powersExplaining ‘best practice’
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seek to further the cause of a particular advocacy coalition through supportive,
ancillary activities.
As ‘an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to
realise core policy beliefs’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 44), it is not
difficult to recognise the central importance of policy learning in this context.
29
For policy-makers, campaigners and facilitators alike, policy learning can
represent a highly cost-effective, pragmatic means of addressing the inherent
uncertainties present in ‘messy’ policy domains. Indeed, for policy-makers,
‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1991, 2005) or ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz and Marsh,
1996, 2000) from spatially and/or temporally distinct political systems is often
the most rational response when faced with a pressing policy problem with no
obvious solution. For campaigners too, the acquisition of pertinent policy
knowledge can prove vital in constructing a viable, coherent and compelling
discourse around a policy problem, such as traffic congestion. Failure to achieve
some threshold level of competence in this can have serious consequences, as
more ‘knowledgeable’ coalitions wrest control of the policy debate and realign it
in accordance with their objectives.
However, as previously discussed, messy policy problems are often
international in scope and have a tendency to generate innumerable quantities of
‘factual’ information (Ney, 2009). As a result, policy actors seeking to acquire
codified knowledge in relation to such problems are invariably confronted with
an almost infinite array of case studies, reports, conferences, plans, proposals,
datasets and other materials that may be of potential relevance.
30 Clearly, both
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1982) and resource constraints make formal
evaluation of such materials a complete impossibility in most instances. Yet,
equally as clearly, this in no way obviates the need for policy actors to learn and,
on the basis of such learning, to act accordingly.
In this context, we can begin to appreciate why the term ‘best practice’ is
drawn upon by policy actors involved in learning activities within the UK
29 It should be noted, however, that this is one of several definitions of ‘policy learning’ and that the concept
has been surrounded by considerable debate and conceptual ambiguity for several decades (see Bennett
and Hewlett, 1992; Bulkeley, 2006).
30 Indeed, simply entering the phrase “solving congestion” into the search engine Google yields upwards of
7,500 results (July 2010).Explaining ‘best practice’
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transport policy community. Simply put, actors are impelled to learn from other
‘practices’ and, reflecting their overriding desire to fulfil certain frame-
conditioned objectives, have a predilection for learning from those that are ‘best’.
As we have demonstrated, ‘practice’ can here pertain to several conceptually
distinct phenomena: policy interventions themselves (cf. Will, Sam, Martha,
Harry, Graham, Lisa); policy interventions’ design standards (cf. Sam, Chris,
Graham); the process by which policy interventions come to be implemented (cf.
Keith); or particular social actualities unrelated to policy (cf. Will). A best
‘practice’, therefore, is an instance of one of these phenomena that a policy actor
deems to be superior, based on a tacit or explicit set of frame-conditioned
criteria, irrespective of whether this framing influence is consciously
acknowledged. For the majority of the research participants, such superiority is
classed in ‘relative’ terms, whereas for Graham (Case F) we saw that it tends to
be classed in ‘absolute’ terms.
However, while a concern for learning from ‘best practices’ may partly
explain the prevalence of the term per se, the notion of ‘best practice’
simultaneously corresponds to a particular learning approach. In other words,
‘best practice’ is not simply a passive colloquialism; it appears deeply
intertwined with the cognitive processes that condition the manner in which
policy learning takes place. Specifically, the empirical evidence in Chapter 3
suggests that the ‘best practice’ notion may be considered to stand in a mutually
constitutive relationship with a particular form of heuristic learning, providing
policy actors with an informal, yet powerful, ‘rule of thumb’ or ‘cognitive
shortcut’ (Weyland, 2005) for approaching and interpreting the sheer volume of
information that may be of relevance to their policy learning activities (see also
Page and Mark-Lawson, 2007). This emphasis on mutual constitution is
important, for it reflects the fact that: (1) as such heuristics are biologically
innate, they may predispose policy actors to a ‘best practice’ learning strategy;
and (2) while such heuristics are innate, they may well themselves be triggered
through an actor’s conscious decision to adopt such a strategy.
Indeed, drawing on cognitive psychological theory, we can perhaps view the
‘best practice’ approach to policy learning as a loose variant of what Gigerenzer
and Goldstein (1999) term the ‘take the best’ heuristic (TTB). As a so-called ‘fast
and frugal’ heuristic―i.e. a ‘simple rule in the mind’s adaptive toolbox for Explaining ‘best practice’
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making decisions with realistic mental resources’ (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000, p.
727)―the TTB heuristic enables actors to rapidly decide between two or more 
alternatives on the basis of particular ‘cues’. A commonly-cited example of this
involves an individual attempting to estimate which one of two cities has the
larger population. The individual has heard of both cities, yet has no direct
knowledge of their respective populations. In employing the TTB heuristic, the
individual first searches for a series of ‘cues’ that might indicate a larger
population; for instance, whether the cities have international airports, a well-
known university or a high-profile sports team. Second, these cues are tacitly
sequenced in accordance with their perceived validity as proxy indicators; for
instance: (1) airport, (2) sports team, (3) university. Finally, following this
sequence, the individual attempts to differentiate between the two cities on the
basis of the selected cues. As soon as a disparity is evident with respect to a cue
(i.e. City A has an airport but City B does not), the individual makes a judgment
in relation to the original question (i.e. perceives City A to have the larger
population). If no disparity is evident in terms of the first cue (i.e. both cities
have airports), the individual then repeats the process with regard to the second
cue, and so on (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999).
To illustrate how this may be of relevance to actors’ policy learning
experiences documented in Chapter 3, let us briefly concentrate on Will (Case
A). As a local policy-maker, Will arguably adheres to the ‘balanced mobility’
doctrine, seeking to strategically implement a range of demand-management
measures in order to sensitively meet the needs of the Marlsworth economy. This
is an extraordinarily difficult and unenviable task, as such ‘new realist’ attempts
at demand-management are particularly prone to failure (cf. Chapter 1).
Moreover, Will’s decisions are subject to continual scrutiny from other actors in
the polity, many of whom have radically different, frame-based perspectives on
the issues involved.
31 In the face of such difficulties, we have seen that Will
undertakes an informal process of ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose, 1991) in order to
identify a limited number of national and international examples of policy
interventions that both (1) appear to have been successful in addressing similar
31 Indeed, even though Marlsworth’s elected politicians ostensibly advocate a ‘balanced mobility’ approach
to policy formulation, in realpolitik the ‘efficient mobility’ mindset prevails amongst the Conservative-
controlled council (cf. Sam, Case B).Explaining ‘best practice’
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policy targets to his own, and (2) may be feasibly implemented in his own
jurisdictional sphere. Yet, as we have also seen, in searching for such
interventions, Will draws on a several sources, notably the internet and the
experiences of consultants and his fellow practitioners―a method which 
undoubtedly uncovers myriad interventions that may be of relevance.
In this context, the TTB heuristic may explain how, without recourse to
formal evaluation techniques, Will is able to cognitively process the respective
merits of these countless alternative interventions and rapidly converge on those
which appear to warrant further consideration and/or mobilisation. Based on the
content of Will’s interview, we can see that he tends to appraise potential policy
interventions on the basis of certain core criteria relating to both successfulness
and transferability: how effective they are likely to be in positively impacting key
policy targets; how compatible they are likely to be with other measures; how
acceptable they are likely to be with key stakeholders; and how implementable
they are likely to be in relation to jurisdictional, legislative and environmental
constraints. Following the example above, we can interpret such criteria as
decision ‘cues’ used in the TTB heuristic and view Will’s informal policy
learning process as a manifestation of the TTB heuristic in action; i.e. alternative
interventions are sequentially compared against the particular cues, and decisions
are taken as soon a significant disparity becomes evident. Further, we can
postulate that these cues, and the tacit order in which they are hierarchically
arranged, are a function of both Will’s ‘balanced mobility’ frame-based
priorities―which in themselves are sensitive to those of other actors in the 
polity―and the nature of pertinent situational circumstances. For example, in 
periods of fiscal retrenchment, we can imagine a ‘cost effectiveness’ cue moving
up the hierarchy and playing a greater role in determining which interventions
come to be viewed as ‘best practice’.
32
32 However, as Newell et al. (2003) note in their empirically-based critique of the TTB heuristic, this neat,
theoretical model bears only a partial resemblance to the chaotic, disordered processes of everyday
decision-making. In practice, actors are shown to be more deliberative than the heuristic would suggest,
and less likely to discount alternatives on the basis of the first cue alone (cf. Harry, Case E; Keith, Case H).Explaining ‘best practice’
- 123 -
(ii) Discourse manipulation
The second causal power bestowed by the notion of ‘best practice’ is fairly
imperceptible, yet highly significant. Essentially, it concerns the manner in
which policy actors―in defining certain ‘practices’ as ‘best’―can indirectly 
manipulate the meta-discourses surrounding a given policy problem, and thus
change the very nature of the problem as it is perceived. For Bulkeley (2006),
this can be interpreted through the theoretical lens of governmentality (see
Foucault, [1979] 1991), whereby the notion of ‘best practice’ may be seen to
represent a subtle governmental ‘technology of performance’, regulating the
nature of debate within transport policy subsystem without resorting to formal
instruments of authority (see also Higgins and Lockie, 2002).
Although a governmentality perspective is by no means restricted to a focus
on the apparatus of the state, Harry’s (Case E) observation of Whitehall officials’
selection of ‘best practices’ is a telling instance of such regulation at work.
“So there are people looking for different things out of ‘best practice’ stuff, and why they
want to push something forward as ‘best practice’. So in [Whitehall]…they would want to
be looking for examples where they can be seen to be pushing things forward a bit, and
pushing innovation, but not too radical[ly].”
(Harry, interview)
In this example, we can view the notion of ‘best practice’ as a means of
establishing certain norms across the networked polity that correspond to a
particular ‘political rationality’ (Bulkeley, 2006). Specifically, this political
rationality appears as a bureaucratic, realpolitik permutation of the ‘balanced
mobility’ perspective―seeking to temporarily placate the sustainable mobility 
coalition whilst delicately retreating from the logic of ‘efficient mobility.’
According to Vettoretto (2009, p. 1082), this technology of performance is
particularly apparent in European spatial planning and policy-making, whereby
the notion of ‘best practice’ corresponds to ‘a regulative instrument, which is
expected to influence sense-making and cognitive frames through selection,
translation and diffusion of success stories that are considered appropriate with
regard to some general and universalistic principles.’ In publishing collections ofExplaining ‘best practice’
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‘best practices’, therefore, European regulators seek to disseminate knowledge
amongst a particular audience that prescribes an officially-sanctioned solution to
a common problem. Linguistic codes thus act to strategically delineate the central
tenets of a normative model, thereby defining which ‘practices’ are viewed as
acceptable and which, by default, are not.
Interestingly, Vettoretto (2009) further notes that for those on the receiving
end of such ‘best practices’, this may not necessarily be perceived as oppressive,
restrictive or burdensome. On the contrary, the surety of pre-specified ‘best
practices’ can be highly-valued in policy domains that are typically characterised
by complexity and uncertainty. However, we can add here that in instances
where actors’ frames diverge significantly from the political rationality being
advocated through ‘best practices’, this passivity can rapidly evaporate. In
campaigning for the rights of pedestrians in Marlsworth, for example, Chris
(Case C), is in constant dispute with the local authority over the issue of so-
called ‘footway parking’, whereby motorists park their vehicles with two or more
wheels on the pavement and obstruct the safe movement of wheelchair users, the
elderly and parents with young children. The local authority’s proposed solution,
following ‘best practice’ guidance, was to formalise this custom by painting
white lines on the pavement and stipulating that motorists must leave a minimum
gap for pedestrians. For Chris, however, this was something of a travesty with
the blame perceived to lie squarely with the overarching political rationality from
which such ‘best practice’ was derived:
“They’re not asking the question: ‘what’s the capacity of this street to contain stored motor
vehicles?―‘n’ vehicles―therefore we’ll devise a management system that prevents more 
than ‘n’ vehicles coming in here and preserves it at least partly as a space. The question that
is being asked is ‘how can we get as many vehicles in here as we can, almost regardless of
the effect that has on other users of the space?…I see that as condoning worst practice
because it’s a limited perspective on a problem.”
(Chris, interview, original emphasis)
Clearly, on the basis of limited evidence, it is difficult to judge the extent to
which the ‘best practice’ notion is consciously employed as a means of discourse
manipulation in the UK transport subsystem. For example, recall the Whitehall
officials that appropriated the ‘relative best practice’ output from Cycle UK’sExplaining ‘best practice’
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Learning Project and published it as normative guidance (Case F). Although this
certainly shaped the tone of the discourse on UK active travel policy, it would
almost certainly be disingenuous to characterise this as a deliberate attempt to
nullify radical progress. Moreover, in her candid interview, Martha (Case D)
gave the distinct impression that where the notion of best practice is used
“tactically” in Whitehall, this is done for pragmatic reasons of resource constraint
and face-saving rather than any conscious attempt to ‘set the rules of the game’.
However, as the experiences of Graham (Case F), Sam (Case B) and Lisa
(Case G) can attest, it is possible to characterise the notion of ‘best practice’ as a
deliberately-deployed rhetorical device which actors calculatingly use to
manipulate certain discourses. Here, ‘best practices’ function as key characters in
‘stories’―articulating a particular narrative derived from political rationalities, 
or regulatory ‘models’ (Bulkeley, 2006; Vettoretto, 2009). What constitutes
‘best’ in such circumstances is thus defined through tacit or explicit frame-
conditioned criteria and when such ‘stories’ are told by particularly powerful
actors in the polity, other actors may, to varying degrees, become socialised into
the norms of the corresponding advocacy coalition.
For Graham, this pertains to the ‘absolute’ conception of ‘best practice’,
whereby ‘best’ is not a relative judgement on an existing practice, but rather a
utopian vision for UK cycling. In articulating this ‘absolute best practice’ vision,
Graham achieves two things. First, in an intra-frame sense, this vision functions
as a pure ‘political rationality’, used to orchestrate organisational activities and
anchor shared understandings within Cycle UK and its affiliates in the
‘sustainable mobility’ coalition (cf. Harry, Case E). Second, this political
rationality is deliberately constituted as ‘best’ practice as a means of influencing
the inter-frame discourses on particular cycling issues, such as whether cyclists
ought to be accommodated on the carriageway or on segregated cycle paths.
Through Cycle UK’s campaigning activities, therefore, ‘best practice’ is
rhetorically used to implicitly frame both problems and solutions, at once
deployed to characterise existing practices as sub-optimal while simultaneously
positing a favoured, frame-conditioned ‘answer’.
However, for both Lisa and Sam, even the notion of ‘relative best practice’
can be strategically used to shape meta-discourses on active travel. Sam, it
should be noted, very much adheres to the principles of the ‘sustainable mobility’Explaining ‘best practice’
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coalition.
33 His local campaigning activities, therefore, are very much inter-frame
in character. For as we have seen, his target audience is mainly comprised of
‘balanced mobility’ policy-makers such as Will (Case A), and local Conservative
politicians who, despite their ‘balanced mobility’ platitudes are perceived by
Sam to be staunch adherents to ‘efficient mobility’ logic. As we discussed in
Chapter 3, Sam points to specific examples of cycling ‘best practices’ in
Wallborough and Northern Europe in order to address what we might
characterise as a perceived ‘knowledge deficit’ on the part of these supply-side
actors. However, the notion of ‘best practice’ in this context corresponds to far
more than a synonym for ‘good examples’. Specifically, it is used rhetorically in
order to enlighten the state of the discourse surrounding cycling in Marlsworth,
drawn upon as a means of transcending provincial, narrow-minded debate:
“I think too often as a cycle campaigner you can be depicted as some sort of sandal-
munching, lefty lunatic―and there are those to be sure―but it’s easy to marginalise cycle 
campaigners. So when we can say that ‘the DfT says this is best practice’ it’s kind of
appealing to sort of established [trails off…]. It’s to sort of say ‘look, you think what we’re
asking for is crazy, but actually they’ve done it for 30 years in the Netherlands where
they’re all perfectly sane and car ownership is just as high as it is in the UK. And in
Germany it’s even higher, but people just chose not to drive all the time; they keep the
Mercedes for the weekend or whatever. So it’s an appeal to a higher good or force, that’s
beyond the County Council and beyond their hierarchies and received wisdoms. It’s almost
like a grail; I think ‘best practice’ is referred to as a grail.”
(Sam, interview, emphasis added)
This process very much echoes Lisa’s approach to developing Scenario 1 in
the Futures Project. Given the nature of the project, the ‘sustainable mobility’
coalition needed little convincing that the integration of overseas ‘best practice’
into UK active travel policy was desirable, if not always practically feasible. The
challenge for the Futures Project, rather, lay in its attempt to reach out to those
policy actors, stakeholders and members of the public who aligned themselves
33 Indeed, in its initial stages of development, the core members of Marlsworth Bicyclists were drawn from
the ranks of Marlsworth’s local Friends of the Earth campaign group.Explaining ‘best practice’
- 127 -
with the ‘efficient mobility’ or ‘balanced mobility’ coalitions. As with Sam, the
notion of ‘best practice’ in this endeavour was at once used to refer to ‘good
examples’ of particular interventions, and also as a means of structuring the
overarching approach to active travel policy in the UK. Hence, in peppering
images of typical UK urban environments with overseas ‘best practices’ (cf.
Figure 3.12), the overriding intention was not to recommend specific ‘best
practices’ per se, but to “get people to think differently” about the role of
walking and the potential roles they can play in sustainable urban transport
systems.
(iii) Egoistic promotion
As well as affording the power of discourse manipulation, we can also point to
the agency of the ‘best practice’ notion in terms of its power to facilitate what we
may term ‘egoistic promotion’. Simply put, this power manifests itself in
situations where policy actors seek to promote their respective practices as ‘best’
as a means of attaining various forms of ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, [1979]
1984). Naturally, the desire to ‘look good’ is present in all walks of life, and
prestige is generally viewed positively. Nevertheless, within the context of the
networked polity, we can point to a few specific benefits that the ‘best practice’
marque can bestow upon policy actors.
Recall, for example, Harry’s comments about the recently-opened Westfield
Shopping Centre, whereby the developers effectively attempted to ‘greenwash’
the project through the strategic association of its attributes to a number of core
values held by the ‘sustainable mobility’ coalition, such as ‘community’ (Case
E). In this context, the ambiguity surrounding ‘best practice’ represents its core
competency; the notion can be called upon in a range of distinct circumstances as
a means of rapidly establishing useful credentials, in turn supporting actors’
abilities to advertise particular ‘practices’ and to benefit accordingly.
Coincidently, Keith (Case H) discussed this promotional, branding power of
‘best practice’ at great length, drawing on the re-development of Kensington
High Street, London and its relationship to the Westfield Shopping Centre.
Noting that no formal evaluation of the Kensington redevelopment had ever beenExplaining ‘best practice’
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undertaken, coupled with the fact that wayfinding appeared to have become more
difficult for pedestrians subsequent to the scheme, Keith became suspicious of
the official, long-standing narrative that labelled the scheme as ‘best practice’ in
relation to walkability. The first sense in which this narrative was disingenuous
concerned the massive financial investment which had gone into the
redevelopment, an amount that vastly overshadowed spending by other
authorities on active travel (i.e. an unfair comparison). Secondly, however, upon
investigating the motivations behind the redevelopment in more detail, Keith
discovered that original impetus for its introduction was to minimise the loss of
retail trade to the Westfield Shopping Centre. The notion of ‘best practice’ thus
had nothing to do with the walkability of the redevelopment per se. Rather, it
functioned as a form of place-marketing, strategically deployed as a ‘badge of
honour’ to advertise the merits of Kensington High Street in the face of increased
retail competition (see also Vettoretto, 2009). Indeed, one may argue that, in
certain cases, such high-profile developments cannot afford not to be associated
with one or more ‘best practices.’
However, within the active travel policy community, where such capital-
intensive projects are rare, perhaps the most significant benefits derived from this
power of egoistic promotion relate to the allocation of public funds. In competing
for scarce financial resources, particularly in the current era of fiscal
retrenchment, certain policy actors are essentially obliged to present themselves
and their achievements in as positive a light as possible. Arguably, this
requirement is augmented through ostensibly meritocratic funding procedures
that seek to ‘back the best’, such as the highly-selective Whitehall-funded
demonstration projects discussed by Martha (Case D). In bidding for such
funding, those local authority officials (e.g. Will, Case A) with a track-record of
implementing effective policy interventions may enjoy a considerable
reputational advantage over their peers, appearing as more trustworthy and
reliable channels for investment, especially if those evaluating alternative
proposals make use of ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics as discussed above. Moreover,
the importance of having a close association to ‘best practices’ in this ‘backing
the best’ environment can become greater still when one considers the
significance of positive feedback. Assuming, not altogether unreasonably, that
some form of positive causal relationship is likely to exist between fundingExplaining ‘best practice’
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allocation and policy effectiveness, a lock-in situation may well result whereby
those undertaking egoistic promotion enjoy protracted benefits over many years.
(iv) Affiliative justification
Somewhat related to the power of egoistic promotion, but nevertheless
conceptually distinct, we can also see evidence of ‘best practices’ being cited by
policy actors in defence of certain policy-related decisions. In acting as a
legitimizing rationale for particular courses of action, the notion of ‘best practice’
thus affords the power of ‘affiliative justification’. More formally, while the
notion’s power of ‘egoistic promotion’ is drawn upon in situations where actors
seek to gain ‘symbolic capital’ themselves, the power of ‘affiliative justification’
is used to profit from the symbolic capital possessed by: (1) the notion of ‘best
practice’ itself; and (2) the established ‘best practices’ of others.
In candidly admitting that the notion of ‘best practice’ is used “tactically”,
we can see echoes of this first form of affiliative justification in the experiences
of Martha (Case D). Martha made it very clear in her interview that she has a
genuine desire to see active travel ‘best practices’ implemented throughout the
entire UK and, in controlling national funds for active travel projects, she
expressed her wish to be able to fund all local authorities handsomely. However,
as only limited funds are available for dedicated walking and cycling
interventions, this is not possible. In order to present this unfortunate situation in
a positive light, therefore, those funds that are available came to be branded as a
“best practice pot”. This affiliation with ‘best’ thus enables Martha to justify
limited spending in terms of meritocratic principles, rather than publicly
admitting to austere circumstances within Whitehall.
With regard to the second form of affiliative justification―profiting from 
the symbolic capital of established ‘best practices’―we can point to the 
experiences of Graham (Case F), Lisa (Case G) and Keith (Case H). In Graham’s
case, where Cycle UK’s organisational usage of the ‘best practice’ notion
somewhat backfired, it is this power of ‘affiliative justification’ that the local
authority practitioners used to shield themselves from the critical voices in the
Cycle UK volunteer base. In claiming to follow ‘best practice’ guidance in theirExplaining ‘best practice’
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choice of cycling interventions, such actors can immediately absolve themselves
of wrong-doing, even if the nature of the interventions are clearly less than
optimal. In Lisa’s case, this affiliative justification was again used in an inter-
frame context, but in a more proactive, calculated sense. Here ‘best practices’
were used to legitimise the radical and ‘visionary’ nature of the Futures Project,
by tethering it to some kind of ‘reality’, albeit a diffuse and unfamiliar one. In
Keith’s interview, however, we heard how affiliative justification is not only
used to repel hostile criticism, but instead drawn upon as a means of reassuring
other policy actors as to the merits of a particular strategy under conditions of
great uncertainty. In other words, so the argument goes, if proposed ‘practice A’
has already proved effective elsewhere―becoming a ‘best practice’―this ought 
to instil confidence in a strategy based on the same approach.
(v) Strategic articulation
The final causal power of the ‘best practice’ notion, as evident from the empirical
material in Chapter 3, relates explicitly to its psycholinguistic function.
Specifically, in affording the power of ‘strategic articulation’, ‘best practice’ is
drawn upon by policy actors in their attempts to codify and communicate
particular frame-based beliefs to other actors across the networked polity. We
can trace two forms of such articulation, both of which were noted by Martha
(Case D) and Harry (Case E). First, each of these actors argued that the positive,
upbeat connotations of the ‘best practice’ notion can be harnessed in order to
inspire and motivate other policy actors. Here, the affirmative tone of the notion
was thought to be considerably more effective as a means of changing actors’
behaviour than straightforward castigation.
The second form of strategic articulation, somewhat related to this, pertains
to the rhetorical value of anecdotal ‘practice’ examples in both textual and verbal
communication. Whether such ‘practices’ are additionally purported to be ‘best’
in this context seems inconsequential; rhetorically, the effect is the same. For
Martha, incorporating or ‘sprinkling’ (Bulkeley, 2006) such examples into policy
materials appears commonplace and deliberate, noting that “quite often, if you
write guidance, you’re on the lookout for case studies to make it a bit moreExplaining ‘best practice’
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meaningful.” However, the most interesting account of such strategic articulation
is provided by Harry and concerns the premeditated communicative approach
that he and his team employed in their recent dealings with an incoming
government minister. Here, anecdotal examples of “practical things” are of great
strategic value:
“We have to think about―in our contact with people―how we approach them, so the 
meeting with X the other day, three of us went along to that and we discussed on the way
there what we were going to say, which we’d worked out beforehand, but also the way we
said it and the approach that we had, and what interests him, what his personality is and
how he decides things. …He’s not the opposition spokesperson and campaigner that he was;
he is now the responsible minister. So we now need to shape our approach to him based on
that changing role. He’s now sitting there in front of his officials and wants to look good as
well, so we don’t want to kind of reinforce the image of him in his previous role. But he
quite likes getting into the nitty-gritty of things, so he wants to focus on the practical things
that are to be done rather than an overarching narrative.”
(Harry, interview, emphasis added)
4.3 A realist synthesis
In this final section, we shall briefly attempt to synthesise the preceding
discussion and offer a tentative, formal explanation for the present ubiquity of
the ‘best practice’ notion in the UK transport policy subsystem. In so doing, we
shall return to the ontological and epistemological precepts of critical realism
first discussed in Chapter 2 and interpret this ubiquity in terms of a series of
‘events’, accounted for by certain ‘transfactual conditions’. Importantly, as
implied by the term transfactual, it is vital to maintain a distinction here between
the domains of the empirical/actual and the domain of the real (Sayer, 1992). In
other words, abstraction via transfactual argumentation entails that while we
must draw upon actual events and cases to have any chance of creating
meaningful theory, we cannot reduce our abstraction to an explanation of specific
events in a given context per se; we are thus attempting realist generalisation.
34
34 Indeed, to categorically explain specific instances would be ‘retrodiction’ (Bhaskar, 1975).Explaining ‘best practice’
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Our transfactual argumentation in this chapter has been guided by the
following banal, yet vital, questions:
‘What does the existence of this object (in this form) presuppose? Can it
exist on its own as such? If not, what else must be present? What is it about
the object that makes it do such and such?’
(ibid., p. 91, original emphasis)
Given the centrality of natural necessity to this process (cf. Chapter 2), we have
thus been concerned with abstracting the internal and necessary relations that
make up the ‘best practice’ notion’s structure. In other words, because the notion
of ‘best practice’ is a social object―as its presence is wholly dependent upon 
actors’ usage of the term―its nature is inherently constituted through its internal, 
necessary relations to other social objects, and it is these relations which we have
effectively attempted to identify, through a focus on the notion’s causal powers
(ibid.; Danermark et al., 2002; Smith, 2006). As Bhaskar (1989, p. 42, original
emphasis) makes clear, ‘a relation RAB may be defined as internal if and only if
A would not be what it essentially is unless B is related to it in the way that it is.’
For example, we might abstract the structure of an aeroplane (Ap) in terms of its
internal, necessary relations with its wings (RApW), engines (RApE) or flaps
(RApF). If any of these relations are removed, the plane will not be what it
essentially is: an object capable of controlled, self-propelled flight.
As we saw in Chapter 2, while influencing the course of events in the actual
domain, structures themselves lie deeper. Through retroductive inference in this
Chapter, we have thus worked backwards―attempting to arrive at the ‘best 
practice’ notion’s structure by way of its causal powers and associated events (cf.
Chapter 3). Indeed, albeit subconsciously, this is what we have done in the
simple aeroplane example above. The fact that it achieved controlled, self-
propelled flight (event) is understood in terms of lift, thrust and manoeuvrability
(causal powers), and from this understanding we thus determined the necessary,
internal relations comprising its structure.
Recognising the five causal powers in Section 4.2, therefore, we can here
argue that the structure of the ‘best practice’ notion is comprised of two internal,
necessary relations to other social ‘objects’, without which the notion would notExplaining ‘best practice’
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be what it essentially is. First, the power of heuristic learning reveals that ‘best
practice’ is necessarily related to a particular form of cognitive heuristic,
seemingly a variant of the ‘take the best’ heuristic identified by Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (1999). Second, the powers of discourse manipulation, egoistic
promotion, affiliative justification and strategic articulation reveal that ‘best
practice’ is also necessarily related to a form of ‘rhetorical device’, capable of
being allied to various political rationalities and governmental technologies
(Bulkeley, 2006). To varying degrees, both of these relations may be considered
as ‘symmetrical’ (Danermark et al., 2002), insofar as the notion of ‘best practice’
derives its true nature from the two objects and, through mutual constitution,
these objects in turn partly derive elements of their true nature from the notion of
‘best practice.’
Crucially, however, while this structure of the ‘best practice’ notion and its
attendant causal powers are internally and necessarily related, the relationship
between particular generative mechanisms―those processes by which such 
powers come to be exercised―and actual events is external and contingent, due 
to the fact that social systems are ‘open’ (ibid.; Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1994). It
is thus vital to recognise that the causal powers bestowed by the notion of ‘best
practice’ are latent, existing irrespective of whether they are exercised. Indeed,
even when exercised, they are by no means guaranteed to manifest themselves in
specific events as they will be inevitably conditioned by myriad concurrent
mechanisms (Figure 4.1).
35
35 In Figure 4.1, we can see Sayer’s (1992) concern for an object’s liabilities as well as its causal powers
(e.g. an aeroplane’s inherent susceptibility to the force of gravity). As this chapter has focussed on
explaining the ubiquity of ‘best practice’, the liabilities of the notion have not been addressed. However, in
Chapter 5, these will be implicitly discussed in relation to the notion’s limitations and broader
implications.Explaining ‘best practice’
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Theoretically-speaking, we can understand the fact of a mechanism
generating a particular event in terms of an ‘efficient cause’ (Collier, 1994)
triggering one or more causal powers. In the context of intra-coalitional and
inter-coalitional activities in the networked polity, we can point to several
situational contingencies that function as ‘efficient causes’, thereby prompting
policy actors to make use of the ‘best practice’ notion. These may include:
demands for practically-relevant policy knowledge; dissatisfaction with problem
conception or interpretation; demands for the acquisition and exhibition of
‘symbolic capital’; demands for prospective or retrospective justification of
actions; and demands for effective and efficient trans-frame communication.
Figure 4.1 The structures of causal explanation
Source: Sayer (1992, p. 109)Explaining ‘best practice’
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Conclusions
Drawing heavily upon the empirical material set out in Chapter 3, this chapter
has sought to offer a tentative explanation for the present ubiquity of the ‘best
practice’ notion in the UK transport policy community. First, it has attempted to
demonstrate that contemporary policy-making is not a rational, linear, value-free
exercise in technical planning, but rather a complex and antagonistic process
characterised by the presence of several competition, frame-orientated ‘advocacy
coalitions’ existing across an institutionally-fragmented ‘networked polity’.
Three such advocacy coalitions were argued to be particularly prevalent in the
UK transport policy subsystem: the ‘efficient mobility’ coalition, the ‘sustainable
mobility’ coalition and the ‘balanced mobility’ coalition. Second, within this
institutional context, the notion of ‘best practice’ was argued to possess five
‘causal powers’ which, by virtue of their nature, are drawn upon by a range of
policy actors in a diverse set of situational circumstances in order to realise
particular policy objectives. Here, insights derived from primary research were
supplemented with relevant contributions from secondary literature. Finally, the
theoretical discussion was formally expressed in terms of the critical realist
approach outlined in Chapter 2. Next, in Chapter 5, we shall assess the broader,
long-term implications of ‘best practice’ thinking in the UK transport policy
community.Balancing ‘best practice’
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Chapter 5
Balancing ‘best practice’:
contextual implications
“Shrewdness is a limitation on the mind. Shrewdness tells you what you
must not do because it would not be shrewd.”
―Samuel Hamilton 
(from John Steinbeck’s ‘East of Eden’)
‘Phronesis thus concerns the analysis of values―‘things that are good or 
bad for man’…Phronesis is that intellectual activity most related to
praxis…aimed at social commentary and social action. The point of
departure for classical phronetic research can be summarised in the
following three value-rational questions: (1) Where are we going? (2) Is
this desirable? (3) What should be done?’
―Bent Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 57) 
In his influential text Making Social Science Matter, Flyvbjerg (2001) draws
heavily on the Aristotelian concept of ‘phronesis’, making a powerful case for a
rejuvenated social science grounded upon a reflexive concern for value-
rationality. This action-orientated, pragmatic intellectual virtue, Flyvbjerg
argues, is not only qualitatively distinct from that of ‘techne’―technical 
knowledge predicated on instrumental rationality―and ‘episteme’―scientific 
knowledge predicated on analytical rationality―but, through engagement with 
social and political praxis, it can redeem the project of social science in ways that
these other virtues cannot.Balancing ‘best practice’
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In describing and explaining the notion of ‘best practice’ as it is encountered
in the UK transport policy subsystem, Chapters 3 and 4 have thus far sought to
produce ‘epistemic’ knowledge, as have the existing contributors to the ‘actor
critique’ (see Bulkeley, 2006; Vettoretto, 2009). Several of the contributions to
the ‘pragmatic critique’ discussed in Chapter 1 are also ‘epistemic’ in approach
(e.g. Stead, 2009). However, this latter critique is also grounded in instrumental-
rationality, generating ‘technical’, goal-orientated knowledge concerning how
practices can be successfully transposed between institutional milieu (e.g.
Gudmundsson et al., 2005; de Jong, 2007). Given the growing productivity of
both critiques, it may be argued that scholars of the ‘best practice’ notion have
made collective headway in addressing the first of the three questions posed in
Flyvbjerg’s epigraph, albeit in a value-free sense.
Conspicuously absent in this literature, however, are any bona fide attempts
to address Flyvbjerg’s second or third questions. To be sure, following
instrumental-rationality, those in the ‘pragmatic’ critique have necessarily
viewed naïve attempts at ‘best practice’ transfer as ‘undesirable’. Moreover, such
authors appear to have produced technical knowledge as an implicit response to
the question of ‘what should be done about this?’ Yet, for all the benefits yielded
by this approach―and indeed there are many―this critical focus fails to take any 
value-rational stance in relation to the notion of ‘best practice’ per se. The
assumption that ‘best practice’ represents a valuable means of orchestrating
policy learning processes goes completely unchallenged, with normative
judgements made solely in relation to how this process may be instrumentally
facilitated. While this may perhaps be understandable, if not altogether
excusable, within the context of the ‘pragmatic critique’, the omission of genuine
phronetic argument in the ‘actor critique’ is more disconcerting. Indeed, while
certain authors have produced impressive theoretical accounts of the ‘best
practice’ notion and its variegated, power-laden appropriation, they appear
extraordinarily reticent to engage with the disarmingly simple question: ‘so
what?’ As a result, conclusions are drawn solely on the basis of analytic-
rationality and neglect to address the glaring implications of ‘best practice’ for
political praxis.
Hence, while Chapter 6 will offer some overarching conclusions to this
thesis as a whole, it is here in Chapter 5 where our intellectual conclusions are toBalancing ‘best practice’
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be drawn (cf. Objective C). Heeding Flyvbjerg’s call for phronetic social science,
the strands of argument developed in preceding chapters will be woven together
and developed through the three questions posed in the epigraph. First, we shall
examine where the notion of ‘best practice’ appears to be taking us in relation to
UK transport policy. Second, we shall explore the value-rational and
instrumentally-rational implications of this trajectory. Finally, we shall make a
very brief plea for a more balanced approach to policy learning in relation to
transport policy.
5.1 Where are we going?
The notion of ‘best practice’ appears endemic in the UK transport policy
community, liberally used by a diverse set of policy actors in an equally diverse
range of policy-orientated activities. The core of this thesis, reflected in
Objectives (A) and (B), has been devoted to understanding and interpreting this
phenomenon. First, we comprehensively traced the manner in which the notion
of ‘best practice’ is encountered within a closely-knit subgroup of policy actors
specialising in active travel. Second, we explained the nature of such encounters
through a detailed examination of contemporary policy processes and the
notion’s inherent causal powers. Four of these causal powers―discourse 
manipulation, egoistic promotion, affiliative justification and strategic
articulation―were argued to derive from the ‘best practice’ notion’s role as a 
‘rhetorical device’; and the fifth―heuristic learning―was argued to stem from 
the notion’s function as a variant of the ‘take the best’ cognitive heuristic
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999).
The fact that the ‘best practice’ notion appears to stem from this
multifaceted structure poses a challenge at this point, as a truly comprehensive
phronetic critique would have to recognise and respond, in kind, to the full
complexity of the picture outlined in Chapter 4. This would be a vast
undertaking, and although this certainly does not fall outside of the intellectual
remit of this thesis, it perhaps lies somewhat outside of its practical scope. In
light of this, this chapter attempts the less ambitious goal of directing a phroneticBalancing ‘best practice’
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line of enquiry exclusively at the power/structure relation of ‘heuristic learning’.
In its totality, this attempt may well appear rather naïve―not least because it 
largely disengages itself from questions of context. However, deferring such
engagement does not necessarily preclude critical reflection. Indeed, it is perhaps
reasonable to make a distinction here between reflections on the merits of ‘best
practice’ heuristic learning per se (cf. Section 5.2) and reflections on the extent
to which it ought to be employed (cf. Section 5.3). The latter is certainly a more
naïve endeavour―given the arguments put forth in Chapter 4. Yet, for all the 
structural underpinnings of the ‘best practice’ notion, it must be recognised that
there is still room for agency in policy learning. While rhetoric and egoistic
promotion necessarily abound, there are those actors who, quite simply, feel that
learning from ‘best practices’ is an instrumentally-rational approach to policy
formulation, the benefits of which are self-evident (cf. Will, Case A). It is to such
actors that this chapter is implicitly addressed.
With regard to the ‘best practice’ approach to heuristic learning, the
empirical and theoretical material presented in the preceding chapters suggests
that we can approach Flyvbjerg’s (2001) first question―‘where are we 
going?’―in terms of three ‘focal variables’, which we may respectively term: 
(X) ‘practice’; (Y) ‘performance’; and (Z) ‘perspective’. By ‘focal’, we
essentially mean that these variables correspond to that which actors may
concentrate on in the course of policy learning. The ‘practice’ variable (X), as its
name suggests, essentially corresponds to the object of learning; that which is
taken to constitute ‘practice’ in a given learning endeavour. As noted in Chapter
4, our eight cases reveal four discrete forms of practice that have acted as the foci
for instances of ‘best practice’ policy learning: policy interventions per se; policy
interventions’ design standards; social actualities indirectly related to policy; and
the process by which interventions are implemented. The ‘performance’ variable
(Y), relates to the perceived quality of such practices. Although a clearly
continuous variable, actors tend to speak here of practices that are perceived as
‘best’, ‘good’ and ‘worst’ in relation to certain core criteria, such as effectiveness
or transferability. Finally, the ‘perspective’ variable (Z) refers to the judgemental
perspective against which practices’ performances are determined. We can point
to two discrete forms here: ‘relative’ judgements, where practices are appraisedBalancing ‘best practice’
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against one another; and ‘absolute’ judgements, where practices are appraised
against some preconceived ‘utopian vision’ (Table 5.1).
Within this conceptual framework, it is clear from the empirical evidence in
Chapter 3 that policy actors undertaking ‘best practice’ learning have a tendency
to concentrate their efforts on particular forms of each focal variable. In answer
to Flyvbjerg’s first question, therefore, ‘best practice’ heuristic learning efforts
appear to be ‘going’ in three particular directions.
X. Practice
With regard to the ‘practice’ variable (X), we can see a strong degree of
convergence upon policy interventions and their associated design standards as
the object of learning. Indeed, while Harry (Case E) and Keith (Case H) stressed
the importance of examining the implementation processes underpinning such
interventions, and Will (Case A) strongly implied that particular social actualities
Focal Variable Associated forms Form description
X. Practice (Discrete)
Intervention
Design
Actuality
Process
Policy interventions per se
Policy interventions’ design standards
Social actualities indirectly related to policy
Process by which interventions are implemented
Y. Performance (Continuous)
Best
Good
Worst
Practice superior to all others
Practice compares favourably to others
Practice inferior to all others
Z. Perspective (Discrete)
Relative
Absolute
Performance judged against that of other practices
Performance judged against utopian vision
Table 5.1 Focal variables and associated formsBalancing ‘best practice’
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can also be learnt from
36, the majority of the participants strongly viewed policy
interventions themselves to be the natural foci for policy learning. Drawing on
what we have seen in previous chapters, we can point to two major reasons as to
why this may be the case. First, and most evident, it is policy interventions which
tend to correspond to the ultimate ‘end product’ that many policy actors
undertaking learning activities must themselves produce. For example, when
faced with the daunting prospect of developing demand-management
interventions for Marlsworth―Collier’s (1994) ‘efficient cause’―Will (Case A) 
immediately looked to draw lessons from a range of other national and
international interventions that had been developed for a similar purpose. We
might draw an artisanal analogy here, where, tasked with producing skilfully-
fashioned articles for the first time, a novice apprentice first observes a master at
work, attempting to decipher those actions and techniques which lead to high-
quality outcome. Similarly, in their respective roles within the networked polity,
Sam (Case B), Martha (Case D), Harry (Case E), Graham (Case F) and Lisa
(Case G) all seek to disseminate knowledge of effective interventions as a means
of achieving their frame-based objectives; hence, in their learning activities, they
correspondingly focus upon interventions.
Second, in centring policy learning activities on interventions, actors can
benefit from such interventions’ tangibility. Unlike the immateriality of their
associated implementation processes, interventions themselves tend to be
somewhat perceptible, possessing definitive spatial and temporal identities. As
we saw with the study tour to Wallborough organised by Sam (Case B), for
example, actors are often able to visit the site of interventions and witness first-
hand how they function. Moreover, given the rapid developments in global
telecommunications that have taken place in recent years and the decreasing cost
of long-distance travel, the virtual and physical tangibility of such interventions
appears to be steadily increasing (see also Rose, 1991).
36 In his interview, Will argued that the Danish cycling culture is a ‘best practice’:
“One thing that you certainly can bring in from places like Copenhagen is that sort of chic culture [where
cycling] is a trendy and stylish thing to do; you don’t have to go out with your high-visibility jacket or
cycle helmet… the Copenhageners look good doing it and it’s part of their style and their fashion and I
think it’s ‘best practice’ that we could bring in.”Balancing ‘best practice’
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Y. Performance
In relation to the ‘performance’ variable (Y), actors unsurprisingly demonstrate a
predilection for learning from practices that are somehow perceived as ‘best’. In
terms of a ‘relative’ judgement, ‘best practices’ are learnt from for several easily-
appreciable reasons. First, often acting with constrained resources, policy actors
undertaking learning activities have a limited capacity to search for, identify and
evaluate the numerous ‘practices’ that may be of relevance to them (cf. Chapter
4); focussing on those that are ‘best’ is thus perceived to represent a means of
maximising the ‘return on investment’ from learning activities.
Second, by virtue of their characterisation as ‘best’, such practices are seen
to be proven approaches for making a positive contribution towards a shared
policy objective. In other words, ‘best’ corresponds to the very quality that actors
are themselves attempting to attain and/or disseminate in the course of their
policy activities. For example, ‘best practices’ for Will (Case A) were argued to
be practices that had demonstrated a superior degree of effectiveness in
improving the quality of active travel. Related to this, ‘best’ practices can thirdly
be perceived as ‘instructional guidance’ or as a ‘recipe’ for success (cf. Lisa,
Case G). Following such ‘guidance’ is often perceived as advantageous, as free-
riding on the back of existing policy research and investment can avoid
expensive and risk-prone attempts to ‘re-invent the wheel’.
Z. Perspective
Finally, in relation to the ‘perspective’ variable (Z), we can see that almost
without exception, actors undertaking policy learning activities judge the merits
of a given practice through a relative, rather than absolute, perspective. Again,
like the overriding emphases on ‘interventions’ and ‘best’, this concern for
‘relative’ judgement is unsurprising. Specifically, we can point to two reasons for
this. First, it may simply be the case that policy actors have no coherent ‘utopian
vision’ against which the merits of particular practices might be judged. For
example, although Graham (Case F) has a very strong sense of such a vision for
UK cycling, Martha (Case D) and her Whitehall colleagues do not:Balancing ‘best practice’
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“I don’t think ‘best practice’ is often used in that idealistic sense in a Whitehall department.
It’s used usually more pragmatically, so actually looking at something that has happened on
the ground…Of course, the Futures Project looks a lot further ahead than Whitehall
departments traditionally look…our ideas are not quite so clearly crystallised as to ‘what
might the world look like if you got to such and such a cycling number’, and we haven’t had
targets for increasing cycling for quite a long time now.”
(Martha, interview, emphasis added)
Second, it may alternatively be argued that practices are judged through a
relative perspective simply by virtue of the fact that this approach corresponds
most pertinently to the perceived project of policy learning per se. In other
words, although actors may well possess an ultimate vision for the nature of the
UK transport system,
37 they may not consider this to be of immediate concern
when undertaking policy learning activities. Specifically, it may be argued that
such visions are already acknowledged in such activities, inherently reflected in
given policy objectives. Learning, as ‘the action of receiving instruction or
acquiring knowledge’ (OED, 1989, np.), is thus concerned with determining
those ‘relative best practices’ that are considered to represent the most effective
means of improving an actor’s ability to realise such objectives through the
procurement of concrete information. We can see echoes here of the sister notion
of ‘best practice’, termed ‘benchmarking’, which, in the context of business
management, can be defined as ‘a process in which a business evaluates its own
operations (often specific procedures) by detailed comparison with those of
another business (esp. a competitor), in order to establish best practice and
improve performance; the examination and emulation of other organizations’
strengths’ (OED, 1989, np.).
As a means of concluding and contextualising this first section, Figure 5.1
graphically represents the focal variables of ‘practice’, ‘performance’ and
‘perspective’ as the X, Y and Z axes of a three dimensional ‘focal matrix’. In
relation to each variable, the eight cases introduced in Chapter 3 are represented
in this matrix as Euclidian points; placed in accordance with a rough
37 Indeed, when shared, such visions represent the grounding loci for the development and coherence of
advocacy coalitions (cf. Chapter 4; Sabatier, 2007).Balancing ‘best practice’
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approximation as to their respective learning foci.
38 Their exact positioning is, of
course, highly questionable and should not be taken as overly significant.
Nevertheless, there is enough validity present in data behind the figure to
illustrate the fact that the participants’ principle learning foci tend to coalesce
around the ‘relative/best/intervention’ (RBI) vertex.
Z. Perspective
Worst
X. Practice
Y. Performance
Best
Relative
Absolute
Intervention Process
Cases
A Will
B Sam
D Martha
E Harry
F Graham
G Lisa
H Keith
C Chris (n/a)
B
AD
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Good H
F
A
H
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E E
AF RBI
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X. Practice
Y. Performance
Best
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Intervention Process
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F Graham
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H Keith
C Chris (n/a)
B
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Design Actuality
Good H
F
A
H
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5.2 Is this desirable?
As we have seen from the preceding section, and as evidenced by the empirical
material contained in previous chapters, ‘best practice’ heuristic learning has a
tendency to focus the attention of policy actors towards particular policy
interventions that are perceived to represent the relative best, within certain
38 This approximate placement may be considered as the answer to the hypothetical question: ‘when you
engage with best practice-led learning, what specifically do you focus on?’ Hence, given his distaste for
the notion, Chris is not present in Figure 5.1. In addition, Will, Keith, Harry and Graham are all
represented more than once as they appear to focus on more than one form for one or more variables.
Figure 5.1 Participants’ learning fociBalancing ‘best practice’
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spatial and temporal parameters. Taking the saliency of this ‘RBI focus’ as our
point of departure, we are thus now in a position to ‘evaluate the extent to which
the notion of ‘best practice’ represents a desirable organising principle for policy
learning processes’ (cf. Chapter 1; Research aim). Given Flyvbjerg’s (2001)
phraseology, however, it is first necessary to briefly reflect upon what we might
understand by the term ‘desirable.’ There are, of course, numerous philosophical,
moral, psychological and sociological avenues that could be explored here.
However, for the purposes of our argument, we shall concentrate on a
straightforward, two-fold conception of desirability. Specifically, in evaluating
‘best practice’ heuristic learning, we shall attempt to interweave a normative,
value-rational aspiration for a fairer, more sustainable UK mobility paradigm,
with a utilitarian, instrumentally-rational concern for effective and efficient
policy-making.
At this juncture, it is perhaps good academic protocol to ‘declare one’s
hand’. This is not because of the wildly misplaced, but nonetheless prevalent
belief that ‘subjective opinion’ must be extricated from ‘objective research’ (cf.
Chapter 2). Rather this simply reflects the need for transparency and clarity of
argument in what follows. Specifically, in passing judgement on ‘best practice’
heuristic learning, I am clearly not, nor do I claim to be, an impartial, frame-
neutral observer of events in the networked polity, attempting what Haraway
(1988) famously terms the ‘god-trick’. On the contrary, and as implied above, I
write here from a position that is at once ideologically sympathetic to profound
social and environmental justice, while politically sympathetic to pragmatic and
democratic modes of governance. Clearly, although both of these sympathies are
necessarily situated and doubtless would prove disagreeable to many, the latter is
less immediately divisive. As a result, while the overarching sentiment in the
following critique of ‘best practice’ heuristic learning is founded upon a genuine,
value-rational aspiration for significant paradigm shift in the UK transport
system, the attendant instrumentally-rational concern for the means by which
such a shift may occur possesses a degree of ‘trans-frame’ currency. In other
words, regardless of ideological persuasion or advocacy coalition affiliation, one
may still appreciate the extent to which ‘best practice’ heuristic learning impacts
upon the viability of decision-making in the UK transport policy subsystem per
se.Balancing ‘best practice’
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Before addressing the desirability of ‘best practice’ heuristic learning in
relation to each of the three focal variables identified in the previous section, it
first must be stressed that the observed RBI focus is not, in itself, undesirable.
Indeed, assuming that knowledge produced in relation to this focus is somehow
‘warranted’, it certainly represents a positive contribution to informed, evidence-
based policy development. Rather than a direct assault on ‘best practice’ heuristic
learning, therefore, the following critique instead aims to highlight some of the
opportunity costs of the present RBI focus. Specifically, these opportunity costs
may be considered to stem from actors’ respective concentrations on: (1) policy
interventions rather than associated policy processes; (2) ‘best’ practices rather
than ‘good’ or ‘worst’ practices; and (3) ‘relative’ rather than ‘absolute’
judgements.
X. Practice
As we have seen, ‘best practice’ heuristic learning appears to have a tendency to
focus policy actors’ attention upon policy interventions themselves. Although it
must once again be stressed that this is by no means inherently objectionable, we
shall argue here that such an intervention-centric focus may inadvertently
preclude important procedural concerns from actors’ analyses. First, we can
point to the apparent omission of learning efforts that genuinely address what
may be termed ‘ex-post causation’, relating to the extent to which identified
interventions are causally responsible for identified ‘outcomes’. Second, and as
highlighted by Harry (Case E) and Keith (Case H), we can similarly point to the
apparent omission of learning efforts that genuinely address what may be termed
‘ex-ante causation’, which corresponds to the manner by which particular
interventions come to be implemented.
In terms of ex-post causation, we can essentially posit that the intervention-
centric focus of current learning approaches acts to crudely caricature the causal
mechanisms that link policy interventions to their outcomes. As in Chapter 4, a
useful perspective on this issue is provided through the lens of cognitive
heuristics. In particular, there are two well-known decision-making heuristicsBalancing ‘best practice’
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identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) that together illustrate the
limitations of oversimplified, intervention-centric ‘best practice’ heuristic
learning: the ‘availability heuristic’ and the ‘representativeness heuristic’.
Generally, we can understand the availability heuristic as a cognitive process that
‘makes people pay disproportionate, excessive attention to especially proximate,
vivid, striking, and memorable events’ (Weyland, 2005, p. 23). Recalling
participants’ encounters with the ‘best practice’ notion in Chapter 3, we can point
to several instances in which an intervention-centric and/or ‘outcome-centric’
focus belies the usage of the availability heuristic, giving cognitive prominence
to particular practices or social actualities.
For example, recall that during the Futures Project, Lisa (Case G) drew
heavily upon her personal cycling history as a source of knowledge, focussing
her attention upon several ‘vivid, striking and memorable’ (ibid.) interventions
that she had experienced as a cyclist in Sweden, the Netherlands and the United
States.
39 In addition, Lisa also focussed her literature review on certain
geographical areas with ‘striking’ rates of walking and/or cycling, such as
Freiburg, Germany. Sam (Case B) similarly appears to exhibit use of the
availability heuristic in his campaigning activities, tending to view ‘best’
practices as desirable interventions that are prominent elsewhere yet strikingly
absent in Marlsworth, such as highly-publicised cycling ‘best practices’ in
Northern Europe. Indeed, the fact that Wallborough County Council employs a
dedicated cycling officer―unlike Marlsworth County Council―appeared to 
characterise this measure as ‘best practice’ by default, irrespective of any formal
evaluation as to its specific benefits. As in Lisa’s case, the fact that Wallborough
has a higher cycling modal split than Marlsworth was clearly a central factor in
Sam’s decision to organise the study tour for his local practitioners and
politicians. Recall also that fellow practitioners from across the UK contacted
Will and his team at Marlsworth County Council for active travel policy advice
simply on the basis that, nationally-speaking, Marlsworth has a relatively high
cycling modal share (Case A).
39 Indeed, given the power of cycling’s ‘affective dimension’ (Spinney, 2006), it is not altogether surprising
that such personal experiences would feature prominently through the availability heuristic.Balancing ‘best practice’
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While the availability heuristic initially concentrates actors’ attention upon
such prominent policy interventions or high active travel modal shares, however,
it is through the representativeness heuristic that actors make rapid inferences,
rightly or wrongly, as to the causal relationships between policy interventions
and perceived outcomes. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 585) note, two
recurrent questions for individuals engaged in such knowledge-intensive tasks
tend to be: ‘what is the probability that event A originates from process B?’ And
‘what is the probability that process B will generate event A?’ In approaching
such questions, they argue that individuals often employ the representativeness
heuristic in order to estimate such probabilities in accordance with the degree to
which A is perceived to be representative of B or vice versa. In essence, this
approach to problem solving can be considered as an informal method of
inductive generalisation, moving swiftly from a premise to conclusion on the
basis of limited data and without recourse to formal statistical analysis (cf.
Chapter 2). It may be this representativeness heuristic, therefore, that partly
explains why actors such as Sam (Case B) and Lisa (Case G) tend to posit a
causal connection between the effectiveness of particular policy interventions
and a geographically coterminous modal share. In other words, they tacitly
reason that a high active travel modal share is representative of the influence of
certain policy interventions and, vice versa, that prominent policy interventions
are likely to result in a high active travel modal share.
However, while the availability and representativeness heuristics are
biologically innate and often highly valuable, they clearly fall short of affording
the comprehensive understanding of ex-post causation that is required if policy
learning is to be a truly holistic endeavour. As a result, they thus offer a
decidedly limited foundation upon which to base conclusions about
interventions’ true effectiveness.
40 The interpretation of statistical data is
particularly salient in this regard, as noted by Will (Case A). To paraphrase his
argument in terms of our theoretical understanding thus far, Will stated that
particular policy interventions will sometimes gain recognition as a result of a
widely-advertised headline statistic related to large increases in active travel.
40 Indeed, in postulating causal relationships solely on the basis of co-presence between interventions and
modal share, policy actors may be guilty of viewing causality in shallow, Humean terms (cf. Chapter 2).Balancing ‘best practice’
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Promulgated by local authority officials keen to derive symbolic capital from
being associated with a ‘best practice’ (i.e. egoistic promotion; cf. Chapter 4),
these statistics are invariably presented in percentage terms and rarely
accompanied in the first instance by absolute figures. As a result, local
authorities may justifiably claim to have encouraged a 50% increase in cycling,
without the necessary caveat that this is an increase upon an exceedingly low
base rate. The dangers of the RBI focus to policy learning in this environment are
clear. The headline figure is striking and thus accorded particular significance
through the availability heuristic, while the representativeness heuristic is liable
to draw inappropriate conclusions as to the effectiveness of the interventions
involved.
Even in instances where ex-post causation has been fully investigated,
however, and the effectiveness of an intervention categorically established, an
intervention-centric focus may also preclude due consideration of ex-ante
causation. In other words, it may not pay heed to how the intervention came to
be. If policy learning and lesson-drawing are to be fruitful and meaningful
exercises, they cannot be restricted to simply attaining knowledge of policies’
effectiveness; efforts must be made to contextualise interventions in terms of
their antecedent causes. What political processes were at work? What barriers
were identified and overcome? How was the intervention funded? Getting
answers to such questions is vitally important if policy actors are to genuinely
learn meaningful lessons about policy change.
To draw on a subtle grammatical distinction, it may be argued that
intervention-centric learning is liable to concentrate solely upon ‘practices’
(noun) rather than ‘practises’ (verb), whereby ‘to practise’ is to ‘work at or
perform one's business or occupation; to exercise the skills of one's trade or
profession’ (OED, 1989, np.). In this sense, then, ‘practise’ pertains to the
deliberate and calculated actions of policy actors involved in realising a
particular intervention. Currently, it would appear from the RBI focus that the
majority of ‘best practice’ heuristic learning efforts are directed at policy
interventions and only subsequently, if at all, is attention paid to questions of
‘practise’. In failing to adequately consider ex-ante causation as an object of
learning in its own right, however, well-meaning policy actors again risk making
crude, erroneous assumptions on the basis of the representativeness heuristic;Balancing ‘best practice’
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assuming, for example, that ‘best practices’ and ‘best practises’ are spatially
correlated. The city of Marlsworth, for example, has one of the highest rates of
cycling in the United Kingdom, yet Sam (Case B) would argue that this is despite
rather than because of associated ‘practises’.
Too great a focus on ‘practise’ and controlled, deliberate acts, however, in
itself risks obscuring the saliency of contingency, luck and external influences
upon the materialisation of particular interventions. For example, while
contemporary transport planners in the Netherlands are undoubtedly highly-
accomplished professionals, the ‘practice’ we witness on the streets of
Amsterdam and Utrecht remains a function of both intended and unintended
interventions throughout history. In the 1970s, for example, the bicycle was
appropriated by far-left, anti-capitalist movements as an icon of environmentally-
friendly living and Dutch road safety groups such as Stop de Kindermoord had
extremely strong political influence (Voerknecht, 2009). It must be recognised,
therefore, that policy interventions are by no means the sole vehicle through
which behavioural change occurs; the influence of institutional arrangements
may be equally, if not more, significant (Rietveld and Daniel, 2004).
Intervention-centric ‘best practice’ heuristic learning approaches, it would
appear, thus undermine the importance and appreciation of this fact. They tacitly
purport the image of a context-free world in which causal mechanisms are
‘blackboxed’ (Latour, 1999); becoming linear, dominant and deproblematised
(Bulkeley, 2006). In reality, the relationship between policy and other
institutional arrangements is complex and iterative; policy can influence settled
habits of thought and behaviour, yet this can only proceed in an institutional
environment which is amenable to change.
Y. Performance
As we have discussed, focussing upon ‘best’ practices in the course of policy
learning is a natural tendency for policy actors. ‘Best’ practices are perceived to
be proven approaches for realising effective outcomes and, like a self-help book,
act as a guidance manual to those seeking to attain similar outcomes. To a large
degree the existing literature on ‘best practice’ and the empirical material set outBalancing ‘best practice’
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in Chapter 3, illustrates that the terms ‘best’ and ‘good’ are often treated as
interchangeable (see Bulkeley, 2006). Where qualitative distinctions are made,
this tends to be in the context of the pragmatic critique, where authors
deliberately refer to ‘best practices’ in order to illustrate the apparent naïveté of
those involved in attempts to instigate policy convergence across diverse
institutional contexts (e.g. Stead, 2009). It is an exceedingly rare event, however,
when explicit mention is made of ‘worst’ or ‘poor’ practice. Indeed, the very
concept of ‘worst practice’ appears to stand completely at odds with current
approaches to policy learning in the UK transport policy community.
We can point to two major disadvantages with this status quo which together
serve to illustrate the fact that an exclusive focus on ‘best’ practice is
undesirable. First, and most obviously, ignoring ‘worst practices’ simply runs
contrary to age-old wisdom that one can improve one’s performance by learning
from one’s own mistakes and those of others. As noted in Chapter 1 and
reiterated in Chapter 4, formulating and implementing effective demand-
management interventions in line with ‘new realist’ transport policy is an
extraordinarily difficult task. Indeed, as Nykvist and Whitmarsh (2008) imply,
policy failure in such endeavours is arguably the rule rather than the exception.
Hence, for each ‘best practice’ policy intervention or policy process that
ostensibly succeeded in some meaningful way, there will be several others which
did not. Regrettably, according to the ‘take the best, ditch the rest’ ethos of ‘best
practice’ heuristic learning, this vast repository of strategically-valuable
knowledge is deemed to be far less worthy of attention than a handful of
analytically-dubious ‘gold standard’ examples―which, if evaluated at all, are 
often done so on the basis of opaque and situationally-specific criteria. Indeed,
even following the same ‘reinventing the wheel’ logic noted in the previous
section, those actors who truly desire to learn from ‘best practice’ would still find
progress more forthcoming if such cases of policy failure were examined and
analysed, as insights would be gained into those ‘wheels’ which one should
avoid ‘reinventing’.
Second, over-emphasis on ‘best’ practices can impose unnecessarily tight
restrictions upon policy actors, obliging them to follow guidance and advice that
may be narrow, inflexible or inappropriate. Clearly, this issue is a cornerstone of
the pragmatic critique of ‘best practice’, with several authors railing against theBalancing ‘best practice’
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manner in which the notion is used to prescribe ‘one size fits all’ measures across
a range of heterogeneous circumstances (see Stead, 2009). However, as Chris
stressed, similar limitations of ‘best’ practice approaches to policy
implementation are evident at the local level (Case C). Indeed, without formally
expressing it in such terms, Chris’s argument against the notion of ‘best
practice’―as recounted in Chapter 3―broadly accuses active travel practitioners 
of ‘anchoring’ their professional decision-making in officially-sanctioned, ‘best’
design standards, at the expense of factoring in basic considerations of usability
or the contingencies of specific locations.
41 In essence, generic ‘best’ practice
guidance is thus argued to both lead and constrain decision-making to a
damaging extent, as blanket, uncreative solutions are thoughtlessly ‘shoehorned’
into a diverse range of situations.
Z. Perspective
The third focus we have witnessed is the overwhelming tendency for ‘best
practices’ to be judged in a ‘relative’, rather than ‘absolute’ sense. Indeed, with
the exception of Graham (Case F), none of the participants in this research who
undertook ‘best practice’ heuristic learning viewed ‘best’ practices to mean
anything other than the best examples of certain practices already in existence.
Of course, as we have noted previously, this does not necessarily mean that these
policy actors do not have any sense of long-term policy ‘direction’. On the
contrary, several do; particularly those in campaigning roles. However, if not
altogether unknown, it appears that actors’ ‘ultimate visions’ for UK active travel
are rarely articulated or communicated in a coherent fashion. For example, as
Martha’s quote in the previous section demonstrated, there are no Whitehall
targets for increasing the rate of walking and cycling in the UK at present, let
alone a clearly-stated ‘vision’ for future active travel..
Given the central role that policy learning must play in moving toward a
more sustainable mobility paradigm, however, this absence of ‘absolute’ thinking
41 Here ‘practice’ corresponds to interventions’ design specifications, rather than their existence per se (cf.
Chapter 4).Balancing ‘best practice’
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and judgement is problematic. Specifically, while knowledge of relative ‘best
practices’ is certainly useful, focussing policy learning endeavours exclusively
upon such practices poses a genuine risk that significant policy change in the
sustainable transport field will not be forthcoming. It may be useful to draw a
sporting analogy here. At the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, the
American athlete Dick Fosbury broke the world high-jumping record by an
unprecedented 2.5 inches. Fosbury achieved this feat using a revolutionary
jumping technique now colloquially known as the ‘Fosbury Flop’. Prior to his
achievement, the dominant jumping technique―known as the ‘straddle 
method’―essentially represented relative ‘best practice’ within the athletic 
community. With his ‘flop’, however, Fosbury effectively demonstrated that
such relative ‘best practice’, whilst popular and seemingly effective, did not
necessarily yield the greatest outcome possible (i.e. absolute ‘best’).
The parallels of this situation with ‘best practice’ heuristic learning are clear.
Collective fixation with policy interventions or processes that are somehow
perceived to be the relative ‘best’, while advantageous in many respects, may
result in a situations of pronounced path-dependency, where learning activities
perversely act to stifle innovation and ‘lock-in’ unsustainable travel behaviour.
Indeed, as Graham (Case F) stressed in the context of Dutch cycle infrastructure,
even the nature of highly-celebrated relative ‘best’ practices can leave a lot to be
desired when viewed through an absolute perspective.
5.3 What should be done?
Let us conclude this chapter by briefly exploring how some of the undesirable
consequences of ‘best practice’ heuristic learning might be mitigated. Rather
than setting out an exhaustive model for policy learning, what follows is simply a
plea for a ‘rebalancing’ of the current approach in terms of the three focal
variables that have structured our discussion thus far. Given the huge complexity
surrounding issues of policy development and implementation, there are clearly
no straightforward answers concerning how actors might temper the
‘relative/best/intervention’ focus of current ‘best practice’ heuristic learning.Balancing ‘best practice’
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However, in order to avoid a situation in which we are left ‘peering at the entire
universe through a drinking straw’ (Hari, 2010, p. 1), it certainly appears that a
change of focus is necessary.
In essence, drawing upon the arguments in the preceding sections, we can
approach Flyvbjerg’s (2001) third question―‘what should be done?’―by 
suggesting that policy actors seeking to undertake ‘best practice’ learning ought
to consider the following three points: first, in addition to concentrating learning
efforts upon policy interventions per se, it is important to also focus upon their
associated ex-ante and ex-post causal processes; second, while it is clearly
advantageous to learn from practices that are perceived to be the ‘best’ in some
respect, it is vital not to disregard the huge potential contribution to learning
afforded by cases of ‘worst’ practice and instances of policy failure; finally,
while appraising the merits of ‘practices’ in relative terms is certainly a valuable
approach―not least as a means of ‘benchmarking’ one’s own 
progress―judgements must also be made in absolute terms in order to realise 
genuine policy change.
In terms of practical approaches through which this ‘rebalancing’ might be
facilitated, specific measures will naturally be highly contingent upon particular
jurisdictional circumstances. Thus it would be inappropriate to recommend a
universal ‘toolkit’ for a renewed approach to policy learning. Nevertheless, it is
possible to point to two overarching approaches that may enable policy actors to
move beyond the current focus of ‘best practice’ heuristic learning and approach
policy development in a more ‘open’ manner. First, and as implied above, it is
vital to recognise the benefits of having ultimate ‘visions’ for the UK transport
system. Importantly, such visions must correspond to more than just platitudes or
indicative modal splits. Rather, remaining sensitive to competing socioeconomic
and environmental priorities, they must strive to offer coherent and holistic
pictures of what transport systems in the UK could be like in the decades to
come. Functioning as an anchor point for absolute judgements made in relation
to active travel and sustainable transport more broadly, the Futures Project
described in Chapter 3 is a fantastic example of this strategy. Through
developing a series of comprehensive scenarios for UK walking and cycling, the
project represents an ideal platform upon which to orchestrate the scope and
character of policy learning activities. Of course, given the intractable nature ofBalancing ‘best practice’
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disagreement in the UK transport policy community, actors’ absolute visions will
be markedly different in a host of respects. Nevertheless, if various advocacy
coalitions made efforts to develop and articulate their respective long-term ideal
visions for the UK transport sector, this would certainly aid strategically-
informed policy-making and enrich the scope for policy learning.
The second approach for rebalancing the present focus of ‘best practice’
heuristic learning is somewhat related to visioning, but concentrates on
identifying strategic pathways by which such visions might be attained. While
visioning exercises encourage novel thinking and facilitate a degree of absolute
judgement, it is through strategic, problem-orientated thinking that the benefits of
a broader policy learning focus may be realised. A good example of this
approach is the EU FP7 OPTIC project, which is currently developing a
framework for ‘policy packaging’―encouraging policy actors to approach policy 
problems in a holistic, pragmatic manner (see OPTIC 2009). Policy learning is
recognised as being vital to such an approach; however, OPTIC strongly implies
that simply focussing learning activities upon relative, best, interventions is
wholly insufficient as a means of instigating genuine policy change. Indeed,
emphasis is continually placed upon the need for policy actors to study how
existing measures come to be implemented and to examine ex-post processes
through detailed monitoring in order to trace the causal factors that explain why
certain measures have succeeded or failed in effectively and/or efficiently
meeting their objectives. Moreover, where policies have failed, or have produced
adverse unintended consequences, these are noted and learnt from; all
information is seen as valuable.
Two final points merit consideration here. First is the need to stress that the
emphasis placed upon strategic thinking should not be read as a rejection of
heuristic-based learning per se. As noted previously, the complexity and sheer
quantity of potentially-relevant information available to policy actors is such that
solely deriving lessons from ‘rational’ cost-benefit analyses is a complete
impossibility. Rather, the tendencies of certain learning-orientated heuristics
ought to be recognised and tempered so as not to preclude valuable information
from policy learning activities. Second, there is clearly a need for policy actors to
disassociate instances of policy failure from instances of incompetence. Of
course, there may well be occasions where the latter gives rise to the former. Yet,Balancing ‘best practice’
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as Keith (Case H) discussed, sometimes policy interventions can appear effective
even though significant incompetence was present in their formulation or
implementation. It is thus hugely regrettable that the pronounced aversion to
admitting policy failure, let alone publicising knowledge of such failure,
effectively serves to embargo discussion of ‘worst practice’. Given the
complexity of policy-making, failures are inevitable. In order to think more
creatively about policy problems, however, this knowledge must not be
concealed.
Conclusions
Following Bent Flyvbjerg’s (2001) call for a phronetic social science, this
chapter has sought to address the implications of the ‘best practice’ notion for
the wider project of policy learning. Concentrating on the notion’s first causal
power of ‘heuristic learning’, it has drawn upon the empirical material
presented in Chapter 3 in arguing that policy actors learning from ‘best
practice’ appear to exhibit a marked tendency to focus their attention upon
existing policy interventions that are perceived to be the ‘relative best’. While
not inherently objectionable, this overwhelming ‘RBI focus’ may preclude a
focus upon other ‘forms’ of three key ‘focal variables’, representing a
potential opportunity cost. First, it may lead policy actors to overlook both
ex-ante and ex-post causal processes, both of which are vitally important
sources of policy learning. Second, in concentrating predominantly upon
practices that are ‘best’, actors may neglect to examine instances of policy
failure; again, a rich source of strategically-valuable knowledge. Third, in
framing ‘best practice’ heuristic learning exclusively in ‘relative’ terms,
whereby existing interventions are appraised against one another and rather
than against a preconceived long-term vision, actors may inadvertently limit
the scope for significant policy change and thus jeopardise a genuine
transition to sustainable mobility. Finally, in making a plea for a more
balanced approach to policy learning, this chapter has briefly noted the
benefits of visioning exercises and strategic policy analysis.Conclusions
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
‘Social scientists do not discover new events that nobody new about
before. What is discovered are connections and relations, not directly
observable, by which we can understand and explain already known
occurrences in a novel way.’
―Berth Danermark et al. (2002, p. 91) 
This thesis has sought to make a substantial and original contribution to academic
debate in the field of policy learning. Specifically, it has aimed to critically assess
the present ubiquity of the ‘best practice’ notion in the UK transport policy
community, and evaluate the extent to which the notion represents a desirable
organising principle for associated policy learning processes. Underpinning and
structuring this aim were three distinct objectives: (A) how is the notion of ‘best
practice’ encountered and understood within this community? (cf. Chapter 3); (B)
what are the generative mechanisms and structures that explain the present
ubiquity of ‘best practice’ within this community? (cf. Chapter 4); and (C) what
are the broader implications of ‘best practice’ thinking with regard to policy
learning and policy development? (cf. Chapter 5).
Given that the substantive, policy-relevant conclusions to the research have
been set out in Chapter 5, this final chapter instead brings closure to the thesis
with concise reflections upon: (1) the core contributions of this thesis to
theoretical and practical knowledge; (2) the limitations of the chosen theoretical
and empirical approaches and their execution; and (3) potential avenues for future
work.Conclusions
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6.1 Core contributions
Policy actors presently involved in the UK transport policy community do not
need to read a lengthy academic thesis in order to appreciate the fact that the
notion of ‘best practice’ is extraordinarily popular. This much is self-evident.
However, thus far, minimal concerted academic attention has been devoted to
truly understanding, explaining or appraising this ubiquity in any real depth.
Given the centrality of the ‘best practice’ notion to contemporary policy learning
efforts, this omission is concerning; a fact compounded by the enormous scale of
the sustainable mobility challenge facing the sector. In Chapter 1, two emergent
critiques of ‘best practice’ in the planning literature were identified. The first of
these, termed the ‘pragmatic’ critique, has gone to great lengths in order to point
out the inherent limitations involved in efforts to transfer ‘best practices’ across
institutionally heterogeneous contexts, while the second, termed the ‘actor’
critique, has made initial, compelling attempts to critically examine the manner in
which policy actors make use of the ‘best practice’ notion. While both critiques
have proved invaluable in subjecting the notion of ‘best practice’ to academic
scrutiny, however, a number of opportunities were identified for additional
contribution.
First, exisiting empirical efforts designed to reveal the nature of actors’
encounters with the notion of ‘best practice’, while valuable, were held to be
limited in depth. As a result, Objective (A) was addressed through eight, detailed
case studies, focussed exclusively on a closely-knit active travel policy network
(cf. Chapter 3). Drawing upon intensive primary research, the participants’ varied
and often fascinating encounters with the notion of ‘best practice’ were traced in
detail. Even within this small sample of participants, a diverse array of
experiences and understandings of ‘best practice’ was evident. The intensive,
case study approach adopted here was invaluable for revealing the complexities
and nuances present in actors’ experiences. The semi-structured interviews
undertaken with each participant were highly-informative and, although its merits
should not be overstated, the cognitive mapping technique was a valuable tool for
structuring the eight case studies and diagrammatically representing the key
causal relationships postulated by participants.Conclusions
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Second, although existing attempts had been made in the literature to account
for the various functions of the ‘best practice’ notion, Objective (B) sought to
develop a coherent and penetrating explanation for the notion’s present ubiquity.
Following critical realist ontology, it was argued that the notion of ‘best practice’
at once functions as a form of cognitive heuristic and as a powerful rhetorical
device (cf. Chapter 4). In particular, this two-fold structure was argued to give
rise to five ‘causal powers’: heuristic learning; discourse manipulation; egoistic
promotion; affiliative justification; and strategic articulation. Correspondingly,
the generative mechanisms responsible for actors’ various usage of the ‘best
practice’ notion, whereby these causal powers are exercised, were argued to stem
from the nature of contemporary policy processes in the UK transport policy
community; characterised as ‘messy’ and fraught with antagonism, uncertainty
and competition, within and across ‘frame-based’ advocacy coalitions.
Finally, noting that neither the pragmatic critique nor the nascent actor
critique have sought to appraise the validity of the ‘best practice’ notion as a
policy approach per se, Objective (C) concentrated on the power and form of
‘best practice’ heuristic learning, examining in detail the manner in which it
appears to concentrate policy learning efforts upon certain ‘forms’ of three ‘focal
variables’: practice, performance and perspective. Although it was stressed that
‘best practice’ heuristic learning was not inherently undesirable, it was argued
that this focus risks incurring a number of opportunity costs. Specifically, it was
argued that the current focus ought to be broadened so as to encompass a concern
for ex-ante and ex-post causation, policy failure and sub-optimality and a
judgemental perspective that considered the merits of alternative interventions in
an ‘absolute’ sense.
The critical realist approach followed in this thesis has provided a
constructive framework with which to approach these issues. Although not
technically a ‘contribution’, it would appear that the realist ontological and
epistemological platform set out in Chapter 2 is relatively compatible with
current directions in transport research more broadly. Indeed, as an overarching
logic of inquiry, critical realism appears to lend itself to both scholars working in
the ‘mobilities’ school and those more allied with the policy-minded ‘middle-
ground’. Moreover, critical realism may help to transcend much of the
unnecessary and regrettable mud-slinging between proponents of qualitative andConclusions
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quantitative research in the academic transport community, encouraging such
‘debate’ to move instead toward more fruitful discussions of ontology and
epistemology.
Given that much of the existing academic literature on policy transfer,
including the pragmatic critique, tends to ‘write out’ the messy, detailed aspects
of the process and the experiences of the actors involved, and given that the
nascent actor critique has thus far demonstrated a reluctance to take any
normative stance on the notion of ‘best practice’, this thesis has also sought to
make some tentative links between theory and practice. Simply put, academic
theory cannot afford to ignore the insights of policy actors; and such actors, in
turn, may benefit from academic perspectives on the issues they grapple with.
Specifically, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have together highlighted the need for caution
and balance in policy learning. Of course, several of the participants involved in
the research were highly attuned to the limitations of the ‘best practice’ notion
before this research was even proposed. Nevertheless, in tracing their experiences
and those of their peers, the formal explanation for ‘best practice’ ubiquity set out
in Chapter 4 may afford greater insight as to why they feel so uncomfortable with
the notion. Indeed, during a chance encounter with one participant subsequent to
their interview, they proceeded to explain at length how their perspective on
policy learning and ‘best practice’ had changed as a result of participating in the
research.
6.2 Limitations
Clearly, there are limitations to every piece of academic work, irrespective of
whether these are explicitly acknowledged. As far as this thesis is concerned,
there are likely to be several theoretical, empirical and analytical shortcomings
present. However, there are a number of immediate limitations to this thesis that
are worth noting here.
First, it is worth reflecting more critically upon the critical realist stance that
underpins this thesis. This is addressed here in the ‘limitations’ section for no
other reason than the main body of the thesis has adopted a rather accepting toneConclusions
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in relation to critical realism, perhaps neglecting to explore its broader
ramifications and ontological limitations. Significantly, this is not the place to
debate and defend critical realism as a philosophy of social science per se;
existing work achieves this more than admirably (see, for example, Sayer 2000).
Rather, with the advantage of hindsight, my intention here is to acknowledge that
the arguments presented in preceding chapters may have been modified―and, 
indeed, strengthened―had they drawn more directly upon the canon of 
poststructuralist work concerned with interpreting and understanding
contemporary policy processes.
Two poststructural theoretical frameworks, in particular, appear to warrant
greater consideration as potential lenses through which one might critically
examine the prevalence and implications of the ‘best practice’ notion:
governmentality (Foucault, [1979] 1991; Miller and Rose, 2008); and Actor
Network Theory (Law, 1986; Latour, 2005). In part, both of these frameworks
have been touched upon in the analysis undertaken in Chapter
4―governmentality, explicitly (albeit briefly) and ANT, implicitly. Nevertheless, 
given its sustained focus on transfactual argumentation and the identification of
causal powers, this thesis has arguably missed an opportunity to engage more
deeply with these frameworks.
With respect to ANT, it may well have been profitable to explore the extent
to which the notion of ‘best practice’ represents a non-human actant bound up in
myriad semiotic and material relations with other actants. Of particular value here
would be an exploration of what Law (2004) terms ‘modalities’―caveats first 
identified in STS that act to temper the truth value of particular ontological
claims. For example, in their infancy, claims that certain practices ought to be
acknowledged as ‘best’ (relative or absolute) may well be tempered and couched
in cautionary terms by their proponents and others. However, as testified by the
presence of the ‘pragmatic critique’ introduced in Chapter 1, these modalities can
be ‘dropped’ or ‘deleted’ (ibid.) through particular inter-actant relations, leading
to situations where ‘best practices’ cease to be tethered to their respective
institutional contexts and, correspondingly, enjoy seemingly self-evident validity.
However, while ANT may provide a more fruitful and explicit platform from
which to investigate the constitutive relationships that underpin the current
prevalence and character of ‘best practice’ thinking, it is arguably Foucault’sConclusions
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concept of governmentality that could shed most light upon the regimes of power
that necessarily infuse such relationships. Drawing on Foucault and others,
Bulkeley (2006) concludes that the notion of ‘best practice’ is at once a political
rationality and a governmental technology, insofar as it embodies both normative
political visions and a means of rendering certain practices governable. In
hindsight, directly examining the empirical material presented in Chapters 3
through the lens of governmentality, and engaging more fully with Bulkeley’s
emergent conception of ‘best practice’―as well as other governmental 
interpretations― may well have afforded a more comprehensive engagement 
with the ‘best practice’ notion with respect to its political nature and implications.
Not least, this could have functioned as a productive means of engaging with
more overarching debates relating to the political character and implications of
contemporary policy processes, such as those pertaining to neoliberalism (Peck
and Theodore, 2010) and urban ‘policy mobilities’ (McCann, 2008; McCann and
Ward, forthcoming). This broader scholarship would have tied in neatly with the
discussion of ‘new public management’ in Chapter 1 and would have offered a
much greater platform from which to draw conclusions in Chapter 5.
Despite these omissions, however, I do certainly do not regret the deep
engagement with critical realism. Although it may sound a little trite and clichéd,
academic scholarship is a path of enlightenment and discovery, and this thesis has
provided a wonderful opportunity to explore the nature of critical realism in great
detail. Although this may sound naïve to more experienced ears, I find critical
realism particularly appealing given the fact that my research falls distinctly
along the ‘policy edge’ of social science; it categorically destroys positivism,
prioritises explanation and yet manages to achieve this without succumbing to
excessive introversion. In short, it ensures that social science is grounded in
philosophy without becoming enslaved by it. The challenge I am faced with now
is an enticing one. I must build upon my knowledge and experience of critical
realism and explore the arguments of other theoretical paradigms in
contemporary social science. Rather than paying lip-service to their ontological
and epistemological arguments, however, or passing superficial judgement on
their merits based on the reading of derivative texts, I aim to engage with such
paradigms at the level of their deepest convictions. In sum, there will inevitably
be a degree of constraint as to the respective theoretical paths we follow asConclusions
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academics. We cannot ignore the formative influence of pedagogic environments,
close colleagues, and even theoretical ‘fashions’. However, writing this thesis has
affirmed the crucial need to be open-minded and critical about theory. Like most
things, there is a balance to be reached. Finding that balance is ought ultimately
to be a never-ending process, but the dedicated, full-time doctoral study that I
soon hope to undertake will doubtless provide a first opportunity for much-
needed reflection.
Second, although the research participants form part of a distinct policy
network, this was perhaps not optimally reflected in the chosen sampling
approach adopted in the research design. Clearly, as a result of drawing
participants from the Futures Project, the participants were all relatively well-
known to each other. However, it would have been perhaps more effective to
have addressed the notion of ‘best practice’ through a web of definite, established
professional relationships, thereby contextualising and triangulating key insights.
In other words, rather that inferring certain relations between Whitehall and
national campaigners on the basis of their discrete interviews, it would have been
interesting to have concentrated on a specific project, gleaning multiple
perspectives on the same issue.
43 Indeed, had this been the case, a genuine
opportunity might have existed for the development of Bulkeley’s (2006) concern
for power relations and governmentality. To be sure, Bulkeley’s insights have
informed the content of Chapter 4―particularly with regard to the causal power 
of ‘discourse manipulation’―yet there are several avenues of potential enquiry 
into power relations which have unfortunately been left unexplored.
This seems an appropriate point at which to briefly address the issue of
sample size. Although the engagement with the research material generated by
the interviews was detailed and in-depth, it may be argued that eight interviews is
too small a sample for the conclusions reached in this thesis to have much
widespread validity. This question of sample size in qualitative research has been
directly addressed in the literature (see, for example, Small, 2009; Sandelowski,
1995) where it is typically argued that sampling considerations in qualitative
research ought to be judged in respect of thematic ‘saturation’ or ‘redundancy’,
rather than against strict a priori standards inherited from extensive methods. In
43 Although Cases A, B and C concentrating on LTP3 in Marlsworth did achieve this to some degree.Conclusions
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other words, the sample is deemed sufficiently large when additional interviews
cease to yield any insights that have not already been accounted for. It is, of
course, difficult to make such a judgement in practice. However, I would
certainly not claim that saturation was reached in this research; while there were
significant overlaps amongst the experiences of the various participants, there
will doubtless be much ‘out there’ that is, as yet, unaccounted for. As a result, the
findings are undoubtedly more tentative and emergent than they might
theoretically be, had greater resources for research been available. Finally in
relation to sample size, it is worth referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2
and Figure 2.1. Arguably, while concern for sample size is often valid, such
concern can often belie epistemological misunderstandings. In short, there is a
difference between inductive inference and retroductive inference. The former
seeks to extrapolate conclusions derived from a sample to a wider population.
Issues of representativeness and sample size are thus highly pertinent. The latter,
however, makes no such attempt. Instead, it seeks to explain rather than to
empirically generalise.
Third, there are two key perspectives on active travel that are missing from
this research―those of elected politicians and those of motoring campaigners. In 
different ways, in-depth interviews with such actors would have undoubtedly
yielded captivating insights into the manner in which the notion of ‘best practice’
is encountered within the UK transport policy community. Once again, this could
have underpinned a more thorough engagement with issues of power and
competing political rationalities, and would also have aided understanding of the
‘messy’ policy processes involved.
Finally, reflecting the nature of the subject matter, this thesis has perhaps
struggled to find a comfortable disciplinary identity. Of course, there is no
inherent reason why this should be problematic; geographers are perhaps more
accustomed to inter-disciplinary work than most other social scientists. However,
there is a danger that in drawing liberally and superficially upon concepts from
political science such as ‘frame-based’ advocacy coalitions, or more pertinently
those from cognitive psychology, such as heuristic decision-making, analytical
insights may have been erroneously concluded on the basis of crude, non-
specialist interpretation.Conclusions
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6.3 Future work
As is customary, we shall conclude this thesis with a brief overview of those
themes that appear to warrant further examination. This final section is labelled
‘future work’ rather than ‘future research’ in order to reflect the fact that while
certain themes pertain to academic investigation, some instead relate to the
practical need to rebalance current approaches to policy learning.
First, and most immediately, the tentative understandings of the ‘best
practice’ notion generated by this thesis would be greatly complemented by both
additional intensive and extensive empirical research. Not least, it would be
highly advantageous to undertake a detailed ethnographic study of a particular
‘best practice’-led policy learning exercise in its entirety. For example, one could
imagine the potential insights that may have been gained though participant
observation of Transport for London’s recently launched cycle hire scheme,
which drew heavily upon the experiences of similar schemes in Paris and
Montreal. In terms of extensive research, both high-level discourse analysis of
policy learning materials and the development of a survey tool would also be
highly beneficial, affording a far greater understanding of the scope and character
of the ‘best practice’ notion and facilitating meaningful inductive generalisation
as a result.
Second, given that much of the ‘best practice’ notion’s causal power appears
to stem from the psycholinguistic properties of the term ‘best practice’ itself, it
would be fascinating to undertake similar research in countries where English is
not the primary language of policy-making. In drawing attention to the role of
supra-national ‘best practice’ thinking in European Union spatial planning policy,
Vettoretto (2009) has already laid some conceptual foundations for such an
endeavour. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to develop this further and
attempt to discern the extent to which the ‘best practice’ notion―regardless of its 
linguistic manifestation―is traceable within informal policy learning approaches 
overseas.
Finally, it may be argued that while additional research would be
academically interesting, a more pressing agenda concerns the need to practicallyConclusions
- 166 -
address the limitations of ‘best practice’ heuristic learning identified in Chapter 5.
Specifically, the ‘relative best intervention’ (RBI) focus that ‘best practice’
heuristic learning appears to engender must be tempered with a concern for
absolute judgements, sub-optimality and attendant policy processes. Such
concerns ought to inform updated user-friendly guidance materials aimed at
policy professionals such as that produced by Rose (1991), drawing attention to
the need for balanced, creative policy learning.Appendix
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Appendix (i)
‘Case A’ Interview Schedule
Role
What is your role in MCC, where do you fit in the planning/policy process? Formulating
policy, implementing policy, evaluating policy?
Main objectives in your role?
In terms of communication in your role, which are the primary audiences are you have to
‘listen’ to, and which are the audiences that you have to ‘speak’ to?
What are the material inputs and outputs of your job? Documents, plans, reports,
physical infrastructure?
Experience of BP
Do you hear/read best practice a lot in MCC ?
When you encounter BP, is it in terms of overarching policies, or specific measures?
How does this impact on your work? Do you advocate the approach, or ‘go with it’, or
resent it?
How involved are you with selecting, disseminating or implementing examples of ‘best
practice’?
If so, what are the processes that you typically go through for selecting/disseminating/
implementing?
If someone in Lancashire CC asked your advice as to how to go about developing a
policy using a ‘best practice’ approach – what would you say to them?
How do you address the issue of transferability? Rule of thumb or formal appraisal of
how appropriate a ‘best practice’ would be for Marlsworth.
Are there common patterns within local government re: foci of BP national vs.
international/ sharing with each other?
General thoughts
How would you define ‘best practice’?
What are the limitations you see with best practice and policy learning more generally?
Are there any ulterior motives for advocating a best practice approach?References
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